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The Political Economies
of Immigration Law
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar*
A largely dysfunctional American immigration system is only poorly explained by simple
depictions of the political economy of lawmaking on this issue, blaming factors such as deliberate
economic policy choices, longstanding public attitudes, explicit presidential decisions, or general
gridlock. Instead, the structure of immigration law emerges from intersecting effects of three
separate dynamics—statutory compromises rooted in the political economy of lawmaking,
organizational practices reflecting the political economy of implementation, and public reactions
implicating the responses of policy elites and the larger public to each other. Together, these factors
help constitute an immigration status quo characterized by intense public concern, continuing legal
controversies, and powerful obstacles to change. (1) Particularly since 1986, American
immigration statutes have created a legal arrangement essentially built to fail, giving authorities
regulatory responsibilities that were all but impossible to achieve under existing law. (2)
Implementation has been characterized by organizational fragmentation, with policy changes
involving one agency producing externalities not owned by that agency, and limited presidential
power to change enforcement or implementation. And (3) the interplay of unrealistic statutory
goals, enforcement, and growing public concern engenders a polarizing implementation dynamic,
where agencies’ incapacity to enforce existing law tends to spur polarized political responses
producing legislation that further exacerbates agency difficulties in meeting public expectations.
The resulting process over the last few decades persistently favored expansion in the
provision of border enforcement resources. This development is widely supported or at least
tolerated by most political actors, even though it fails to address the core institutional problems of
the status quo. Beyond what these developments tell us about immigration, they also reveal much
about (a) how statutory entrenchment in the United States is affected by political cycles capable of
eroding the legitimacy of public agencies, and (b) how powerful nation-states control, in limited
but nonetheless significant ways, the transnational flows affecting their well-being and security.

* Professor and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School and Co-Director, Stanford
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). I am grateful for support from CISAC,
Stanford Law School, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. For their thoughtful feedback, I
am indebted to Wayne Cornelius, Gerald Neuman, Stephen Legomsky, Rebecca Bernhardt, Peter
Andreas, John Skrentny, Marc Rosenblum, Tomás Jimenez, Jake Shapiro, and participants in the UC
Irvine Law Symposium: “Persistent Puzzles in Immigration Law.” Warner Sallman, Kyle Maurer,
Andy Parker, and Gina Cardenas provided superb research assistance. Needless to say, what errors or
shortcomings remain are mine alone.
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INTRODUCTION
American immigration law rarely appears as a coherent body of legal
doctrine. Instead of creating a defensible prescriptive scheme for regulating
national membership, the day-to-day realities of immigration law are more often
defined by a long list of controversial disputes sprawling across federal
courtrooms, state legislative chambers, congressional committees, and federal
agencies. Immigration cases reaching the Courts of Appeal frequently engender
growing skepticism about specialized immigration adjudicators, and showcase
appellate judges’ increasing reluctance regarding deference to factual or legal
judgments of administrative adjudicators making wildly inconsistent decisions.1
Many of the same appellate judges have long wrestled with the perennially divisive
problem of immigration federalism,2 each dispute underscoring the depth of statelevel frustration with a system that simultaneously tolerates the presence of over

1. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671,
1679–80 (2007).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999).
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ten million undocumented immigrants while it spends billions of dollars to avoid
such migration.3 Another doctrinal corner features agencies subject to growing
pressure for strict interior immigration enforcement, even as agencies face stark
limits on federal power to punish employers harboring “constructive knowledge”
of their workers’ illegal status.4 Still other cases provoke controversy by declining
to extend labor law protections to unauthorized immigrants whose presence
affects broader labor market conditions.5
Indeed, because these immigration disputes involve matters ranging from
labor markets to judicial deference, they often appear to implicate fundamentally
distinct legal, cultural, and economic disagreements. Yet closer scrutiny reveals
instead a curious measure of convergence. In fact, most of these controversies
constitute the gnarled, partially occluded roots of a single statutory compromise
shaped by decades of legislative accretion: the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). Within the text of the INA are enshrined difficult-to-prove state-of-mind
requirements governing employer liability for hiring unauthorized workers.6 The
statute’s provisions helped generate the contested relationship between
immigration laws and labor-related statutory protections for workers.7 They define
the discretionary powers of immigration courts and produce their vast caseloads.8
Perhaps more than any other aspect of American law, the statute defines how the
country addresses the extent of unlawful migration galvanizing state and local
interest in immigration regulation.9 As federal agencies have sought to implement
the statutory scheme in recent years, moreover, rising numbers of concerned
Americans have derided the process through which the United States appears (or
fails) to govern immigration.10
3. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339
(9th Cir. 2011) (“Against a backdrop of rampant illegal immigration, escalating drug and human
trafficking crimes, and serious public safety concerns, the Arizona Legislature enacted a set of statutes
and statutory amendments in the form of Senate Bill 1070.”).
4. Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1991).
5. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002); see also Rivera v.
NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “most undocumented workers are
reluctant to report abusive . . . [labor] practices”).
6. See, e.g., United States v. New El Rey Sausage Co., 1 O.C.A.H.O. 78 (1989), aff’d, 925 F.2d
1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
7. See generally Annie Decker, Comment, Suspending Employers’ Immigration-Related Duties During
Labor Disputes: A Statutory Proposal, 115 YALE L.J. 2193 (2006) (proposing statutory changes to clarify
the importance of labor law responsibilities in relation to immigration requirements).
8. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369
(2006) (discussing statutory changes restricting the discretion of immigration judges); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010) (discussing the chronic
problems with immigration adjudication, and the changing scope of discretion for immigration
judges).
9. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 567, 571–76 (2008); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008).
10. See Randal C. Archibold & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Serious Concerns Among Americans
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But how exactly does the United States govern immigration? It is a thesis of
this Article that the answer lies not only in the content of statutory provisions, but
in the distinctive relationships between statutes, public organizations, and the
larger public. Describing these relationships, and particularly how they can drive
immigration policy outcomes, is the major purpose of this Article. In the process,
I elucidate how current immigration law persists even in the face of widespread
public scorn. I also explore what this state of affairs tells us about the broader
process of statutory entrenchment in a changing world of organized interests,
complex regulatory challenges, and transnational flows. Immigration officials may
shoulder the unique responsibility for administering laws that shape the character
of a nation and, as we shall see, face an often unforgiving institutional context. But
in a larger sense, they share with food safety inspectors, transportation security
supervisors, and countless other civil servants a role in feedback loops that
connect statutory schemes to public reactions and legal outcomes in a world of
difficult-to-control transnational flows.
A focus on institutions can tell us much about statutory implementation in a
pluralist system. But it can be particularly illuminating in the immigration context.
In immigration, a complex overlay of distinct bureaucracies and political crosscurrents exists in an uncertain relationship to elaborate statutory language.11 It is
important to scrutinize the interplay of statutes, implementing institutions, and
public reactions in this context because simpler explanations for the law’s
development come up short. As explained in Part I, the content and persistence of
the nation’s broad immigration architecture is only partially and incompletely
explained by accounts focusing on the general difficulty of achieving major
statutory changes in any domain, public attitudes, or rational economic
policymaking. Because statutes come alive (or die) through the implementation
process, we should look there for some of the answers missing from simpler
accounts. We will therefore need to understand the implementation trajectory of a
scheme that, by most accounts, took its present form around the mid-1980s when
lawmakers enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) that
promised to rationalize immigration through a combination of enforcement and
legalization of undocumented individuals.
That promise was never realized. In some cases, of course, the
implementation process can smooth out statutory contradictions, as when
administrative agencies and even courts have sometimes brought coherence in
statutory domains involving civil rights 12 or public health.13 Not so with

About Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A15.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES
(2010) (discussing the harmonization and development of statutory schemes in a variety of contexts,
including civil rights).
13. See generally LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (2008).
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immigration. Here, statutory contradictions involving a domain fertile for social,
cultural, and economic concerns have grown ever more toxic because of
organizational problems, and agencies lack the flexibility to better align regulatory
activity and public expectations. In this environment, formidable cross-winds
arising from statutory limitations, implementation problems, and public reactions
have engendered a cycle of increasingly polarized public attitudes and legislative
responses. Properly understood, this dynamic goes a long way toward revealing
the terrain in which legal disputes about immigration arise.
In Part II, I lay the groundwork for understanding that terrain. In addition to
reviewing some often-neglected economic and political factors affecting complex
regulatory schemes, I explain how those forces interact. Scholars and observers
with some interest in the institutional dynamics affecting American immigration
have occasionally devoted valuable attention to understanding discrete features of
immigration law, such as the history of the President’s role,14 the implications of
state and local action in this area,15 and the swelling importance of border or
criminal enforcement.16 Though each of these areas alone merits scrutiny, one
recurring challenge in unpacking the system is the entanglements among these and
other institutional realities of immigration, including the reactions of organized
interests and the public as agencies struggle to implement an intricate statutory
scheme amidst growing national concerns about the issue.
Immigration regulation thus presents policymakers with unusually severe
dilemmas. Even as policymakers pursue relatively distinct agendas at opposite
ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, they share a surfeit of technical challenges, growing
public scrutiny, and competing pressures from factions seeking to protect,
exclude, or exploit immigrants. Accordingly, in Part III, I train attention on how
those realities fuel the existence of three interlocking political economies that
shape modern immigration law: statutory compromises rooted in the political
economy of lawmaking, organizational practices reflecting the political economy
of implementation, and public reactions implicating the responses of policy elites
and the larger public to each other.17 All three are necessary to assess the law as
implemented and perceived by the public. The first political economy implicates
the major statutory features of immigration law, particularly the modern, post-

14. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J.
458 (2009).
15. See generally Rodríguez, supra note 9 (discussing the implications of and interactions between
state and local government actions in immigration law).
16. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement:
Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of Law, 47 VILL. L. REV. 897 (2002).
17. The reference to “political economy” describes the process through which individuals and
organizations manage scarce resources and political capital and make trade-offs in an environment
that is difficult to control. Cf. Alberto Alesina, Program Report: Political Economy, 3 NBER REP. 1, 1–3
(2007), http://www.nber.org/reporter/2007number3.
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IRCA Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Here, interested parties feature
prominently, often having done their work against the backdrop of relatively
limited public attention.18 The second dynamic implicates public organizations and
their incentives, which share control over immigration and respond to a
presidency with surprisingly limited capacity to drastically change the immigration
status quo through executive action. Finally, the third political economy implicates
the process through which policymakers and stakeholders decide on their strategy
to capture, shape, and respond to public attention about immigration.
Together, these multiple political economies reveal the relationship between
a complicated statutory law and its larger institutional context. They define the
subtleties of a “policy feedback” process that partly reflects the insights of the
established literature on the subject and partly showcases some underappreciated
dynamics allowing much-maligned legal regimes to persist in the face of eroding
public legitimacy for the agencies and the statutes they implement. By taking these
factors into account, a more useful picture emerges of the immigration law status
quo—as well as some of the powerful constraints that keep it in place. We can
thus better understand how resource constraints on interior enforcement counterintuitively coexist with and even encourage some forms of aggressive
enforcement,19 and why statutory changes justified in the name of empowering
agencies and restoring public confidence are more likely to have precisely the
opposite effect.20
The resulting picture is not merely one of statutory dysfunction. It portrays
instead a cluster of responses driven by entanglements between statutory
provisions, organizational fragmentation, and political backlash. Those
entanglements exist because of the overlapping political economies of immigration
law, where statutes affect agency actions, and these actions in turn impact politics
as well as the durability of an important piece of the nation’s legal architecture.
Because the modern immigration system avoided difficult trade-offs (such as the
consequences of actually enforcing statutory requirements in the domestic labor
market) and originated in a policymaking process that needed to satisfy multiple
stakeholders (perpetrating a system that kept domestic enforcement limited and
blocked or deferred changes in lawful immigration), it lacked the essential legal
attributes that would have made it more feasible for administrators to align the
system’s outputs with its putative goals.21 That is, IRCA’s regulation of the labor
market is rarely enforced and harbors virtually no flexibility to address changing
18. See infra Part III.A. The “modern” immigration system means the statutes, rules, and
enforcement practices that have emerged in light of the passage of two landmark pieces of legislation
that (respectively) created the foundations of the modern immigration enforcement system and visa
allocation scheme governing American immigration law: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.
19. See infra Part III.D.
20. See id.
21. See infra Part III.A.
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U.S. economic rationales for migration. Meanwhile, the mix of labor market
incentives and limited legal immigration opportunities all but ensures a vast, longterm undocumented population in the United States which has been increasingly
discouraged from leaving because of a build-up in border security that has proven
an easier sell than the alternative policy solutions.22 Agencies thus struggled with
modern immigration law from the outset as they implemented statutory changes
in 1965 and 1986, and the agencies’ missions grew more difficult amidst rising
political frustration and organizational fragmentation.
Political reactions from lawmakers and the public have compounded these
structural weaknesses. Those reactions subject the system to increasing derision
while simultaneously fomenting a slew of barriers to change arising from growing
public concern about immigration, public skepticism that authorities will enforce
legal requirements, and risk-aversion to more dramatic changes from some
stakeholders who have adapted to the status quo. The result has been substantial
difficulties in both implementation and achieving change to the status quo—
difficulties greater than those encountered in a variety of regulatory domains less
prone to trigger deep cultural conflict, such as disease surveillance or tax
enforcement.23 Those difficulties have persisted even in the face of support for
reform from Presidents, many economic stakeholders, and the public. Instead, the
institutional realities of modern immigration law have served up a constant
ratcheting up of border security resources and changes in agency authority
incapable of resolving broader immigration problems. In short, the system was
built to fail, and because it does, immigration law engenders growing public
skepticism and political incentives for piecemeal changes that exacerbate some of
the daunting problems in immigration policy. In contrast, earlier reforms benefited
from lower public salience, a more supportive interest group context, and a
policymaking process not burdened by the legacy of a major immigration scheme
essentially built to fail.
Plainly, such institutional failure does not explain everything about the
complicated history of immigration in the United States. The patterns of migration
that produced the modern United States owe much to the politics of language and
race, the long-term structure of labor markets, and the interplay of geography and
economic history. Instead the point is to highlight how these and other forces
capable of driving immigration law in recent decades operate through a pattern of
institutional relationships, organizational problems, and public reactions that
shape the meaning and entrenchment of statutes and regulatory rules. The
resulting institutional challenges and political responses inevitably constrict the
range of options, and change the costs and benefits of alternatives. Consider: if
22. See, e.g., Kevin Thom, Repeated Circular Migration: Theory and Evidence from Undocumented
Migrants (June 25, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://files.nyu.edu/kt44/public/
RepeatedCircularMigration_Jun09.pdf.
23. See infra Part III.A.

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

8

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

[Vol. 2:1

the landmark 1990 Immigration Act that raised worldwide ceilings for immigration
illustrates how American immigration policy is far from a one-way ratchet fueled
by restrictionist sentiment, it is also quite plain that such a statute—devoid as it
was of large-scale enforcement measures even as it embodied changes sought by
immigrant, civil rights, and business advocates—would stand little chance of
passage today.
Beyond what these developments tell us about immigration law, they also
reveal much about the interplay of policymaking and statutory entrenchment in
American law. As Part IV explains, the federal immigration system illustrates how
political feedback relationships can erode the legitimacy of public agencies. The
recent history of American immigration law also sheds light on the prospects for
powerful nation-states to control, in limited but nonetheless significant ways, the
transnational flows affecting their well-being and security. Thus, while no
thoughtful observer can deny that advanced industrialized countries like the
United States have a measure of capacity to shape these flows, what power exists
to control them is badly depleted under the current system. In an irony that
reverberates through far-flung doctrinal corners, that capacity has itself been
shaped by institutional realities producing far too much attention to controlling
borders—and too little to controlling immigration.
I. THE STRUCTURE AND PERSISTENCE OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW
Ranchers in the Sonoran Desert of Arizona’s Cochise County, technology
executives in forested suburbs of Seattle, meatpacking managers overseeing
facilities in the Nebraska prairie, New England university presidents, and
California farmworkers all have something in common. All are affected in large
and small ways by the American immigration system, and all have a means of
affecting the lawmaking process that produced that scheme. These Americans live
in a nation of vast cities, complex labor markets, and social change. In each of
these domains and many others, the story of immigration—and the responses to
it—is the story of the nation. This makes for a complicated history, where
significant episodes of restrictive, exclusionary policymaking have alternated with
self-conscious efforts to establish a framework for large-scale lawful migration.24
Recent efforts to establish such a framework have failed. In this Part, I set
the stage for understanding the realities of modern immigration law by explaining
its significance and the contradictions arising during a roughly quarter-century
long process to build such a framework for lawful immigration. The focus then
turns to the persistence of the nation’s core immigration compromises, even in the
face of concerted efforts by two Presidents over the last five years to make major
changes amid widespread public scorn. As with other characteristics of the
existing INA compromise, this persistence is not fully explained by the public’s
24.

See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN 432–33 (2006).
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broad acceptance of immigration law’s goals or structure or by the widespread
prevalence of political gridlock, nor does it arise from a reasoned strategy (either
among the bulk of employers or among policymakers) to manage the labor
market.
A. Statutory Foundations of the Immigration System
In 1965, the Johnson administration scored a sweeping legislative victory.
The Texan in the Oval Office had already achieved far-reaching changes in civil
rights statutes. Now, Johnson and his congressional allies had delivered on the late
President Kennedy’s goal of starkly reforming American immigration law. With
the enactment of the 1965 Immigration Act, the federal government began
administering a new system providing a higher number of visas, removing national
origin quotas, and establishing family unity (as well as continuing availability of
some employment-based visas) as a core principle of immigration law. With its
pragmatic accommodation for heightened legal immigration and its realization of
the ideal of removing the national origin quotas that had so defined immigration
law in the preceding half-century, the 1965 law was a landmark achievement.25 At
the same time, the law embodied some tensions that arise from pressures for
compromise in a pluralistic society and which are perhaps heightened in the
contested field of immigration. We will shortly discuss how agencies’
implementation of these complex statutes plays a critical role in managing those
contradictions and, ironically, in facilitating their persistence, but to understand
that process our first task is to review some core statutory features of immigration
law.
The package of intricate statutory changes drastically reformed the INA.
Gone were the national origin quotas that had long garnered heavy criticism as
blatantly racist, particularly at a time when domestic policy concerns were
increasingly focused on matters of civil rights. The longstanding four-category
preference system was replaced with a more targeted set of seven preference
categories, emphasizing the goals of family unity and (subject to a smaller number
of total visas) meeting employer demand for individuals with particular skills.
While these changes, and particularly the elimination of national-origin quotas,
reflected more tolerant attitudes toward Catholics, Asians, and Jews amidst
national concerns about inclusion and equality under the law, the new statute
nonetheless imposed hemisphere-specific limits on immigration. In particular, it
created a worldwide quota of 120,000 immigrants for the Western Hemisphere,
and 170,000 immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere (along with a per-country
limit of 20,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere). While lawmakers eventually

25. See Edward M. Kennedy, The Immigration Act of 1965, 367 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 137 (1966) (providing a contemporaneous account of why the 1965 Act wrought such dramatic
changes in the American immigration scheme).
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abolished distinctions between the Western and Eastern hemispheres, important
constraints remained with respect to overall limits on most immigrant visa
categories, and applying to specific countries.26
When Congress enacted the 1990 Immigration Act, it essentially finalized the
macrolevel architecture of modern American immigration law. The new legislation
raised the annual limit for worldwide immigration to 675,000 (after a three-year
period of higher totals to clear backlogs). Of these, about sixty-eight percent of
visas were allocated to family-sponsored immigrants,27 and about twenty percent
for employer-petitioned immigrants. A small new diversity visa lottery system
allocated 55,000 visas under the new law. In addition, the legislation (and a
subsequent 1991 enactment making technical modifications) also created five new
employment-based immigration categories to take the place of the two previously
existing categories, and slightly altered the country-specific quotas that continue to
create long backlogs in countries with higher demand for emigration to the United
States.28
If the reform of legal migration opportunities drove the 1965 reforms,
concern over undocumented migration drove the other major statute shaping the
modern system.29 Unquestionably a compromise to integrate somewhat
competing visions for the future of immigration policy, the 1986 Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) included two large legalization programs (one
based on the amount of time individuals had unlawfully been present in the
United States, and another a special program for agricultural workers).30 At the
26. For a helpful discussion of the changes in the INA, see ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 317.
27. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, such as parents and minor children, are still exempt
from numerical limits on immigrant visas. Nonetheless, their numbers are deducted from the full
allocation of visas for family-based immigrants (subject to a minimum guarantee of admission of at
least 226,000 other relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents).
28. The per-country ceiling is set at 25,000, not counting immediate family relatives. Beginning
after the 1990 Immigration Act, seventy-five percent of second-preference immigrants (for example,
immediate relatives of lawful permanent residents) are generally excepted from the country-specific
cap. Moreover, if the limit on employment-based immigration exceeds the demand in that category in
any calendar quarter, any remaining openings may be filled from among visas in other categories
(even if the total otherwise exceeds the per-country cap). See generally DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA
DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 28–35 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing the
Immigration Act of 1990 and how it reformed the rules regarding legal entry to the United States,
including the numerical limitation system). Although these measures introduced a small degree of
flexibility into the scheme, the overall structure of the INA, as amended, remains relatively hardwired
and bereft of the flexibility often delegated to administrative agencies in the modern system.
29. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
Ironically, what was considered a relatively large undocumented population in 1986 paled in
comparison to the number of illicit migrants in the United States even five or six years later. See JEB
BUSH & THOMAS F. MCCLARTY III, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY: INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 63, at 88 (2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/
immigration/us-immigration-policy/p20030 (discussing the context during which IRCA was passed).
30. Applicants in the general program were required to meet most of the requirements of
immigrant admissibility to the United States, to not have been convicted of any felony or of three or
more misdemeanors in the United States, to not have assisted any form of persecution, and to register
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same time, IRCA made a host of other changes to immigration law reflecting an
emerging political move toward regulating and reducing the relatively routine
employment of undocumented migrants through a comprehensive scheme. The
statute’s premise of addressing immigration-related issues through a
comprehensive strategy was borne out in provisions increasing border
enforcement—though in retrospect, these increases were quite limited in
comparison to what lawmakers would provide over the ensuing quarter century.31
Most notably, it imposed landmark new affirmative responsibilities on the entire
labor market by requiring employers to assess the immigration status of potential
hires as part of a system to reduce the presence of unauthorized workers in the
United States.
Through the anodyne language of statutory provisions forging that system,
IRCA readily conveyed one of its core goals. Perhaps it even conveyed the
clandestine ambition of virtually all immigration regulation: shaping labor markets.
Specifically, the employer sanctions provisions of IRCA punished a “person or
other entity” that hires, recruits, or refers for a fee for employment in the United
States a noncitizen, either (1) knowing that person is unauthorized, or (2) without
complying with the Act’s employment verification system.32 The new
requirements extended to all employers, including those subcontracting their
work, and nearly all workers (including temporary workers). Moreover, the law
required employers to retain I-9 forms indicating the specific documents
examined.33 IRCA also permitted an employer to establish as an affirmative

for selective service if required to do so. If noncitizens met these requirements and filed an initial
application before May 4, 1988, they received temporary residence. Recipients of temporary residence
then had a limited period of time during which they could adjust their status to lawful permanent
residence, subject to conventional conditions involving minimal civics education and Englishlanguage requirements.
31. Because provisions included in IRCA also inaugurated the modern era of increasing
concern about border security, and about (interior) enforcement, it may appear to some observers as
quite similar to recent immigration laws. Nonetheless, it also created by far the largest legalization
program in the history of the United States. IRCA’s legalization program was responsible for putting
millions of people (ultimately 2.7 million) on a path to permanent residence. See DONALD M.
KERWIN, MIGRATION POLICY INST., MORE THAN IRCA: U.S. LEGALIZATION PROGRAMS AND
THE CURRENT POLICY DEBATE 7–8 (2010), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
pubs/legalization-historical.pdf. To understand IRCA, its historic employer sanctions provision and
more modest border enforcement elements need to be put in the context of the legalization program.
32. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 274A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006). Note
that, in principle, this formulation established that knowledge of an individual’s undocumented status
made an individual liable to sanctions even if the administrative requirements of the law (such as
inspection of documents and maintenance of I-9 forms) were otherwise followed. Not surprisingly,
the question of what constitutes knowledge soon triggered considerable legal disputes. See, e.g., Collins
Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1991).
33. See Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar
Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1049 (1990). Although penalties have changed, the fundamental
problem of low detection probability and the lack of sanctions for outcomes involving employer
states of mind, other than “knowledge,” plainly limit the scope and impact of enforcement.
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defense to an allegation of unlawful employment that it had complied in good
faith with the requirements of the new employer verification arrangement
requiring inspection of an individual’s documentation.34 These provisions raised
concerns among some lawmakers that IRCA would trigger widespread national
origin discrimination among employers inclined to use such characteristics as a
proxy for the appropriate immigration-focused screening—concerns that were
vindicated through the creation of a new Justice Department office to enforce
laws against unlawful national origin and immigration-related discrimination
practices. As part of its promise to stem the flow of undocumented workers,
IRCA also inaugurated a period of increasing border enforcement resources.
None of these measures proved capable of stemming undocumented immigration
in the succeeding decades. As explored below, IRCA’s own internal contradictions
soon exerted an undeniable impact on the entire immigration system, including
passage of subsequent enforcement-oriented legislation, the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which greatly
expanded the proportion of immigrants subject to removal.35
It is this statutory framework that has produced one of the largest continuing
flows of legal immigration in recent history. At a time when even other countries
that shared long traditions of high immigration have curtailed new legal migration,
the American statutory scheme has remained favorable to high per capita levels of
legal immigration.36 In the process, U.S. laws have helped unify hundreds of
thousands of families, incorporated millions of new workers to take part in the
American system, and continued to provide a relatively unimpeded path for lawful
permanent residents to become citizens. At the very same time, the system has
generated a host of results often described as troubling.37 Visa preference
categories, interacting with country visa caps, have produced staggering visa
backlogs and restricted the availability of immigrant visas for talented individuals
capable of making unusual contributions to the American economy. The system
harbors little flexibility to adjust as social or economic circumstances change.
Crucially, two other things have been achieved by the current system: the statutes
imposed ambitious labor market rules that are (for reasons discussed below)
34. INA § 274A(a)(3).
35. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1986).
36. Australia is one contrast. See, e.g., Gary P. Freeman & Bob Birrell, Divergent Paths of
Immigration Politics in the United States and Australia, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 525, 525–26 (2001)
(“Only in Australia did [populist concern over immigration] lead to tighter control over legal and
illegal entries, declining annual numbers, and significant retrenchment with regard to policies
supporting multiculturalism.”).
37. For one review of such criticisms, see BUSH & MCCLARTY, supra note 29, at 50–51
(conceding that the current statutory framework for visa allocation provides legal resident status for
family reunification, but noting that the process is slow and ineffective, leading to delays of up to a
decade or more), and id. at 87 (criticizing the current use of national quotas because it limits the
amount of skilled immigrants U.S. companies seek).
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difficult to enforce, and fed now-familiar public expectations of controlling
immigration through domestic regulation and border enforcement.
Perhaps even more so than with statutory schemes addressing a single sector
or harboring narrower ambitions than structuring the very sovereignty of a nation,
the significance of these immigration statutes depends on how they are
administered. Indeed, the crucial if limited role that implementation and
enforcement discretion play in the recent story of immigration law persists despite
the unusually hardwired nature of statutory choices involving the allocation of
immigrant visas.38 Although the INA framework is primarily a vehicle for
Congress to control most important details of routine immigration policy, it
nonetheless leaves to agencies in the executive branch certain key decisions.
Between the INA, IRCA, and IIRIRA, a vastly larger number of people are
subject to removal than law enforcement is in a position to remove. Agencies have
a role (constrained in limited ways by the President) in targeting resources at
particular enforcement goals. They can influence the interpretation of ambiguous
terms involving asylum and refugee status, as well as administrative practices
determining the availability of work authorization to certain immigrants.39
Routines and administrative practices therefore play a critical role in shaping how
immigration law is experienced and what consequences it creates.
Some observers and stakeholders scrutinizing those practices undoubtedly
approve of specific features in the existing immigration system. Indeed, some
political players would prefer those features to some of the characteristics of a
reformed immigration system. What is striking is nonetheless how the resulting
statutory scheme bequeathed to the agencies a set of daunting practical challenges
that have grown more pronounced over time. In fashioning the modern INA,
Congress and the President did little to provide for flexibility in addressing
changing economic and social conditions. They have left in place a system that has
only to the most limited degree managed to quench the thirst of the American
labor market for unauthorized workers, despite a staggering increase in an
undocumented population, including both millions of individuals who have

38. For just one example highlighting instances of executive branch discretion in certain
aspects of the implementation of immigration law, see Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence to the
Executive Branch’s Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in Immigration Matters: The Case of the
Haitian Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1993). Despite recent concerns from appellate courts
regarding the provision of deference to immigration judges, immigration-related agency judgments
have traditionally been afforded Chevron deference. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987). Formally, of course, much of immigration adjudication turns on the exercise of the Attorney
General’s adjudicatory discretion. Yet the overall architecture of immigration—and particularly the
number and allocation of visas—provides only meager opportunities for agencies to play a
meaningful role in policymaking. See infra Part IV.
39. See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Signs of Change in Immigration Enforcement Policies
Emerging from DHS, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.
migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=722 (chronicling apparent changes in
enforcement under the then still-new presidential administration).
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entered without inspection (the vast majority by crossing the southern border) as
well as millions more who initially entered with valid nonimmigrant status that
later expired.40
Indeed, it is hard to disentangle that increase in the undocumented
population from the structure of the law in place after IRCA. At a time when the
American public was beginning to view undocumented migration as a more
serious concern, the statutory framework put the country on a path toward
pronounced failure in addressing that concern. First, the law created a system for
verifying employment eligibility that was full of gaps and, because of how obvious
the enforcement difficulties were, virtually inviting employers not to comply.41
Second, constructive knowledge of undocumented status was difficult to prove,
drastically limiting the scope of severe penalties for noncompliance. Third, the law
continued to provide a relatively inflexible scheme for managing changes in the
demand for migration. Even acknowledging the interdependence between legal
migration opportunities and future demand, it is difficult to imagine an all but
entirely rigid system serving as an element of an effective strategy to reduce illicit
migration.42 Finally, it contained the initial installment of increases in border
enforcement, thereby taking the first step in the border enforcement ramp up that
eventually went a long way toward disrupting circular migration and encouraging
an increasing number of illicit migrants to stay exclusively in the United States
longer-term.
These features help connect the statutory framework, its subsequent
implementation, and the major legal disputes defining modern immigration law.
Following the enactment of IRCA, cases like Collins Foods International, Inc. v. INS
further confirmed that the statute sets a difficult bar for authorities to show
employer knowledge of their workers’ illegal status.43 Consider, further, the
increasingly prominent issue of local and state intervention in immigration policy.
For decades, such disputes have turned largely on the preemptive effect of
provisions contained in the INA that limit the scope of state and local lawmaking
and reflect a recognition of the difficulties implicit in unconstrained nonfederal
lawmaking in this area. At the same time, the laws generating disputes about state
and local intervention in immigration policy arise largely from regional perceptions

40. See Ted Robbins, Nearly Half of Illegal Immigrants Overstay Visas, NPR NEWS (June 14, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5485917.
41. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th
Cong. (2011) (testimony of Austin T. Fragomen), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/Fragomen_Embargoed_Testimony.pdf.
42. In the short term, legal migration opportunities almost certainly serve as a partial substitute
for unlawful migration activity. See infra Part III.A. The value of illicit migration should be expected to
depend at least in part on the gap between legal migration opportunities and demand; if demand
fluctuates by increasing and legal migration opportunities remain rigid, the value of illicit migration
(ceteris paribus) will tend to increase.
43. Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1991).
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that the federal government has defaulted on its end of the bargain. The district
court’s opinion in the litigation over Arizona’s S.B. 1070 legislation, for example,
explicitly acknowledged that frustration.44 Meanwhile, even though the Supreme
Court ultimately declined to extend the full coterie of labor regulatory protections
to undocumented workers in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB., both the
dissent and the lower court opinions in the case recognize—as explicitly as Judge
Bolton acknowledged the public’s frustration in the Arizona case—that labor
markets are affected by the presence of millions of undocumented workers.45
The unwieldy statutory compromise that has played a major role in
generating that undocumented population has thus given rise to a doctrinal picture
replete with contradictions. In that picture, society commits not to hire
undocumented workers but makes it difficult to enforce that commitment. Even
as unauthorized migrants generate increasingly intense political debate and
enforcement initiatives, those workers nonetheless merit legal protections and the
overall structure of the IRCA enforcement regime remains unchanged. Moreover,
the presence of undocumented workers at a time of significant social and
economic change generates continued regional demand for state and local laws
even as the federal government seeks to discharge its preeminent responsibility in
this area. Whatever else one expects from judicial efforts to clarify and police
these doctrinal domains, the underlying disputes will persist as long as the present
statutory regime (or something like it) persists.
The legacy of today’s INA has been growing controversy and concern.
Certain features of the status quo play a significant role in our national
architecture. These include continued high legal immigration, and a relatively open
path from lawful permanent residence to citizenship. Yet many of its
consequences are also costly, even if the subtleties are poorly understood. An
example: today’s immigration law is characterized by vast and growing sums spent
on compliance even as noncompliance is commonplace.46 Although it is difficult
to measure the precise social welfare effects of immigration law, it would be a
heavy lift to argue that the status quo is socially optimal from an economic
perspective. There is at least a plausible case lending credence to the arguments of
economic stakeholders who maintain that, in the short-term, the country’s
capacity to excel in scientific and technical innovation, higher education, and

44. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011)
45. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB., 535 U.S. 137, 155 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that “denial [to the NLRB of the power to award back pay to unauthorized
immigrants in the event of labor law violations] lowers the cost to employer of an initial labor law
violation (provided, of course, that the only victims are illegal aliens). It thereby increases the
employer’s incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien employees.”).
46. See generally Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of
U.S. Immigration Control Policy, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 661 (2001) (discussing unintended
consequences of the enforcement buildup in border policing occurring since the early 1990s, and
questioning the impact of border enforcement on illicit entries into the United States).
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certain forms of business activity depends on continued capacity to attract
economic immigrants with advanced skills and creative prospects—and that
existing policies create costly barriers to this process.47 At the other end of the
economic spectrum, the large undocumented population experiences a gap in
wages relative to what they would earn if they were legal workers. The size of that
population, too, has the potential to adversely impact wages and working
conditions for legal workers.48
Just as bleak is the security-related legacy of the status quo. The status quo
brings with it a large cost of significant outlays of funding focused on routine
immigration enforcement, which could focus on more effectively targeting
terrorist mobility and related problems.49 A related concern voiced even by police
is the potential for growing distrust of law enforcement in immigrant
communities, making it more difficult for police to build relationships helpful for
gathering routine intelligence about individuals and organizations capable of
posing more serious threats.50 The complex impact of additional border
enforcement, while providing a heightened sense of safety in some communities,
also raises questions about the longer-term security implications of the status quo.
Like other forms of regulation, efforts to engage in shadow governance are replete
with trade-offs. As one potential source of further example, take the movement of
people across the U.S.-Mexico border. Historically this has been a relatively
disorganized activity, and the prices charged by smugglers have been low. But
aggressive border enforcement could theoretically drive up prices, induce larger
shares of aliens to cross at ports of entry (where greater organization is required),
and entice cartels to become involved in controlling an increasingly lucrative trade.
In fact, the evidence from the price of illicit migration from Mexico to the
United States is quite striking. The number of migrants pursuing high-risk routes
through the desert has skyrocketed, and as a consequence, so has the number of
illicit migrants who die while seeking to cross the U.S.-Mexico border. The

47. See BUSH & MCCLARTY, supra note 29, at 47 (discussing the context during which IRCA
was passed); see also SPENCER ABRAHAM ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION AND
AMERICA’S FUTURE: A NEW CHAPTER 40 (2006), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
ITFIAF/ [hereinafter MPI TASK FORCE].
48. See, e.g., William Shaw, U.S. Immigration Policy Must Change, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT’L PEACE (June 17, 2010), http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=
41001 (stating that “[u]ndocumented workers are limited in their ability to organize to protect their
rights, which may erode working conditions for American workers in general through competition
(though some employers benefit from this)”).
49. See infra Part III for a discussion of the rising costs of immigration enforcement. If we
leave aside border enforcement policy, moreover, even the large increases in immigration funding
nonetheless probably prove poorly matched for the tasks that agencies are supposed to carry out.
50. See generally SUSAN GINSBURG, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., SECURING HUMAN MOBILITY
IN THE AGE OF RISK (2010) (discussing the resource-intensive challenges in monitoring and
disrupting terrorist mobility, and opportunity costs of immigration enforcement strategies that fail to
prioritize high value targets).
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alternative for migrants is to seek assistance from alien smugglers, whose response
to an increasingly fortified U.S.-Mexico border has been to increase prices starkly.
Studies of illegal border crossing behavior indicate an increasing concentration of
aliens crossing through border checkpoints (requiring more sophisticated
planning, forged documents, and other techniques), the proportion of aliens using
coyotes rising, and border crossing fees rising. These changes are likely to further
the pattern of more organized trafficking networks becoming involved in alien
smuggling.51 News reports on these issues are not always accurate, but it is telling
that they show a major spike in reporting on drug trafficking organizations’
interest and involvement in alien smuggling.52
At some level this is no surprise. As the border buildup proceeded it altered
the risk of nonassisted border crossings, driving many crossers towards dangerous
and sometimes fatal crossings in the desert. But others paid more to smugglers—
making the average price for being smuggled across the border quintuple in
inflation-adjusted dollars between 1990 and 2009. Crucially, the price change is
likely to attract, as well as encourage, organized illicit activity, as the returns of
controlling the smuggling market rise dramatically and the methods of successful
illicit crossing increasingly involve use of ports of entry. These developments
illustrate how domestic laws can affect the organization of transnational criminal
activity. The impact of domestic immigration and border security policy on other
states, including fragile jurisdictions, underscore the importance of disentangling
distinct security goals affected by immigration and border policy. While the
multidecade buildup of border enforcement unquestionably raised the cost of
illicit activity, such a development could simultaneously contribute to the rising
concentration of the remaining illegal cross-border migration in large criminal
organizations with greater capacity to threaten state authority structures.
Some of these limitations are not entirely lost on policymakers or the public.
Many recent surveys document widespread public scorn regarding the status quo
associated with immigration law. Stakeholders and organized interests representing
law enforcement, business, civil rights, and religious concerns (among others) have
decried the present system. Since 2006, hundreds of lawmakers and two
Presidents (a Republican and a Democrat) have heavily criticized the present
51. See Wayne Cornelius, Presentation at the Center for Comparative Studies in Race and
Ethnicity, Stanford University: Does Border Enforcement Matter? What Mexican Migrants Can
Teach Us (Sept. 30, 2010) (discussing rising prices for alien smuggling in the last ten to fifteen years,
and the increasing concentration of border crossing activity occurring at ports of entry in California
and Texas, but not Arizona).
52. As just one example of the analyses emphasizing the connection between alien smuggling
and drug trafficking organizations, see Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better Address Alien Smuggling Along
the Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative Resources and Measuring Program Performance, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement of Richard M. Stana). Separately, I am working on a project that chronicles changes
in alien smuggling and its relationship to organized criminal entities along the U.S.-Mexico border in
recent years.
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immigration law regime and made efforts to change it. These moves have failed to
dislodge or fundamentally modify the preceding arrangement, raising questions
about the staying power of broadly disfavored legal regimes and the consequences
of their entrenchment.
B. Statutory Entrenchment and Its Persistence
When a statutory scheme is entrenched, the challenges entailed in changing
the law stretch beyond the mere requirements of lawmaking and instead implicate
the broader logic of the entire political system.53 In the American pluralist political
system, organized interests and their closely allied public supporters routinely end
up at the center of the policymaking process. In one version of the now-classic
account of American pluralism influenced by political scientist Robert Dahl,
organized interests offset broader public concerns in lawmaking and regulatory
implementation,54 resulting in many arrangements with concentrated benefits to
specific groups even if the aggregate benefits are far outweighed by diffuse costs
borne more broadly. A generally functionalist account of immigration law could
pivot on the idea that perhaps the most relevant concentrated interests—
employers—are perfectly happy to keep in place a system that lets them squeeze
value from undocumented labor or workers with temporary H-1b visas, while
maintaining (given the problems with employer sanctions) a relatively low risk of
sanctions by federal authorities.
There is no question that some players in the system benefit more than
others from existing immigration law. But the very behavior of some of the
industries that allegedly benefit most from current law—including, for example
agribusiness and the service sector—tells a more complex story. Indeed, neither
the simple functional labor market account nor conventional variations of it
adequately explain the persistence of the present statutory scheme, a persistence
that defied three recent efforts by a Republican President and a Democratic
President, and majority votes in both houses of Congress over the course of four
years. Nor can this pattern be explained convincingly by political economy
accounts focused purely on public opinion or general gridlock. Each of these
factors may be important to some degree, by illustrating a means through which
social or political developments can make an imprint in the nation’s approach to
migration. None, however, explains the persistence of recent compromises built
into American immigration law. To understand the logic of how America regulates
migration, we must account for why the existing scheme persists.
Rational Labor-Market Management. Consider first the fit between
existing immigration law and domestic economic concerns. Certain stakeholders

53. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 12, at 127–32 (discussing the definition of
entrenchment).
54. See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY (1971).
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benefit from the status quo because they gain from a labor market with a large
number of undocumented workers.55 To be more precise, some businesses and
individuals reap rewards from the nation’s existing immigration scheme relative to
a system with some mix of characteristics associated with potential alternative
paths for immigration law: (1) far more limited undocumented immigration; (2)
aggressive and reliable employer verification; and/or (3) less employer control of
the heavily rationed opportunities for employment-based legal migration (such as
opportunities available through H-1b visas). Moreover, because some econometric
studies suggest that most Americans have benefited from immigration,56 it may
also be tempting for some observers to conclude that Americans gain something
from the status quo because it provides cheaper labor and lower prices that
redound to the advantage of both employers and businesses.
But the benefits from the status quo are not uniformly distributed, and have
helped create strong dissatisfaction with immigration policy among economic
actors ranging from technology companies to unions. Even agribusiness, a sector
that arguably derives some benefit from the cheaper labor costs that
undocumented immigration makes possible, has strongly pressed for reform
(through, for example, enactment of the so-called AgJobs legislation addressing
the unlawful status of certain agricultural workers). The key issue here is not
whether some Americans benefit from lower labor costs relative to a
(counterfactual) world with little or no undocumented immigration; it is whether
the status quo carries economic costs relative to a regime where the
undocumented population is regularized (and some reform of future flows of
immigrants occurs).
This question, in turn, implicates the recurring logic of pluralist division and
is vigorously present in the sense that parties interested in the economics of the
labor market have a variety of reactions—and increasingly, those reactions
disfavor the immigration status quo. Many leading labor groups and business
interests increasingly express dissatisfaction or outright hostility regarding the
existing immigration system. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) rarely agree, but they both staunchly
criticize the status quo and insist their stakeholder constituents bear high costs as a

55. Cf. Sabrina Isé & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Legal Status and Earnings of Agricultural Workers, 77 AM.
J. AGRIC. ECON. 375, 386 (1995) (noting that “[a]gricultural workers who work in the United States
legally earn substantially more per hour and per week than those who are unauthorized to work
here”). Note also that the research indicating wage increases after legalization suggests fairly clear
linkages between legal status and wages, even if we consider that many of the workers affected by
legalization increased their wages by changing their occupations. Such changes can still impact the
labor market most directly relevant to their previous employers by forcing them to bid up wages.
56. See BUSH & MCCLARTY, supra note 29, at 3–5; GIOVANNI PERI, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS IN RECESSION AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION (2010), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Peri-June2010.pdf.
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consequence.57 Businesses seeking greater levels of employment-based migration,
often though not exclusively clustered in the technology sector, argue that the
nation’s immigration status quo is a major cost. Employers depending on
semiskilled labor formed the Coalition for Essential Workers to advocate for a
regime that entails lower risks (by reducing the amount of unlawful activity) while
still providing access to foreign workers through legal channels. From a broader
perspective, some participants in the economy undoubtedly view the existing
system as imposing some high costs and it is difficult to argue that it represents
the optimal approach to increasing domestic social welfare.
It is easy to see, on reflection, how many participants in the economy relying
on semi-skilled labor could simultaneously face manageable-to-low risks of
sanctions while still desiring a more regularized, less risky scheme to obtain
workers at what they consider an acceptable wage. None of these arguments,
however, settle the more complex empirical question of how much Americans
gain and lose economically from the existing immigration system. Scholars
continue to debate this issue, even though it is becoming increasingly clear that
most native-born workers benefit from our immigration status quo while a smaller
number of such workers (particularly those lacking a high school education) do
not benefit. Instead, the preceding discussion of the economic context for
American immigration laws shows the limitations of the idea that the current
system, by and large, implements a rational scheme to manage the labor market.
At a minimum, that assertion raises the question of whose perspective (e.g., large
or small employers, particular unions, Americans hiring domestic labor, or families
of the undocumented) counts when defining the nature of rational labor market
management.
Democratic Choice and Immigration. The structure and staying power of
the current scheme are not sufficiently explained by the idea that Americans have,
at core, chosen their system.58 This idea turns out to be persuasive only if we
accept the circular notion that the status quo is chosen because it is the product of
the American system of representative democracy, executive power, and
administrative governance. Instead, public reactions paint a complicated picture.
Strong evidence suggests that substantial majorities of the public dislike the
current scheme—although they often differ on the details. Many surveys depict an
increasingly hostile trend toward the immigration status quo, and corresponding
erosion in the public’s trust that the government can address the problem
effectively (a point to which we return below).59 In some surveys, the public

57. Id. (discussing support among business and labor constituencies for comprehensive
immigration reform, including legalization of the undocumented).
58. Cf. Thomas J. Espenshade, Unauthorized Immigrants to the United States, 21 ANN. REV. SOC.
195, 195 (1995) (noting that the “current level of clandestine US immigration may not be far from
what society might view as socially optimal.”).
59. See infra Part III.
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appears to hold contradictory views about immigration policy, raising the question
of what explicit choices are reflected in such attitudes.60
Where survey data do highlight substantial public majorities supporting a
particular policy change (for example, favoring some form of legalization; or
seeking lower levels of overall immigration, as well as fewer backlogs), such views
are often at odds with existing immigration law. Even allowing for questionframing effects and other complexities in the nature of public opinion about a
complicated issue, there is little support for the idea that the public is satisfied with
immigration law and policy. Trends in public responses to immigration policy also
showcase increasing concern about immigration, rather than a pattern where the
issue increasingly fades from view as the public comes to accept the present
arrangement.61
Some observers have remarked on the possible connection between the large
number of undocumented immigrants and public perceptions about erosion of the
rule of law. Indeed, both the increase in media coverage and changing patterns of
geographic dispersion make it difficult for members of the public to ignore the
presence of such a large undocumented population. Nonetheless, it is also the case
that the current immigration status quo turns a vast number of Americans into
lawbreakers. By creating a requirement to hire legal workers without a workable
enforcement regime and institutionalizing relatively high costs of compliance for
all hiring transactions (including household assistance, for example), IRCA
contributes to a situation where millions of Americans violate federal law by hiring
undocumented workers. In short, for every undocumented worker, there is an
employer on the other side of the transaction. With the proportion of household
help provided by unlawful workers as high as it is and the relative domestic
burden of compliance, a vast number of Americans are almost certainly failing to
comply with relevant laws.62 This state of affairs all but certainly impedes what
John Skrentny has described as the “moral” entrenchment of existing immigration
60. See id.
61. Such gradual acceptance is often understood to play an important role in entrenching the
legitimacy of a particular statutory scheme. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 12. The fate
of the INA, in contrast, has been quite different. See infra Part III. These reactions raise the question
of whether, over time, the public’s concerns about certain aspects of existing immigration law could
spread to other domains, such as the existing, relatively unimpeded path from permanent residence to
citizenship.
62. See generally MPI TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 3–14 (discussing the proportion of U.S.
employees who are undocumented); id. at 35 (“[A]n estimated 300,000–350,000 [unauthorized
immigrants] enter the US labor force [each year]. The overwhelming majority work . . . in the lowskill, low-wage, low-value-added sectors of the economy. Similarly, although the H-2A program for
temporary agricultural workers has no caps, the program is deeply underutilized. It is seen as overly
bureaucratic and unresponsive to employers and it contains few commensurate gains for workers.
With little enforcement against illegal hiring, there are few incentives to use the program.”); id. at 46
(discussing the low priority and ineffectiveness of meaningful employer enforcement under the IRCA,
and stating that “[f]or non-compliant employers, the cost savings from employing illegal labor can
outweigh the possible cost of sanctions.”).
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laws.63
Nor is the current situation fully explained by anxieties about immigration—
whether recently engendered or reflected in episodic historical turns toward
greater restriction. American immigration policy embodies a limited but significant
tradition of aperture to immigrants (motivated by foreign policy and other factors)
incorporated into existing immigration law alongside a heritage of concern about
new immigrants. Moreover, American immigration law and policy reflects major
variations in priorities over the last few decades. The 1965 INA amendments
contrast with the previously enacted status quo by raising visa totals dramatically,
instituting hemispheric caps, and eliminating racial quotas.64 Further, IRCA’s
legalization provisions contrast with the 1996 reforms focusing on unauthorized
migration. Evidence of public attitudes about immigration from 1986 to the
present show growing public willingness to support harsh immigration measures
expanding the scope of removable individuals.
Changing Public Mood. Similarly, the argument that the country has
simply grown more ideologically conservative since IRCA provides little insight.
Whether the country has in fact become more conservative, as the term is
generally understood in discussions of American politics and policymaking, is a
question that implicates conceptual debate over both the nature of ideological
labels and methodological issues. Regardless of how one measures the nation’s
aggregate ideological changes, the direction of immigration policy has long had a
contested relationship to conventional political ideology. Specifically, many
interests that are sometimes labeled conservative (in a conventional political sense)
support larger immigration flows or legalization, while some progressives question
the impact of immigration on wages or oppose significant policy changes
including legalization.65
Any reasonable analyst must acknowledge that politicians have been
rewarded for keeping in place our overall immigration architecture and ratcheting
up enforcement. In that sense, Americans have chosen the current system. But
subtleties soon emerge whenever one juxtaposes the concept of democracy against
a complex regulatory regime like immigration. The question of what the public

63. See, e.g., John D. Skrentny & Micah Gell-Redman, Comprehensive Immigration Reform and the
Dynamics of Statutory Entrenchment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 325, 328–29 (Mar. 18, 2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/3/18/skrentny-gellredman.html.
64. See, e.g., Roger Daniels, The Immigration Act of 1965: Intended and Unintended Consequences, in
HISTORIANS ON AMERICA: DECISIONS THAT MADE A DIFFERENCE 77, 82 (U.S. Dep’t of State
2008), available at http://www.america.gov/publications/books/historiansonamerica.html (describing
how the political logic of the 1965 amendments to the INA heavily reflects the idea “that immigration
policy is a subset of foreign policy and that the monocultural goals of policies laid down in the 1920s
were inappropriate for a nation seeking global leadership”).
65. See generally Wendy M. Rahn et al., A Framework for the Study of Public Mood, 17 POL.
PSYCHOL. 29 (1996) (discussing some of the complexities inherent in assessing the ideology of the
public’s mood).

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF IMMIGRATION LAW

23

chooses in a democracy is far more complex than what is implied by axiomatic
acceptance of the notion that the status quo neatly reveals the public’s
preferences. In a pluralistic system, stakeholders advocate competing positions
and the public’s attention is fragmented. Lawmakers, governors, and Presidents
can garner attention for a variety of reasons, leading some members of the public
to support candidates with whom they disagree on particular issues. Attitudes can
be complex or even contradictory, raising the possibility that individuals may
simultaneously appreciate some details of the current scheme while being
concerned about the overall system. Leaving aside the issue of how we evaluate
the public’s views and the relevance of multiple issues in elections, the existence of
“veto gates” establishing supermajority requirements for policy change all but
ensure that some statutory schemes will persist long after public views evolve.66
In the end, immigration is a compelling example of the subtle and sometimes
strained relationship between public attitudes and policy outcomes. The vast
majority of the public lacks views about the intricate details of immigration policy,
even if they have generalized attitudes about the overall system. The salience of
immigration issues, far from being stable, has been growing over time. Moreover,
while some individuals and interests benefit from the immigration status quo, a
large majority of Americans seem to strongly disfavor the present system. These
features suggest that public reactions about immigration are likely to be one
important ingredient in explaining the political context in which immigration law
exists and evolves, but certainly not the only factor that turns far-reaching policy
goals into an administrative scheme.
Gridlock. The fact that statutory change is slow and difficult in the United
States does not sufficiently explain the existing equilibrium either.67 The status quo
does not reflect a longstanding constitutional requirement.68 History matters in
explaining how the current system developed, but the word “developed”
appropriately conveys the presence of important changes creating current
conditions. The current status quo resulted as much from dramatic statutory
changes (including, in particular, the 1965 amendments to the INA and the 1986
IRCA) as from long-term continuity. If we define the modern era as stretching
from the moment that the core legal architecture of visa caps and worldwide
immigration was put in place in 1965, it is clear that significant policy change has

66. On the nature and significance of veto gates, see McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 720 (1992).
67. For a discussion of some of the institutional factors creating “gridlock” and exacerbating
the difficulty of broad legislative changes, see generally, DAVID W. BRADY & CRAIG VOLDEN,
REVOLVING GRIDLOCK (2006).
68. Neither, it is helpful to remember, did many supermajoritarian requirements that now
unquestionably have a role in shaping the prospects for legal change. See generally Daniel Carpenter,
Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial Reform in the Obama Administration, 8 PERSP. ON
POL. 825 (2010) (using legislative debates over financial regulatory reform to illustrate a broader
process routinizing the use of once-exceptional procedural devices to slow legislative action).
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occurred over the last half century. Some of those changes, including the 1980
Refugee Act, the 1986 IRCA, the 1990 Immigration Act, and the original 1965
amendments to the INA, reflect policy change in a direction that could be
described as broadly generous toward immigrants.69
Even if we examine more recent trends since 1990, the presence of veto—
though not unimportant in the political economy of lawmaking—also neglects to
explain the continued production of immigration-related statutes and resource
changes since then.70 These changes do not fundamentally alter the structure of
the system because they leave in place most of the undocumented population, do
not change interior enforcement much, and leave future flows unchanged. But
they showcase the continued capacity of American policymakers to modify
immigration law and policy in a particular direction even as key features of the
overall system prove resistant to change.
In short, while it is almost certainly true that changes in supermajority
requirements, other things being equal, would have affected recent legislative
debates about immigration, these constraints have not thwarted far-reaching
immigration reforms over the last half century.71 The bare invocation of gridlock
(or even the notion of growing gridlock) also proves unsatisfying as an explanation
in light of massive statutory changes in domains outside immigration, including
financial regulatory reform and health insurance reform.72 Finally, explanations
focused on the existence of gridlock do not offer much detail (beyond simply
underscoring that statutory gridlock leaves room for presidential action) about
executive branch incentives with respect to the crucial implementation and gapfilling functions defining the actual significance of immigration law. If we want to
explain variations in the production of statutes, we must look beyond the simple
existence of gridlock and supermajoritarian institutions.
***
Unquestionably, the lawmaking process in America, and in all pluralist
democracies, is affected to some extent by cultural or ideological attitudes,
overarching national or sector-specific economic interests, and institutional
constraints slowing down statutory change. Each of these factors shapes the
69. See generally ZOLBERG, supra note 24 (discussing major legislative enactments).
70. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1986). For a
brief summary of the recently enacted border security bill signed by President Obama, see Julia
Preston, Obama Signs Border Bill to Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at A10.
71. Immigration reform would have all but certainly been enacted absent the filibuster in 2007,
and then again—at least as far as the DREAM Act is concerned—in 2010. See generally Michael
Barone, Immigration Reform: The New Third Rail, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2010, at A19 (discussing the
political risks of pursuing substantial statutory reforms of immigration policy for Republican and
Democratic lawmakers).
72. Note that in some of these domains, public attitudes and opinions appear to have shifted
significantly in the course of a particular legislative or policy debate, emphasizing some of the limits of
static applications of gridlock-oriented models.
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political economy of lawmaking in general, and immigration in particular. But
there is more to the story of American immigration law. Statutes are rarely, if ever,
pure reflections of public attitudes—even attitudes far more monolithic and less
replete with the subtleties that characterize public reactions to immigration.73
Statutes are instead produced through institutional mechanisms designed in our
system to accommodate multiple (and often competing) interests. Such
fragmentation of interests also raises serious questions about assertions that
statutes reflect overarching national interests in rational labor market-management
or rational anything. More relevant is the question of whose interests a particular
arrangement serves, and (potentially) which constituencies might pay a
corresponding price. And to say that American policymaking is replete with veto
gates creating vast “gridlock” regions where the status quo prevents change is
largely to restate the question of how and when—given those constraints—
statutory schemes change or remain relatively stable. This assertion also says little,
if anything, about the related question of how the executive branch turns statutes
into administrative schemes affecting millions or even hundreds of millions.
If it is difficult to account for the architecture and staying power of
American immigration law by arguing that Americans have simply chosen it or
face too many veto points to change it, how else might we explain it? A reasonable
place to start in our exploration of this situation is with the mechanisms that turn
immigration laws from dry statutory commands into a more elaborate, organic
system of administrative regulation and enforcement. The immigration statutes are
not unique in the extent to which they call for administrative elaboration. Perhaps
more than many statutory schemes, the immigration system embodies
contradictions and internal tensions that raise the importance of agency
implementation. Those choices, along with developments in public attitudes about
immigration policy that almost certainly included responses to the system itself, go
a long way toward explaining the nature and persistence of the current American
system.
II. IMMIGRATION AS A REGULATORY SYSTEM
In the late 1990s, enforcement officials were determined to crack down on
illegal hiring practices despite the statutory limitations of modern immigration
laws. The sprawling meat processing plants in the nation’s vast Great Plains
almost inevitably drew their attention. These firms had dramatically changed their
workforces in less than a decade and were increasingly staffed by relatively low-

73. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 6–9 (1990)
(Despite the fact that most voters know little about candidates’ policy positions, and few elections
hinge on those positions, legislators nevertheless obsess over what they anticipate the electoral
consequences of their decisions to be. Additionally, “[t]hose who have studied the link between
constituency opinion and legislative decisions have found little evidence to support such a strong
claim about legislators responding to opinion in their home districts.”).
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wage Latino workers.74 As agents of the then-INS responded to concerns about
the hiring of undocumented workers in the meat packing industry, they sought
production of I-9 documents for tens of thousands of workers in Nebraska meat
processing facilities before embarking on a similar effort in other states.75 The
paperwork associated with thousands of workers exhibited irregularities, and as
federal agents further scrutinized the situation, vast numbers of the relevant
workers left the meat packing plants. The employers then reported widespread
labor disruptions,76 and both state and federal politicians condemned the program
energetically enough to stop it.77
Any useful account of the modern American immigration system needs to
explain why Operation Vanguard collapsed under its own weight even as many
lawmakers and members of the public claimed to seek more aggressive
enforcement. Such outcomes underscore the reality that immigration is a
regulatory system, defined as much by its pervasive similarity to other areas as it is
by the issue’s distinctive multidimensionality and cultural stakes. The discretion
lodged in DHS to initiate removal proceedings holds considerable importance.78
Yet the anodyne language of judicial opinions rarely, if ever, acknowledges the
complexities agencies face in applying such discretion. As a regulatory domain
simultaneously shaping labor markets, perceptions of security, and the scope of
the national community, immigration policy affects a vast array of economic,
political, and social interests. Those interests, in turn, work through several layers
of institutions and a larger public context to shape policy outcomes. A country’s
approach to immigration is a major feature of its national architecture, defining
the scope of a national community as well as functional issues of economic
consequences and security-related concerns.
Just as multiple constituencies ranging from high-technology executives to
farmworkers are affected by immigration policy outside the government, different
players share power over immigration within the public sector. A swelling number
of border patrol agents and their supervisors play a part in a system also affected
by interior enforcement officials, lawmakers authorizing new immigration laws,
appropriators controlling the financial spigot to immigration bureaucracies, and
executive officials working against the backdrop of an increasingly engaged public.

74. See Dell Champlin & Eric Hake, Immigration as Industrial Strategy in American Meatpacking, 18
REV. POL. ECON. 49 (2006).
75. See Matt Kelley, INS Is Staunch on Crackdown: Operation Vanguard Is Successful and Will Be
Expanded, an Agency Official Tells Congress, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, July 2, 1999, at 1.
76. See Nelson Says INS Operation Draining State’s Labor Pool, LINCOLN J. STAR, June 4, 1999, at B2.
77. See id. (discussing politicians’ opposition to the INS operation); After Vanguard, Plan Next
Trial Somewhere Else, LINCOLN J. STAR, Aug. 28, 1999, at B6 (discussing the widespread criticism of
Operation Vanguard); Art Hovey, Panel Calls for Changes Immigration Issues: Task Force Tackles INS
Crackdown, LINCOLN J. STAR, Oct. 17, 2000, at A1 (discussing how Operation Vanguard was
suspended and placed under review by INS Commissioner Doris Meissner).
78. See Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Because immigration law’s complex statutory and regulatory structure is not the
product of a single economic or political ingredient, understanding immigration
law requires us to investigate the factors structuring the relationships among these
actors.79
We will see that immigration law’s role as yet another body of regulatory law
proves at least as important as the uniqueness of the immigration issue. To a
considerable extent, immigration law is forged in the same cauldron of lawmakers,
institutions, agency officials, political reactions, and stakeholder interests that
produces policies involving public health, national security, taxes, or criminal
justice. Because immigration is capable of affecting the economic and political
fortunes of multiple stakeholders in a pluralist democracy, it can trigger political
reactions reminiscent of those arising in other domains. To understand
immigration, we must contend with its distinctiveness as well as its similarities to
problems arising in alternative domains.
A. Shaping the System: Lawmakers, Implementers, Interests, and the Public
Because immigration policy is first and foremost regulatory policy, it
implicates conflict and competition. Agency officials, businesses, lawmakers, and
other political actors engage in fights over agency autonomy, legal interpretation,
and political economy common to other forms of regulation. Rules governing
visas, border enforcement, and interior investigations represent more than merely
a static bargain negotiated among competing interests. Migrants carry with them
the potential to define both the very essence of a society as well as its outer limits.
As such, the stakes in immigration policy implicate a variety of complex
motivations. And the system has evolved in intricate ways in response to
distinctive feedback relationships reflecting the responses of elites and the public
to each other. But no account can make sense of an important regulatory system
such as immigration without taking account of the relevant interests.
As with public health or environmental regulation, stakeholders have
considerable economic and political interests at stake when it comes to controlling
migration. As with criminal justice, the public rarely understands a variety of
complexities, but has strong opinions on the subject. As with other intricate
domains of legal regulation, then, immigration implicates compromises rooted in a
pluralist political system. Agencies can fragment and reflect different priorities
given pressure from labor unions, domestic law enforcement agencies, large
employers, and civil rights organizations representing recent immigrants.
79. Although the United States offers a unique legal, geographic, and political context,
immigration has the potential to trigger similarly contentious debates in other advanced industrialized
democracies. See ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 449–50 (“As I have emphasized throughout, the debates
that immigration provokes are especially contentious because they implicate disparate spheres of
concerns and interests, and also involve both domestic and external policy considerations.”); Freeman
& Birrell, supra note 36, 532–36 (discussing the experience of Australia).
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Businesses are likely to contest vigorous enforcement. Minimizing the far-reaching
influence of such pressure is akin to arguing that immigration, despite its
enormous economic, political, and social stakes, is sharply different from the vast
array of regulatory contexts where politics and organizations play a critical role in
legal implementation.
Organized interests shape not only the implementation of regulatory laws,
but also their content. Even as lawmakers scramble to respond to district-specific
concerns, their political fortunes and constraints are heavily affected by regional
and national advocacy organizations, businesses, labor groups, and related
constituencies.80 Indeed, the pluralist character of American legislative politics may
tend to engender not only competition between constituencies who want to
protect immigrants and organizations determined to limit immigration flows, but
also the consequences of shifting alliances resulting between either of those
constituencies and interests seeking primarily to reap economic rewards from
immigrant labor.
The otherwise noteworthy distinctions in the roots of those interests—only
some of which involve explicit economic or material goals—are not as critical at
this juncture as is recognizing that, for all its differences, immigration bears some
similarity to tax policy or economic regulation. Competition among interests
hardly implies that agencies are “captured,” a far more specific claim that refers to
the eliding of contingent factors which drives the capacity of agencies to achieve a
measure of independence.81 Deeper ideological reactions or psychological
processes may also play a major role in issues seen by the public as a bellwether of
the nation’s culture and future direction.82
80. Lawmakers’ interactions with interest groups take place, moreover, in a setting where
institutional rules play a critical role in shaping policy outcomes for regulatory systems such as those
implicated in immigration policy. In a system where policymaking is multidimensional (and, indeed,
even if the legislature focused exclusively on writing immigration laws, the following section unpacks
the multidimensionality of this issue), and lawmakers are elected locally from heterogeneous districts,
there is essentially no single, predictable relationship between voter preferences and policy outcomes
that does not depend on institutional rules. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions
and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7 (2003).
81. For a discussion of those factors, at least in the context of public health, see MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar, Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law, in PREVENTING
CAPTURE (Daniel Carpenter et al. eds., forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Cuéllar, Coalitions].
82. Cultural conflict matters, and issues vary in terms of the intensity of cultural conflict they
provoke. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al.., Purple America, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (2006)
(acknowledging divergent public reactions to social issues compared to economic issues and
recognizing the significance of social issues even in a larger political environment where reactions to
economic issues have a stronger effect). At least some studies, for example, suggest that reactions to
undocumented immigrants are driven in part by respondents’ perceived cultural affinity with the
unauthorized migrants. See, e.g., Thomas J. Espenshade & Charles A. Calhoun, An Analysis of Public
Opinion Toward Undocumented Immigration, 12 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 189 (1993). For an
interesting discussion of the relationship between elite polarization on cultural issues and reactions
among the larger public, see Ryan L. Claassen & Benjamin Highton, Policy Polarization Among Party
Elites and the Significance of Political Awareness in the Mass Public, 62 POL. RES. Q. 538 (2009) (increasing
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Public reactions to issues with an intense cultural or social dimension,
moreover, can interact with the strategies of interested parties whose strategic
repertoire can include mobilization of the public. At core, however, if businesses
have something to gain from (say) a new regulatory approach to one of America’s
few existing temporary work programs, they will fight for their preferred
outcome.83 Where the recent history of immigration law is concerned, organized
interests have had a lot to say, even with the longstanding potential (increasingly
realized) for greater concern about immigration among the larger public.84 Given
the significant consequences of regulation, the enforcement of regulatory rules is
also an all but inevitably contested arena. Contrary to strong versions of the
“regulatory capture” thesis popular among some political economy scholars and
observers of the policy process, economic interests often vigorously contest
regulatory enforcement. Sometimes, they succeed.85 In the immigration context,
witness some of the forces driving the demise of Operation Vanguard,86 or the
relatively weak requirements for obtaining approval of H-1b temporary visa
petitions often made by large corporations.87
The success of organized interests in any policymaking domain must
contend, however, with the possibility of intense public reactions capable of
reshaping the policymaking environment. The influential literature on “policy
feedback” in political science addresses one aspect of the political economy of
statutory and policy entrenchment, whereby policy changes create their own

elite polarization on cultural issues involving race, social welfare policy, and abortion is associated
with growing polarization among survey respondents with high levels of political information).
83. Such conflict plays out against a status quo offering a limited number of employmentbased and temporary worker visas, and imposing administrative costs on employers seeking to make
use of such visas. See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32044, IMMIGRATION:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS (2010).
84. Interests and coalitions, and not just longstanding cultural or social reactions, play a major
role in shaping immigration law. For a discussion of the role of political interests and coalitions in the
development of the 1965 Immigration Act, see generally ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 337–82. An
insightful summary of the role of economic interests in shaping IRCA and the potential for temporary
worker arrangements is found in Daniel J. Tichenor, The Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States,
1981–1990, 26 POLITY 333 (1994). See also John A. Clark & Jerome S. Legge, Jr., Economics, Racism, and
Attitudes Toward Immigration in the New Germany, 50 POL. RES. Q. 901 (1997) (arguing, on the basis of
survey results comparing Germans from different regions, that economic concerns explain policy
attitudes in the former German Democratic Republic).
85. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 68 (discussing organized interests’ approach to diluting
financial regulatory reform, including efforts to weaken the statutory bases for subsequent regulatory
enforcement); John T. Scholz & Feng Heng Wei, Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System, 80 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1249 (1986) (discussing how state occupational safety activities respond to contact
with interest groups).
86. See supra notes 74–77 (describing the context, nature, and fate of Operation Vanguard).
87. See generally Sabrina Underwood, Note, Achieving the American Daydream: The Social, Economic,
and Political Inequalities Experienced by Temporary Workers Under the H-1B Visa Program, 15 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 727 (2001) (describing the H-1B visa program and the American Competitiveness in the 21st
Century Act of 2000 that increased the number of H-1B visas for 2001–2003).
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political responses and support.88 In underappreciated respects, this literature may
shed important light on the fate of immigration. In particular, some of this
literature underscores the extent to which public perceptions play an important
role in the trajectory of public policy in a democracy.89 For example, members of
the public whose lives are positively affected by new health or environmental
regulations that are effectively administered can mobilize constituencies that
would not have supported the original legislative package.
At the same time, the public’s role in influencing policymaking can create
strategic dilemmas for politicians, as they consider what appeals they will make to
the public or how (for example) patterns of enforcement facilitate (or hinder)
politicians’ decisions to focus on particular aspects of an issue. In other cases,
exogenous developments might initially change the distribution of public attention
focused on an issue, thereby affecting the political context even if the public’s
underlying substantive views on the issue remain largely unchanged. By
investigating the role of the public (and its potential reactions to enforcement
patterns), we could also shed light on whether forms of “policy feedback” not
commonly described in the literature could arise. In particular, it is possible that
greater public attention—far from either entrenching and legitimizing a statutory
compromise or failing to bring attention to it—could also bring attention to an
issue without legitimizing the statute in question.90
If interests and reactions outside government are all but certain to go a long
88. Policy feedback might be understood as one potentially significant element in explaining
the evolution of policy, particularly in a democracy. E.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS,
PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF 288 (Schuyler C. Wallace ed., 1935) (coining the phrase that “new
policies create a new politics”). More recent works provide a more systematic treatment of policy
feedback. For two seminal works, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 1990), and THEDA
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS (1992). For an interesting explanation of policy
feedback in the context of the GI Bill, see Suzanne Mettler, Bringing the State Back In to Civic
Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 351
(2002). See also Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Pierson, Increasing Returns] (demonstrating that “increasing returns”
(positive feedback) processes are likely to be prevalent, and can provide a more rigorous framework
for developing some of the key claims described in historical institutionalism scholarship).
89. A useful overview of the theoretical terrain (and some of the gaps that remain) can be
found in Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change, 45 WORLD POL.
595, 610 (1993) [hereinafter Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause] (“Policies do create powerful packages
of resources and incentives that influence the positions of interest groups, government elites, and
individual social actors in politically consequential ways.”).
90. Plainly, changing attitudes can affect policy developments, a phenomenon sometimes
obscured by the fact that policymakers also shape attitudes. For an insightful effort to disentangle
both dynamics (while also acknowledging the strategic consequences of the potential feedback
relationship between them), see BRANDICE CANES-WRONE, WHO LEADS WHOM? PRESIDENTS,
POLICY, AND THE PUBLIC (Susan Herbst & Benjamin I. Page eds., 2006). What has received less
attention is the potential for the implementation of statutory compromises to affect the environment
in which attitudes develop and (through some version of “policy feedback”) the further evolution of
those compromises.
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way toward explaining how regulation evolves, the organization of public
authority within government is also critical. The organizational context can help
policy remain in place, as with the long resistance of the U.S. Department of
Defense and its services to legislative reform of the combatant commander
structure.91 Organizations and their leaders can also affect the costs and benefits
of executive action, by building coalitions with lawmakers and seeking to
undermine executive decisions that they reject.92 Organizations can also mobilize
to change existing policies, as epitomized by the role of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in reshaping its jurisdiction in response to changing economic
conditions and the rising power of the trucking industry.93 In addition, poor
organizational reputation could damage the prospect for substantive legal changes
that depend on (or at least on the perception of) competence and effectiveness on
the part of the relevant public agencies.94
Since organizations matter, so can the fragmentation of authority across
them. Hierarchical organizations with few constraints and preeminent authority
over a particular function, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) in relation to measures involving restrictions on travel, are bound to
operate quite differently from those that must share power over a domain of
public activity with other players. Simple trade-offs rarely exist in this context, of
course, as unifying one mission (e.g., infrastructure security, by placing the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)) fragments another (transportation policy).95 Whatever
the original prescriptive or political rationale for splitting up power among
multiple bureaus, the resulting organizational fragmentation can carry costs such
as making policymaking (and policy implementation) more difficult.96
Organizations are thus central players in the political economy of legal
implementation. Between efforts to accommodate the competing goals of multiple
bureaucracies and the differing views held by organizations with distinct expertise
91. See generally AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN 131–35 (1999) (describing how
presidential reform was thwarted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff design).
92. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 217 (1989); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing”
the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
587, 654 (2009) [hereinafter Cuéllar, Securing] (“Across the constellation of interests within and around
an agency, it remains possible that some players will be all too aware of an agency’s potential capacity
to acquire a greater measure of autonomy over time, as it builds an external constituency of support
or acquires an ever stronger reputation for technical competence.”).
93. See generally LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
POLITICS (1994) (describing the evolution of Interstate Commerce Commission motor freight policy
in response to changes within the trucking industry).
94. This is a major implication of Daniel Carpenter’s magisterial account of the evolution of
the FDA. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER (Ira Katznelson et al. eds., 2010).
95. See generally Cuéllar, Securing, supra note 92, at 653 (discussing the inevitable prescriptive
trade-offs in organizing the bureaucracy).
96. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 92, at 257–58, 267–71 (agency fragmentation raises the
difficulty and costs of coordination).
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and value commitments, then, fragmentation may create at least two
consequences: (1) a “transaction cost” on policymaking that, in an ideal world,
would implicate coordination across agencies (e.g., enforcement plus adjudication
plus prosecution coordination); and (2) questions about the capacity of the
President to tightly control immigration policy.97
B. Shaping the Context: Immigration Law’s Multidimensionality
The more specific immigration-related context is just as important,
particularly in one crucial respect. No single prescriptive ideal or goal defines the
immigration issue. Instead, the social context in which immigration law is written
and implemented is likely to reflect at least three different dimensions, where elite
and public concerns straddle the divide between cultural and more conventional
policy concerns. This multidimensionality thus yields a more complex debate
relative to a variety of more conventional regulatory domains.
First, immigration has powerful effects on the labor market. Although most
Americans appear to benefit from these effects, not everyone does. Immigration
probably also bears some relationship to society’s capacity for innovation—a
dynamic that may be partly rooted in immigration’s relationship to diverse skillsets and approaches to economic activity (as recognized in some econometric
analyses of immigration’s impact on the labor market). Although we are not close
to understanding all substantial questions regarding immigration’s (conventional)
economic impact, it is relatively easy to appreciate immigration’s far-reaching
consequences as an economic issue, and thereby its potential to shape broader
public reactions to economic and social policy.98
Second, immigration and its closely related domain of border security clearly
have an impact on Americans’ perceptions of security, and, at the margin, on the
country’s broader instrumental security agenda.99 The dilemmas associated with
regulating terrorist mobility are an example. Absolute control over the mobility of
individuals engaged in terrorist activity (or very likely to be, on the basis of strong,
justifiable suspicion) is all but impossible. But what is possible depends
substantially on immigration policy, particularly in a relatively open society that

97. Contrast this view with that advanced (admittedly with at least a few caveats) in Cox &
Rodríguez, supra note 14. There, they argue that perhaps the single most significant underappreciated
feature of American immigration law is the critical role of the President in controlling immigration
(largely through ex post facto discretionary enforcement). Id. at 528. But organizational
fragmentation—plus pressures involving public and lawmaker reactions—could squelch that control
or at least severely limit it. Id. at 537–38.
98. See, e.g., Ann-Helén Bay & Axel West Pedersen, The Limits of Social Solidarity: Basic Income,
Immigration and the Legitimacy of the Universal Welfare State, 49 ACTA SOC. 419 (2006).
99. For a helpful overview of some of the terrain, see generally Christopher Rudolph, Security
and the Political Economy of International Migration, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 603 (2003) (describing how
migration affects the security of advanced industrial states and how the security environment shapes
the way states deal with international migration).
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values limits on the scope of internal surveillance and policing. Not surprisingly,
the larger public often (though certainly not always) views immigration through a
security lens—and this pattern varies over time.
Finally, immigration, at its core, is a means through which we delimit
national communities in a world where laws and societies are defined—at least in
principle—by the scope of the nation-state.100 This dimension implicates not only
concerns about the stability and reach of legal arrangements (and, consequently,
potential concern about the efficacy of those arrangements in the face of larger
global forces) but also reactions (sometimes subtle and less than fully conscious)
to demographic and cultural change. As a descriptive matter, capacity to accept
demographic and cultural change is neither infinite nor is it uniformly distributed
across a large and diverse country such as the United States.101
These factors reflect differing dynamics and interests relevant to immigration
law. Because recessions, security concerns, and demographic change have
activated concerns in all three domains over the last few years, Americans have
become increasingly concerned about the nature of their immigration policy in
recent years (though not necessarily about immigration as such). As Figures 1 and
2 reflect, news coverage of immigration has increased dramatically over the last
three decades. Particularly striking is the proportion of news coverage focused on
border issues. Such news coverage, in turn, coincides with public reactions
reflecting swelling national concerns about immigration.102 Demographic change
means larger undocumented populations are moving into parts of the country
with less of a history of large-scale recent (Latino) immigration, turning policy
disputes about migration into increasingly national concerns. With these
considerations in mind, we can turn to assessing the details of immigration law’s
evolution and implementation in recent decades.

100. See ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 11 (describing “the [formal] organization of the world into a
congeries of mutually exclusive sovereign states, commonly referred to as the ‘Westphalian system’”).
101. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 4 (1983). The Report notes:
We see evidence that if the newcomers to a community do not excessively disrupt or
change the attributes of the community which make it familiar to its residents and uniquely
their “home” . . . then the newcomers may well be welcome, especially if they make
positive contributions to the community’s economic and general well-being. On the other
hand, it is seen that if the newcomers remain “foreign,” they may not be welcome,
especially if they seek to carve out separate enclaves to embrace only their own language
and culture and if their numbers and the areas of the community which they directly affect
are great. This should not be so in the “ideal” world, but it is real.
Id. (emphasis added).
102. Francine Segovia & Renatta Defever, American Public Opinion on Immigrants and Immigration
Policy, 74 PUB. OPINION Q. 375, 393 (2010) (“Spanning what will now be over a decade, public
opinion on immigration indicates an increasing lack of confidence in U.S. leaders’ abilities to address
immigration issues.”).
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Figure 1: Yearly Count of Major Newspaper Articles Mentioning Immigration
Issues in the Title103
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Figure 2: Percentage of Total Congressional Hearings and Congressional
Quarterly Almanac Articles Focused on Immigration, 1960–2009104
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103. Headlines were compiled from the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and
USA Today (accessed through Westlaw database).
104. POLICY AGENDAS PROJECT, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (search of
Congressional Hearing and Congressional Quarterly Almanac databases, 1960–2009), available at
http://policyagendas.org/page/trend-analysis.
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III. THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF THE IMMIGRATION STATUS QUO
From legislative action to agency enforcement choices, the broad evolution
of immigration law and policy since the mid-1980s bears out the institutional story
described above, and goes quite a distance toward explaining some of the
limitations and contradictions bedeviling the American immigration system. As we
will see, that system avoided crucial trade-offs, hastening what can only be
described as a considerable degree of statutory dysfunction. The constraints built
into the system, in turn, were exacerbated by organizational problems and limited
presidential control and have become, ironically, more difficult to change as public
concern about immigration has grown in response to demographic changes and to
some of the structural problems with the system itself.
By leveraging the multiple political economies just discussed as well as some
of the uniquely multidimensional features of immigration, the following account
goes a long way toward explaining why changes in immigration policy have run
into increasing difficulty as the years since IRCA stretch into decades. Put simply,
the problem is not merely the role of veto gates creating institutional gridlock, but
rather a combination of continued opposition from politically significant
stakeholders, pervasive employer-based enforcement, and diminishing public
legitimacy which together make large-scale change easier to undermine. The next
part takes a closer look at the factors that can help us better understand the
relationship between a complex statutory scheme and the administrative process
that gives it relevance.
A. Statutory Dysfunction: Statutory Bargains Built on Contradictions
If ever a competition discriminated among statutes on the basis of how
loudly they send mixed messages, surely IRCA would merit a gold medal. At the
same time that IRCA enshrined in American law an explicit new employer
responsibility to avoid hiring undocumented workers, the statute embodied a
regime of enforcement and verification that seemed only a few small steps
removed from what someone might have designed to make the law fail. If IRCA
visibly failed to deliver what it promised, the INA’s visa allocation scheme—
constituting the backdrop for IRCA and subsequent rounds of immigration
lawmaking—also came up short, although perhaps in subtler and more complex
ways.
But the challenges associated with immigration statutes go well beyond the
employer sanctions system inaugurated by IRCA, and it is helpful to understand
some of the limitations built into the broader immigration system before revisiting
employer sanctions. Immigration flows reflect a variety of changing domestic and
international conditions, some of which are in principle relevant to the
institutional design of immigration laws. Yet very little flexibility is built into the
American system for allocating visas. Country quotas often result in both waits
exceeding a decade for many categories (particularly family-based visas), as well as
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a small number of employment-based visas, which are allocated through a
cumbersome process primarily involving employers.105 The INA includes strict
constraints on most aspects of agency substantive regulatory policymaking,
forcing agencies to explore far more limited and imperfect options involving
enforcement-related changes (many of which are not implemented through rules
or even explicit enforcement guidelines).
A good example is found in the structure of the INA provisions governing
family-based immigrant admissions following the Immigration Act of 1990. Rather
than addressing concerns about backlogs and flexibility by repealing the ceiling for
family-based visas (or allowing an agency to change the ceiling pursuant to certain
conditions), Congress instead established an elaborate formula found in INA
section 201(c). Under that arrangement, the statute establishes a floor for familybased preference categories (a minimum of just under 230,000 spaces each
year).106 Whenever total family admissions (including those that are not capped)
exceed 480,000 in a single year, the guaranteed floor overrides the ceiling that
would otherwise be applicable for the succeeding fiscal year (thus ensuring that
uncapped family categories do not entirely preclude admission of a minimum
number of individuals in capped family visa categories). In a similar vein, recent
policy regarding temporary visas, epitomized by the H-1b program, involve
compromises that please virtually no one—the program meets short-term
employer needs yet denies employers the benefit of recipients’ accumulated
experience because they are forced to leave. In this manner, labor and similar
constituencies are placated with pro forma administrative procedures putatively
designed to protect American jobs that raise costs and increase delays with little
consequence.107
This very pattern contrasts with the degree of substantive flexibility agencies
routinely receive in other regulatory contexts. In the context of illegal drug policy,
relevant federal statutes provide the Attorney General with authority to
temporarily “schedule” (e.g., establish criminal penalties associated with the
distribution of) a drug if “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public
safety.”108 Other examples abound, in domains ranging from air pollution
regulation to occupational safety.109 Even among domains that involve more
circumscribed delegations of authority to agencies than those spawning colorable
nondelegation claims, agencies are rarely subjected to the type of constraints so
105. For a discussion of the relative rigidity in the system and the potential policy
consequences of modifying such a scheme, see MPI TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 22.
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2009).
107. See Underwood, supra note 87.
108. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2004).
109. Two of many other examples include the legislative authority to establish National
Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act, discussed in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), and provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act at issue in
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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common in immigration.110 With lawmakers exhibiting continued reluctance to
write statutes conferring widespread formal discretion to agencies and executive
branch officials on decisions regarding such a politically sensitive subject, the
executive branch ends up with relatively limited capacity to adapt legal provisions
to changing objective conditions and public demands.111
Plainly, greater flexibility in allocating visas is not guaranteed to end unlawful
migration. The precise elasticity of demand for undocumented immigration
relative to changes in legal migration opportunities is difficult to anticipate
precisely. That said, we can learn something from the history of the Bracero
program in the 1960s. When the program was abruptly terminated and quotas
were imposed on Western hemisphere migration, businesses turned in vast
numbers to hiring undocumented workers, which in turn helped establish the
pattern of illicit migration.112 Historical examples of this type suggest the extent to
which lawful and illegal migration are (imperfect) substitutes for each other, and
highlight the trade-offs and incentives potential migrants face as they contemplate
their choices.113 Other things being equal, it probably makes sense to presume that
potential migrants would probably prefer safer legal migration opportunities to
illicit ones. Employers who are weighing the value of making a concerted effort to
hire legal workers might confront a similar calculus. Sensitivity to the potential
risks of illicit crossing (particularly as the danger involved changes) is certainly
consistent with undocumented migrants’ increasing unwillingness to risk crossing
110. For an overview of a variety of statutory domains that evolved over time largely in
response to relatively flexible grants of statutory authority to agencies, see ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN,
supra note 12.
111. At least in the short term, this trend bodes poorly for efforts seeking to address structural
problems in immigration law through creation of an executive branch agency or independent
commission with the power to make substantial adjustments in the availability of visas. The historical
pattern suggests extreme congressional reluctance to create such an entity, and even if such an effort
succeeded, it would almost certainly face substantial congressional pressure unless lawmakers were
persuaded that the public would not hold them accountable for the new entity’s decisions. See MPI
TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 42 (developing a proposal for an independent commission); Cristina
M. Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1787 (2010). For further discussion on delegation, see infra Part V.A.
112. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS (2002).
113. The experiences of migrants in South Korea in past decades provide another example of
how migrants choose between lawful and unlawful status given a variety of constraints and incentives.
Temporary workers were given “trainee” visas to enter the country, but soon discovered they could
make more money as undocumented workers and began working illegally. See Wang-Bae Kim,
Migration of Foreign Workers into South Korea: From Periphery to Semi-Periphery in the Global Labor Market, 44
ASIAN SURV. 316, 324 (2004) (“The primary reason for deviance from the original contract [to work
only in jobs authorized for “trainee” visas] lies in the simple reality that these workers are able to
make more money through illegal work.”). For an informative discussion of the trade-offs involved in
designing policies, including temporary migration opportunities, to manage the demand for migration,
see GORDON H. HANSON, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3–8 (2009). These experiences and challenges illustrate the
importance of program design details in any framework seeking to deploy changes in legal migration
as a means of discouraging unauthorized workers.
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the U.S.-Mexico border in the context of circular migration.114 Moreover, the
marginal benefit that residents of other countries expect to realize from emigrating
varies, so there’s no reason to expect that allocating (for example) two or three
times as many U.S. visas to Mexicans would immediately generate a two or
threefold increase in the overall willingness of Mexicans to emigrate to the United
States (thereby maintaining the pre-existing ratio of legal visas to overall demand).
It is admittedly difficult to evaluate the precise injury to immigration law’s
legitimacy arising from the visa allocation scheme. The consequences of those
compromises, however, are unlikely to bolster Americans’ opinions of the efficacy
and legitimacy of their immigration policy. The public’s opinions are affected by
the baseline expectations set by policymakers, elites, legal proceedings, and the
media. In multiple ways, these sources emphasized the expectation that the
country’s southern border could be relatively easily “secured” in the sense that—
despite the existence of Western Hemisphere quotas after 1965 and a labor market
thirsty for semiskilled labor from Latin America—little or no illicit immigration
would occur. The combination of physical proximity to an attractive labor market,
visa overstays (which even today make up well over a third of all undocumented
immigrants), and limits on legal migration opportunities for semiskilled workers
from Latin America made it difficult to deliver on converging expectations about
border control. Missing these nuances, some modern observers describe the
problem in terms of “regaining” control of the borders without recognizing the
extent to which the new dynamics create a novel and important challenge for the
country.115
Meanwhile, the undocumented population has crept steadily upward.116 At
the same time, employers with strong interests in hiring immigrants (particularly
ones with specific skills) have been constantly at loggerheads with civil servants
and labor organizations in a process that increases the administrative costs of such
hires while rarely changing the number of available visas. This process has also

114. See Douglas S. Massey, Borderline Madness: America’s Counterproductive Immigration Policy, in
DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129, 135–36 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007) (discussing the sensitivity of
migrants to the costs and benefits of illicit border crossing). The threats associated with illicit
migration may arise from migrants’ desire to avoid heavily policed, formerly attractive locations for
border crossing by attempting to cross in the desert. Migrants may also encounter risks as organized
criminal groups become increasingly involved in alien smuggling. See supra Part I.A (discussing the
potential for increased interest in alien smuggling from organized criminal networks as the real price
of border crossing increases).
115. Compare Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., The Borders We Deserve, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at A25
(noting that progress on immigration is only possible “if America first regains control of its southern
border”), with Edward Alden & Peter Andreas, Letter to the Editor, The Big Picture Beyond Arizona’s
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at WK7 (“[C]alls to ‘regain’ control of the border suffer from
historical amnesia, perpetrating a common myth that it was ever actually under control.”).
116. See generally JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CENTER REPORT,
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1–31 (2011).

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF IMMIGRATION LAW

39

given rise to a process that poorly serves its stated purpose and almost certainly
engenders cynicism about immigration policy.
IRCA was not built to solve these problems. By the mid-1980s, the relatively
high undocumented population and the politics of congressional compromise all
but guaranteed that any new legislation would include a considerable emphasis on
enforcement. Few thoughtful observers expected success in controlling illicit
migration through an exclusive focus on border enforcement. Lawmakers and the
Reagan Administration thus incorporated a new employer sanctions regime in
even the earliest version of the principal immigration reform bill then being
discussed. In retrospect, the move toward greater employer responsibility in
immigration policy was at least as historically significant as the IRCA legalization
program. Throughout the nation’s past trajectory, employers had avoided such
responsibilities. When lawmakers had previously enacted laws criminalizing the
harboring of unlawful immigrants, a “Texas proviso” clarified that any such
harboring offense did not encompass the mere existence of an employment
relationship.117 Even as the Texas proviso was eliminated in IRCA, the new
reforms soon came to reflect the contested nature of regulatory policy. The
resulting scheme was one that accommodated employers’ considerable influence,
while nonetheless creating a set of requirements that allowed policymakers to
herald a new era in immigration law.
In effect, IRCA established a framework that rendered vast tracts of labor
market activity unlawful, including employer activity that was not previously
unlawful. At the same time, lawmakers coupled this ambitious change in the scope
of labor market regulation with a rickety, easy to evade system that drastically
limited enforcement. Far from being strictly liable for hiring unauthorized
workers, or even being subject to a simple negligence standard, meaningful
sanctions only kicked in if employers had knowledge of their worker’s unlawful
status. Given the relevant procedural and substantive limitations, neither the
conventional penalties, nor the harsher “pattern or practice” provisions, provided
a simple means of enforcing IRCA’s requirements. Nor did courts interpret the
relevant provisions in ways that would have systematically eased the authorities’
burdens when enforcing the law.118 Employers could avail themselves of a “good
faith” exception if they had otherwise followed the requirements of IRCA, which
included simply examining required identity documents to determine if they
appeared valid.
Hence, instead of providing incentives for the reporting of information to
authorities and routine monitoring, IRCA’s most severe penalties (and even these
were relatively meager) were reserved for willful violations that were difficult to
117. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR 121 (2004).
118. See Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 553–56 (9th Cir. 1991) (A valid finding
of “constructive knowledge” requires, for example, lower-level managers to have actual information
of an employee’s ineligibility to work.).
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prove. At the same time that it gave immigration authorities the staggering task of
policing tens of millions of businesses, IRCA left the agency little flexibility to
dramatically heighten penalty levels to a degree that could have changed
businesses’ expected utility calculations in an environment where the probability
of detection was low.119 Kitty Calavita reviews how IRCA constituted a “reversal
of the long-standing laissez-faire policy” that previously governed low- and
semiskilled immigration to the United States. Moreover, she notes, “[E]mployer
violations are widespread and . . . the continued hiring of undocumented workers
is a direct consequence of the high benefits that employers derive from this source
of cheap labor, coupled with the low risks associated with this ‘white-collar
crime.’”120 At a minimum, certain tensions were built into the statutory scheme in
light of the mismatch between the public expectations IRCA helped cement
(regarding the extent of legal regulation of labor markets) and the limited tools the
public sector received to achieve these goals.121 Those tensions could become
even worse if resources for interior enforcement eroded—a subject addressed in
detail below.
Admitting defeat is politically risky for agency leaders. If the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA) is not likely to convey its inability to inspect the vast array
of food processing establishments under its jurisdiction and the FBI is scarcely
about to simply accept the difficult odds it faces in disrupting some terrorist plots,
neither are immigration officials eager to convey the full range of difficulties they
face in implementing their responsibilities. If anything, those risks are greatest just
as the agency prepares to implement a major new statutory responsibility. So it is
not surprising that immigration authorities’ first response to their daunting task
was to assert the existence of widespread compliance. Early in the history of
IRCA, law enforcers claimed widespread compliance on the presumption that
employers would generally (and voluntarily) comply with the law. The INS District
Counsel in San Diego, for example, trumpeted “the success we’ve had across the
board in securing voluntary compliance from employers nationwide.”122 No doubt
some employers, whether vast corporations or small businesses, make an effort to
comply. But in an environment where compliance is administratively burdensome
and may carry a considerable opportunity cost in terms of labor expenditures, it is
far more likely that the extent of compliance would depend in good measure on
some combination of social norms about the value of conforming to legal
requirements and reliable enforcement.123

119. For an insightful analysis, see Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a
Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1042 (1990).
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1050.
123. Cf. Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior, 27 LAW
& POL’Y 262 (2005). Thornton and her coauthors conclude that most firms are already in compliance
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To wit, Calavita conducted a survey of sectors that had long relied on
immigrant labor in Southern California. She assessed behavior in the garment
industry, construction, restaurants, hotels, and building and landscape
maintenance. Results revealed a widespread lack of compliance with employer
responsibilities under IRCA. Forty-eight percent of the employers who were
interviewed indicated they “thought” they had undocumented workers in their
work force. Of these, nearly half estimated that a quarter or more of their
workforce was undocumented. Further, the workers themselves reported
information validating these findings (thirty percent were undocumented, and
another thirty percent were in the process of applying for legal status under
IRCA’s legalization provisions).124
The trajectory of the IRCA-imposed employer sanctions, and their
subsequent implementation, reflects the extent to which regulatory enforcement
implicates competition and contestation. In the immigration context, the conflict
over targeting employers with potentially far more aggressive regulatory
enforcement targeting employers is exacerbated by the potential costs to business
and some agency resistance and risk aversion.125 As Martin puts it, in principle,
interior enforcement imposes quite tangible burdens on business:
As a result, significant interest group pressure quietly helps push
Congress toward underfunding these enforcement endeavors, and there
has been no equivalently organized constituency pushing back. Moreover,
though employers may not like the current I-9 verification process,
involving the examination of work authorization documents of all new
hires (albeit according to a very lax standard of scrutiny), they have
become accustomed to it. Proposed revisions in the employers’
obligations generate determined resistance among a highly influential
interest group.126
The features thus built into the IRCA system from the outset contrast with
more functional schemes, such as those governing aviation safety and health
surveillance. True, all regulatory schemes require some implementation and
enforcement. If they did not, then the regulation itself would not be necessary.
While the challenge of implementation makes virtually every regulatory scheme
susceptible to problems of execution, several factors probably combine to
exacerbate the problems with regard to immigration. In immigration, the relevant
agencies did not begin with a reservoir of public reputational capital, unlike (for

with environmental regulations because of social norms and that “explicit general deterrence”
knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance
that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance
routines.
124. See Calavita, supra note 119, at 1051.
125. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 525, 544–48 (2007).
126. Id. at 546.
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example) the FDA. Agencies lacked statutory authority or resources to better align
activities with public expectations (because of congressional reluctance to delegate
formal authority to agencies on most immigration policy issues). Contrast this with
agencies possessing broader authority to reshape regulatory requirements in order
to address substitution problems (e.g., financial regulatory agencies charged with
antilaundering responsibilities; food safety agencies). The social and cultural
dimensions of immigration make it easier for social, economic, and political
developments to engender divisive reactions and changes in public concern, and
complicate the argument that the use of enforcement discretion is a legitimate
means of achieving de facto regulation of immigration policy in the absence of
broad rulemaking authority.
For all these reasons, many regulatory agencies encounter a less
dysfunctional picture when working with complex regulatory schemes not
involving immigration. The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) regulation of
aviation safety is more tightly coupled to asserted regulatory goals than anything
involving immigration. Even in acknowledging some limitations of historically
existing regulatory practices, reports on FAA surveillance of safety problems
indicate a variety of detection mechanisms for assessing the risk of regulatory
violations not available to immigration authorities, including a greater flexibility to
determine fines, prophylactic requirements, and general regulatory
requirements.127 As another point of contrast, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) monitoring of health conditions leverages state authorities
and health reporting throughout the country to create a relatively reliable system
for tracking recent changes in infections or incidence of foodborne illness.
Congress requires the CDC to collect data on a variety of diseases through the
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System.128 To facilitate reporting, the
CDC established a National Electronic Telecommunications System for
Surveillance, which includes participation of all fifty state health departments,
New York City, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories. While Congress
does not require all states to participate, the fact that every single state health
agency in the country participates underscores the extent to which jurisdictions
face incentives to take part in the system. A similarly comprehensive arrangement

127. For a brief overview of some of the scope of regulation and detection mechanisms
involved in FAA aviation safety regulation, see generally Kendal Van Wagner, Comment, Cutting Costs
and Cutting Corners—The Safety Risks Associated with Outsourcing Aircraft Maintenance and the Need for
Effective Safety Oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 631 (2007). For an
overview of the mechanisms through which the FAA monitors the nature and magnitude of
commercial aviation safety developments, see AL GORE, FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON:
WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY (1997).
128. See National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/osels/ph_surveillance/nndss/nndsshis.htm (last visited Nov. 17,
2011).
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is in place to provide information on foodborne illness through the FoodNet and
PulseNet initiatives.129
These regulatory efforts exist in a larger context. Budget constraints and
institutional features combine with public reactions to limit the scope of federal
authority. As a result, federal capacity for national-scale, routine regulatory
monitoring is far from unlimited. While the federal government is by no means a
classic weak state, its development has followed a historically contingent path that
has made some regulatory and administrative functions easier than others.130 The
federal government’s historical trajectory led it to build public organizations
capable of administering benefits and federal resources on a national scale. By
contrast, exclusive federal administration of a pervasive, national-level regulatory
monitoring system (designed to detect and facilitate responses to real-time
developments that call for regulatory action or enforcement) is less common.
In fact, virtually all such systems at the federal level fall into four categories,
each possessed of a certain institutional logic making it at least plausible to expect
some results. The first involves building elaborate mechanisms for third party
reporting coupled with a large bureaucracy for civil enforcement and criminal
referrals. A classic example is the IRS.131 Second, federal regulatory monitoring
systems can also leverage the presence of individual, organizational, and state-level
incentives for accurate reporting, with the aforementioned CDC schemes relying
on the incentives of the reporting jurisdictions to share accurate information.132
The third category involves relatively close monitoring of a small, tightly
circumscribed industry with strong barriers to entry, as with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s oversight of safety in nuclear power plants or the FAA’s
129. See generally Sandra Hoffmann & William Harder, Food Safety and Risk Governance in
Globalized Markets, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 48 (2010) (“The United States has also invested in
improvements in disease monitoring to provide the information basis for risk-based targeting of
policy by federal and state government—most importantly through development of FoodNet, a
nationwide active surveillance system, and PulseNet, which uses genetic fingerprinting in tracing the
source of outbreaks.”). The CDC is in many respects not a conventional regulatory agency: it engages
in few regulatory rulemakings or enforcement actions. Yet its monitoring of public health
developments, and its analysis of and reporting on such information can trigger powerful
enforcement, rulemaking, or adjudicatory actions from other public agencies. Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17 (6th ed. 2009) (describing the stereotypical frameworks of
regulatory agencies with respect to promulgating regulations and enforcement).
130. For two insightful discussions of changes in federal capacity to implement administrative
and regulatory programs, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC
AUTONOMY (2001), and Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations,
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006). While both accounts underscore the longstanding capacity of
the federal government to undertake regulatory and administrative activity, they also acknowledge that
such capacity has developed in accordance with a variety of constraints and limitations.
131. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON M. BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 181 (4th ed. 2008) (“[E]mployers are required to send information
reports on wages and salaries for all their employees to the IRS. The IRS computers then match up
most of these information reports against tax returns.”).
132. See Cuéllar, Coalitions, supra note 81.
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regulation of safety in commercial aviation. Finally, federal regulatory monitoring
schemes sometimes involve wholesale deployment of state-level bureaucracies, as
with environmental protection, leveraging local monitoring systems and
institutional knowledge.133
By contrast, employer sanctions do not fall into any of these categories,
though the early history of the federal effort shows an aborted attempt to borrow
some elements from these models and that the relevant officials initially sought to
argue that (as with the CDC) incentives for compliance were high. Without the
institutional logic available for any of the aforementioned categories and no clear
precedent for the success of a vast new federal regulatory monitoring scheme,
IRCA faced staggering challenges from the very beginning. If there was any
plausible way to see how federal officials could manage those challenges, it would
all but certainly involve a combination of regulatory flexibility coupled with
substantial resources for interior enforcement. As discussed below, neither of
these elements materialized.
The present discussion of statutory dysfunction began by acknowledging that
employer sanctions are not the only cumbersome compromise built into
immigration law. Some observers might therefore emphasize that the immigration
system would be severely compromised even without the problems of enforcing
IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions. It is true enough that a good deal probably
depends on how statutes are implemented—a topic taken up below. Although a
variety of factors may affect the legitimacy of the immigration system, however, it
is revealing to examine the specific criticisms that lawmakers and other politicians
levy at the status quo. The fiercest critics frequently focus on enforcement
problems.134 Moreover, the decisions of prospective unauthorized immigrants are
affected by labor market opportunities,135 which are in turn affected by
enforcement of labor market regulations. In effect, the mechanisms enshrined in
law have almost certainly contributed to public skepticism of the system, eroding
support for the more ambitious goals and heightening the focus on a growing
undocumented population.
Even if one acknowledges the trade-offs and limitations built right into
existing statutes, might the general public have been persuaded to take seriously
133. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54
MD. L. REV. 1141, 1178 (1995) (“[T]he federal government simply does not have the capacity to
regulate [pollution] effectively without the cooperation of state and local governments.”).
134. For just a couple recent examples, see Press Release, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subpoena Issued to DHS for Secure Communities Data (Nov. 4, 2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/
news/DHS%20Subpoena.html (criticizing DHS for failure to provide necessary data), and Mickey
McCarter, DHS: Republican Lawmakers Demand DHS Drop “Irresponsible” Deferments of Immigration
Enforcement, HOMELAND SECURITY TODAY (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.hstoday.us/
briefings/daily-news-briefings/single-article/republican-lawmakers-demand-dhs-drop-irresponsibledeferments-of-immigration-enforcement/65aeec030d8e786ec0a89851fcb54bd3.html.
135. For a description on migration decisions of prospective immigrants, see Cornelius, supra
note 46.
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the idea that they were often themselves the very employers from whom compliance
was expected? It is among law’s most meaningful characteristics that compliance
arises in settings where enforcement is difficult or even nonexistent. Public health
regulatory rules, for example, matter for multiple reasons, and not only because
failure to comply could result in adverse material consequences for state or private
sector officials. Legal regimes can generate a considerable degree of support
because of the law’s perceived legitimacy or social significance, or because a failure
to comply could expose an individual to informal sanction from among her
peers.136 It is just as true that some laws fail to garner such support because the
public perceives them as widely ignored, ineffective, burdensome, and ultimately
illegitimate. Scholars investigating the regulatory process have long analyzed the
consequences of different enforcement regimes on compliance. In particular, a
major effort to understand private sector compliance (or the lack of it) in the
environmental context emphasized the role of industry’s perceptions regarding
enforcement. If widespread perceptions exist that a law is not being enforced
against the most obvious transgressors, interest in compliance—and indeed, the
law’s very legitimacy—could profoundly erode.137
No account of compliance with the law would be accurate if it focused only
on individuals’ responses to short-term material costs and benefits. It is just as
true, however, that administrative enforcement is part of what shapes
“acculturation,” or the process through which individuals internalize legal
commitments. The process through which acculturation arises depends in part on
what other parties are doing and saying about the law. In the case of employer
sanctions, millions of employers possess substantial economic incentives to
disregard the law. They could easily describe the paperwork requirements as
burdensome and observe blatant failures to honor it (particularly among their
friends, family members, and coworkers hiring domestic labor). As the months
after IRCA’s passage turned into years and then decades, growing segments of the
public increasingly viewed the system as poorly designed.138
B. Organizational Fragmentation #1: Interagency Coordination Costs
Most statutory authority for regulating migration is concentrated in a single,
far-reaching statute, the INA. But immigration law functions differently in a world
where the DHS and DOJ share power over many immigration agencies, and
where at least three agencies within DHS vie for attention. Without suggesting
that the fragmentation of authority over immigration is entirely new or responsible

136. See, e.g., Douglas D. Heckathorn, Collective Sanctions and Compliance Norms: A Formal Theory
of Group-Mediated Social Control, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 366, 382 (1990).
137. See Thornton et al., supra note 123, at 273 (discussing environmental compliance in the
private sector).
138. See Segovia & Defever, supra note 102, at 393 (describing the public’s increasing rejection
of the existing immigration system and lack of confidence in the enforcement of immigration laws).
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for every feature of immigration enforcement, consider the distinction between
the status quo and a world where a single official is responsible for immigration
services along with enforcement, and that single official reports to the Attorney
General. In the earlier discussion of regulation’s institutional context, we
considered how bureaus, cabinet agencies, and other public organizations can play
a major role in the story of how laws are interpreted or even modified.
Lawmakers, organized interests, and agencies themselves fight over structure.
Hence, even if a variety of forces help determine how the INA is implemented, we
should investigate whether the organizational context helps or hurts the coherence
and practical viability of immigration policy.
In the existing system, organizational problems tend to hurt the effectiveness
of immigration regulations in three interrelated ways. First, the fragmented
incentives and agendas of different agencies—both within and outside the DHS—
tend to raise the “transaction cost” of implementing policy changes, as the distinct
agencies can and do resist changes and do not answer to a single senior official.
Second, the problems implementing immigration law across competing agencies,
and in particular the swelling backlogs in immigration adjudication, feed the
widespread perception across the political spectrum that immigration
policymaking is ineffective. This erodes the federal government’s credibility
regarding successful implementation of a complex new system involving both
enforcement of laws and procedural guarantees. Finally, agency fragmentation and
resistance to outside control raise the cost to the President of exercising authority
over what appears to some observers to be executive discretion in immigration
(particularly in an environment where, as explained below, immigration issues
have become higher-profile public concerns).
American immigration law is a sterling example of organizational
fragmentation. One cabinet agency (the DHS) enforces laws, adjudicates
immigration benefits, and administers national boundaries. Within that cabinet
agency, three separate agencies with differing agendas and (in some cases)
profound rivalries coexist. The DOJ, a different cabinet agency altogether,
prosecutes immigration crimes, defends U.S. immigration policies in court, runs an
adjudicatory system of immigration law judges, and retains limited rulemaking and
adjudicatory powers over the small sliver of substantive immigration issues over
which Congress provided flexibility to agencies. The result is a considerable
disjuncture between the DHS and DOJ, and even within the DHS. Large increases
in border enforcement can impact the work of other agencies within DHS, and
the overall bundle of DHS enforcement activities carries even larger downstream
consequences outside the department for immigration adjudication (by
immigration judges), prosecutions, and incarceration functions overseen by the
DOJ.139

139.

The gap between immigration judge resources and DHS resources helps explain vastly
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Far more than organizational fragmentation drives immigration outcomes.
But a number of accounts suggest that since the creation of DHS, even the
bureaus within the DHS entrusted to manage immigration and border policy have
experienced considerable conflicts.140 Tensions seem especially pronounced
between the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) over jurisdiction involving domestic investigations,
and between ICE and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) over the proper
balance between immigration enforcement and service provision. These
competitive pressures illustrate the double-edged consequences of seemingly
straightforward technocratic rationales to split agencies into units with more
coherent missions.141 The trade-off is that a greater focus on a particular mission
can exacerbate interbureau tensions over shared policy domains and undermine
the capacity of higher-level managers to make reasonable accommodations to
competing needs.
The lack of coordination almost certainly carries consequences for both
operations and agency-level policymaking. As noted below, since the DHS was
created in 2003, the number of unresolved immigration court cases has nearly
doubled.142 Relations between immigration authorities and many local entities
have often grown strained.143 Some longtime observers of immigration policy who
have examined DHS’s early performance on immigration policy and enforcement
also harbor rising concerns about the agency’s capacity to effectively coordinate
immigration both within and beyond the department. They conclude that one
result of the creation of the DHS has been “fragmentation of responsibility and
weak, largely ineffective immigration policy development and coordination by the
executive branch.”144

increasing backlogs and greater (more costly) litigation in federal courts, making the DOJ Office of
Immigration Litigation the largest component of the Civil Division.
140. See DORIS MEISSNER & DONALD KERWIN, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTION, DHS
AND IMMIGRATION: TAKING STOCK AND CORRECTING COURSE 92 (2009) (reviewing reasons for
concluding that the performance of DHS has been adversely affected by “the absence of mechanisms
for resolving [problems between the three immigration and border agencies] in the new DHS
structure”); see also e.g., Jay Weaver & Alfonso Chardy, Agencies’ Merger Spawns Tension, Arrests, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 4, 2008 (reporting tension, dissatisfaction, and criminal conduct among employees
after agencies merged).
141. See Cuéllar, Coalitions, supra note 81, at 647 (discussing the prescriptive tensions in agency
[re]organization).
142. See Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in Immigration Courts,
TRAC IMMIGR. (2011), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog (last updated Sept.
30, 2011) (graphing pending cases as a time-series data through September 30, 2011).
143. See, e.g., Jason Buch, States at Odds over U.S. Plan, SAN ANTONIO EXP. NEWS, June 13,
2011, at 11A.; see also David Raths, Federal Fingerprint Sharing Program Meets Resistance, GOV’T TECH.
(July 5, 2011), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Federal-Fingerprint-Sharing-Program-Meets
-Resistance.html (discussing Secure Communities and the lack of compliance with this program at the
local level).
144. See MEISSNER & KERWIN, supra note 140, at 86.
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Beyond the situation within DHS, the condition of the immigration
adjudication system is especially problematic. Immigration courts within the DOJ
reconcile the enforcement of immigration laws with process-oriented aspirations
and limited due process requirements. If immigration adjudication is subject to
widespread delays and the analyses of immigration judges are routinely questioned,
stakeholders with a variety of views about immigration can further lose confidence
in the capacity of the system—or even a reformed system—to enforce laws and
vindicate individual protections. Saddled with a growing number of cases and
insufficient resources to address them, the total number of unresolved cases
before immigration courts has swelled from about 125,000 in 1999 to about
270,000 by 2011.145 Average completion time for immigration cases has grown
from 184 days in 1999 to 280 days in 2010.146 Some burdens reflect the
dissatisfaction of immigration courts with the bases for deportation advanced by
authorities in cases brought before them. Immigration courts are finding that in a
growing proportion of individuals brought before them (about ten percent
nationally, and roughly twenty percent in large districts such as Los Angeles and
Miami), ICE has no grounds to remove the person in question.147
Immigration judges review these cases against the backdrop of skyrocketing
apprehensions and diminishing resources for the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR). The accelerating increase in backlogs since the
EOIR was created and the immigration enforcement agencies were placed in
different departments underscores the differing incentives faced by the DHS and
DOJ as they sit together at the budget policymaking table. Even if individual
policymakers at the DHS are concerned about the adjudication-related
consequences of new policies, their department does not own the adjudicatory
function and is unlikely to approach it with as much concern as the DOJ. Within
the DOJ, meanwhile, resources for nearly all functions—including immigration
adjudication—have been squeezed by the redirection of resources toward national
security functions and prison operations.
In short, the immigration adjudication system could serve as an example of
federal capacity to administer immigration laws relatively efficiently. Instead, it is
an example of how certain laws are enforced in slow motion and procedural
guarantees are drastically delayed, thus unavoidably raising questions about the
federal government’s capacity to execute complex changes in immigration laws
that would also involve adjudication and procedural protections. Little wonder
that Judge Richard Posner, channeling widespread criticism within and outside the

145. See Growing Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGR. (2011),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/246/include/pendingG.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
146. See Immigration Courts Taking Longer to Reach Decisions, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/244.
147. See ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243.
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bench, described the performance of the immigration courts and the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) as “depressing.”148 This is not to say that all of the
problems and limitations associated with the recent performance of these agencies
are driven by funding problems or by the differing priorities of the DHS and
DOJ. It is all but impossible to understand those problems, however, without
considering the resource and caseload constraints of these adjudicatory
bureaucracies, or the extent to which the DHS and DOJ lack incentives to
coordinate enforcement, adjudicatory, prosecutorial, and civil litigation capacity.
These organizational problems may seem paltry in comparison to some of
the economic and political forces shaping administrators’ decisions to accept or
challenge existing provisions of immigration law, or lawmakers’ incentives when
facing organized interests unhappy with the status quo. Still, without some
attention to organizational factors, it is harder to understand why the agencies
cope with such a protracted policymaking cycle, particularly since the creation of
DHS. The glacial pace of policy change is evident, despite considerable effort
from some quarters, in the problems with immigration courts, in the slow-moving
reforms of Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds exceptions, and in the
process for revising agreements between ICE and the Department of Labor
(DOL).149 Nor can we understand the limits of presidential control over
immigration—discussed below—without appreciating the competing priorities of
agencies charged with immigration policy. And in the years following the creation
of DHS, the reforging of agency responsibilities almost certainly exacerbated
fragmentation, as it created coordination challenges both within the cabinet
department as well as with sister departments. So even if organization does not
explain every shortcoming in immigration law, or even in the law’s
implementation, policy change is more difficult and costly because of multiple
agency interests.
Of course, the presence of multiple agency interests in a given policy domain
is not unusual. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services
(encompassing both the FDA and CDC) shares jurisdiction with the Department
of Agriculture (USDA) over food safety.150 The FDA and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) both play a role in assuring the safety of drinking water,
with the EPA focused on tap water regulation and the FDA responsible for
regulating bottled water.151 In these and many other cases, though, agencies
148. See Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2005) (“At the risk of sounding like a
broken record, we reiterate our oft-expressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by the
Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . The performance of these federal
agencies is too often inadequate. This case presents another depressing example.”).
149. Labor and immigration authorities have long struggled to resolve internal disputes
involving the coordination of their jurisdiction. For a discussion, see Decker, supra note 7.
150. See Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31
SETON HALL L. REV. 61 (2000).
151. See Processing and Bottling of Bottled Drinking Water, 21 C.F.R. § 129.1 (2011).
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(whether by informal arrangement or more explicit legal distinction) split
responsibilities in a manner that does not require agencies to coordinate on a large
proportion of individual matters. There is thus a distinction between an
arrangement wherein the USDA shoulders near-exclusive responsibility for meat
and poultry safety even as the FDA regulates roughly the other eighty percent of
the food supply, and the more common situation involving immigration. In the
latter, a single case may involve an apprehension made by the CBP, an
investigation by ICE, immigration adjudication within the DOJ or in the federal
courts, criminal prosecution and eventual imprisonment also under the purview of
the DOJ, and collateral immigration benefit consequences impacting CIS and the
State Department.
In short, Americans have built an immigration system that is profoundly
fragmented and has become more so in the last decade. It may be tempting to
think of this motley arrangement as all but inevitable. If so, it is worth recalling
that the three other advanced industrialized nations with high rates of immigration
(Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) all have unified cabinet-level immigration
agencies.152 In contrast, the Homeland Security Act moved American bureaucracy
even further along the continuum of fragmentation by splitting the INS three
ways and lodging most of its functions within a new cabinet agency.153
C. Organizational Fragmentation #2: Limited Presidential Control
If the agencies charged with executing immigration laws and border
enforcement policies are fragmented, perhaps presidential control is the answer.
Yet the President, too, pays a price for the fragmentation, while also facing
political and institutional constraints arising from heightened public awareness of
immigration policy. Presidential administrations can, at the margin, pull on some
of the levers that might shape whether authorities focus on arresting unlawful
workers or take at least mild steps to target the employers.154 Though a President

152. MEISSNER & KERWIN, supra note 140, at 86.
153. This is not to suggest that centralization is the solution to every legal implementation
problem. In many if not most aspects of regulatory governance, centralization of certain functions
(say, those involving national and homeland security, conventionally defined) inevitably results in the
fragmentation of other functions (such as agricultural inspections or vaccinations). Sometimes the
benefits of decentralization and even agency competition may outweigh those achievable through
greater centralization. Nonetheless, administering immigration with as much fragmentation as exists
in the American system entails considerable costs, and given the nature of the splits in agency
responsibility, the system almost certainly suffers a good deal from the transaction costs of routine
(and often case-by-case) negotiation of common functions plus the difficulty of implementing rational
policy planning across the system. For a discussion of how the concept of transaction costs can
inform the analysis of public bureaucracies, including those with a need to forge agreements because
of overlapping mandates, see John D. Huber & Charles R. Shipan, The Costs of Control: Legislators,
Agencies, and Transaction Costs, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 25 (2000).
154. See, e.g., Julia Preston, A Crackdown on Employing Illegal Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011,
at A1.
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has some influence over these strategic goals of immigration policy and shapes the
congressional agenda on immigration, in many respects the President has more
limited control over enforcement and the executive aspects of immigration policy
than commonly believed.155
There is, it turns out, a deep irony to the modern presidential role in
immigration. Where legal scholarship sometimes points out the difference
between strict rules written into the law on the books and a more fluid,
discretionary reality reflected in the “law in action,”156 the situation is precisely the
opposite with regard to presidential control. The law on the books, as it were,
suggests extraordinary discretion. The reality is strikingly different.
Legislative changes, including ones favored by presidential administrations,
expanded responsibilities for removal and reshaped prevailing public expectations.
In doing so, lawmakers set in motion the now-familiar removal machinery built
into the agencies responsible for immigration, bringing about a mix of new
statutory authority, some initial increased budgets (though almost certainly not
enough to keep up with responsibilities), relationships with state and local
governments, and engendering of public expectations. The unusual spike in
removals during the second term of the Clinton administration, as we shall see,
helped create a new baseline, with new administrations facing elevated political
costs if they were viewed as fundamentally abandoning or otherwise entirely
undoing the newly-enshrined efforts to remove the undocumented population.
Hence, while individual administrations retain some control in reshaping the mix
of individuals removed (including, for example, the proportion being removed
after serious criminal convictions), they are not making macro level removal policy
decisions on a blank slate. The distinctive social and cultural elements of
immigration law discussed earlier make it harder to rely on the argument that
systematic changes in enforcement discretion are legitimate instances of executive
discretion. Meanwhile, constraints from (actual or potential) agency resistance and
lawmaker interference can play a persistent role in discouraging bold presidential
reforms using existing legal authority.

155. Cf. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 14 (positing a substantial role for the President in
shaping immigration policy as a matter of inherent constitutional authority and history, explicit
statutory authorization, and enforcement discretion). While there is no question that presidents retain
some capacity to influence how agencies implement immigration law, the argument above explains
why that capacity is, in practice, more limited than either the full scope of the statutory grants of
authority to the executive branch or the de facto degree of discretion that law enforcement officials
must exercise as a result of the staggering gap between their enforcement capacity and the full scope
of their responsibilities. Cox and Rodríguez are certainly right, however, to point out that the broader
issue of the presidential role in immigration is one of the most important pieces (if not the single
most critical piece) of the immigration puzzle.
156. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT C. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE
6–9 (1981) (discussing the distinction between the “law on the books” and the “law in action”).
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We can trace the pattern of increasingly constrained presidential capacity to
reshape the implementation of immigration enforcement over a long arc of years
and decades. Just as the organizational structure governing immigration law has
evolved, so has presidential power. In the process, the relative power of different
actors evolved as well. Since the period beginning just before IRCA, that arguably
inaugurated the present chapter in American immigration history, presidential
administrations have probably faced declining capacity to make stark changes in
immigration enforcement as immigration has become a higher-profile national
issue. In general, immigration enforcement reflects how agencies make sense of
their statutory responsibilities in a politically complicated, resource-constrained
world. By most accounts, the first lines of the post-IRCA chapter in immigration
law were written largely by agency actions. The INS and its partner agencies
already managed an elaborate (if not very flexible) arrangement to implement visa
allocation schemes and enforcement; IRCA increased this complexity by adding
new responsibilities for policing the labor market and creating a legalization
program that required a stark, short-term expansion in the provision of
immigration services.
Over time, agencies continued to play a meaningful role in many
implementation-related decisions about the INA. The INS, after engaging in
consultation with staff at the Justice Department and other agencies, was in a
position to decide on early strategies for interior and border enforcement, requests
for new resources, and how it would manage relations with other bureaus with
overlapping jurisdiction (as with the then-INS and the Labor Department). If
anything, these early choices about enforcement priorities and resources
(including, for example, regarding the broad presumption that employers would
comply with the law) were made all the more relevant because of the gaps and
contradictions in the relevant statutory scheme, and as long as public concern over
immigration remained low relative to other issues, these matters were less likely to
attract attention from the White House.
Over time, however, immigration law became a subject of greater public
concern, and early agency choices had consequences. As agency choices developed
into larger, more consistent patterns of implementation, initiatives ranging from
worksite enforcement changes to resource requests for border security developed
a cluster of political supporters both within and outside the relevant agencies,
raising the cost of dramatic presidential interference.157 Even more important,
growing public attention affected both the cost of presidential interference and
thus the incentives shaping presidential willingness to engage in such interference.
Adding to other factors limiting the reality of presidential prerogative in this
domain, what was once a blank canvas became a series of images reflective of a

157. Cf. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Refugee Security and the Organizational Logic of Legal Mandates,
37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 583, 696–701 (2006) (discussing “locked-in” organizational goals).
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baseline commitment to enforcing the law and securing the border, which
Presidents could not easily abandon. A closer look at presidential incentives and
recent trends bears this out.
Like agency officials, presidents clearly have a measure of power to change
certain details of immigration enforcement over time. The Obama administration,
for example, has reportedly conducted fewer of the high-profile workplace
enforcement actions that were commonplace in the latter part of the George W.
Bush administration. The Obama administration also reversed the previous
administration’s trend toward removing an ever-shrinking proportion of criminals
relative to civil immigration offenders. Nonetheless, political and organizational
constraints essentially take off the table certain options that would otherwise, in
principle, be available to have a systematic impact on the use of discretion in the
immigration system.
Indeed, with just a few exceptions and caveats, broad trends in removals,
investigation, and prosecution (with important but limited exceptions) have
continued through different administrations and across parties, at least since after
the second term of the Clinton administration. Thus, while the cumulative
increase in total annual removals between 1994 and the present is quite striking
(from about 46,000 removals to about 390,000), the increase occurred over several
administrations.158 Indeed, the extent and constancy of the increase, even during
periods where average resources for interior enforcement were declining, is
consistent with efforts from immigration authorities to pursue enforcement
activities likely to consistently generate larger numbers of removable individuals,
even if the specific individuals do not necessarily meet an explicit basis for
concern (e.g., commission of a serious crime). If there is an exception showcasing
the (limited but still potentially significant) role of changes in administrations, it is
in the Obama administration’s greater focus on removals of individuals
committing crimes. After being on a downward trajectory over the latter half of
the Bush administration (from 2005 to 2008), the percentage of formal removals
involving individuals who committed crimes in the United States jumped to over
forty percent in the first quarter (up from roughly twenty-five percent in 2009 and
about thirty percent in 2008).159 Even this shift, however, is relatively small in the
broader context of a mechanism that has provided nearly linear consistent
increases in removals across presidential administrations.
The Obama administration offers a further illustration of the constraints
affecting the prospect for drastic changes in discretionary removal authority. Over
two years into the presidential term, the administration announced further efforts

158. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95
(2009).
159. See, e.g., Current ICE Removals of Noncitizens Exceed Those Under Bush Administration, TRAC
IMMIGR. (Aug. 2, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/234.
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to further focus removals under the controversial Secure Communities.160 While
the new measures to focus removals on priority targets are likely to have some
measure of impact, they do not disturb the larger infrastructure allowing
authorities to remove individuals. The measures instead reflect the considerable
challenges that senior administration officials have encountered over more than
twenty-four months in asserting control over the routine actions of lower-level
enforcers who have increasing access (through state-federal cooperation
arrangements) even to detained individuals who have not been found guilty of
committing crimes. Senior officials are left to make a case for focusing scarce
removal resources on higher-value targets (particularly immigration violators who
have committed serious felonies). Given that the infrastructure for facilitating
removal of individuals detained in state and local jails and prisons is in place,
however, it would be difficult to argue that immigration violators should be
immune from removal simply because they have not committed serious offenses.
Meanwhile, it remains politically costly for the administration to dismantle the
infrastructure for increased removals created in previous Republican and
Democratic administrations, particularly given the administration’s focus on
demonstrating a commitment to interior enforcement even as it seeks legal
changes in immigration reform.161
In some ways this degree of continuity should not be surprising. The
presidential appointees who run immigration agencies face pressure from law
enforcement employees and as a result are apt to resist interference from political
superiors.162 Lawmakers and agency officials concerned about curtailing discretion
can leverage relatively widespread public concern about immigration enforcement
to raise the political cost to a presidential administration of making drastic changes
in immigration enforcement. While these constraints do not entirely limit an
administration’s capacity to make changes in its ex post facto enforcement strategy
or use tools such as humanitarian parole, these constraints exert considerable
influence over the choice set of a new administration, which can make either

160. See Enforcement and Removal: Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(July 28, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Jul. 28, 2011) (discussing the
nature and details of the Secure Communities program). The program relies on coordination between
local authorities and ICE officials and the use of biometric data and federal database resources to
identify individuals in local custody that may be subject to removal.
161. Cf. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003)
(discussing how the creation of an administrative scheme can make it politically costly for a politician
to dismantle that scheme at a subsequent time, even when many policymakers no longer support the
goals of the scheme).
162. See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Calls for His Resignation ‘Just Part of the Territory,’ WASH. POST, July
19, 2010, at A13 (describing Assistant Secretary Morton as “apolitical” and noting criticism from
lower-level ICE employees that he abandoned ICE’s “core mission”); see also Jerry Seper, Agents’ Union
Disavows Leaders of ICE, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at A1 (describing a “vote of no confidence” in
Morton by the union representing rank-and-file ICE field agents, who claimed ICE had “abandoned”
its core mission of protecting the public to support a political agenda favoring amnesty).
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legislative reforms or milder changes in emphasis (e.g., raising the priority of
removals of deportable individuals with criminal records) rather than drastic shifts
in policy.
Separate trends involving the implementation and enforcement of
immigration laws—including, for example, the increase in immigration-related
federal criminal charges—reflect a degree of organizational inertia and institutional
incentives that cut across multiple administrations. U.S. Attorney’s Offices are
receiving a greater number of referrals from the DHS bureaus flush with
additional border enforcement resources, and they can increase their total cases
and convictions. As a result, judicial districts along the Southwest border now
account for just under fifty percent of annual federal prosecutions, even though
they make up only nine percent of the national population. In Fiscal Year 2010,
federal prosecutors undertook about 47,000 federal immigration felony
prosecutions, compared to about 58,000 nonimmigration felony prosecutions. By
contrast, even just three years ago, the number of federal immigration felony
prosecutions was about 28,000, compared to roughly 60,000 nonimmigration
felony prosecutions. During roughly the same period, staff for the CBP increased
by thirty-five percent, while the staff for US Attorney’s Offices increased by only
nine percent.163
Relative continuity in enforcement policies is also evident in the Obama
administration’s approach to border enforcement. For example, in response to
Arizona Senator John Kyl’s questioning of the administration’s commitment to
border enforcement, the White House underscored its support for policies
continuing, by and large, the ramp-up in border enforcement resources. Even as
the administration’s communications director emphasized that “securing the
border will require a comprehensive solution to our broken immigration system,”
he also insisted that “there are more resources dedicated toward border security
today than ever before.”164 Examples touted by the administration as of mid-2010
included 110 new special agents for the Border Enforcement Security Task
Forces, and 116 new Border Patrol Agents—this after the border patrol itself
doubled in size in the five previous years (since 2004).165
Some of the pressures limiting administrations from asserting control over a
fragmented bureaucracy have originated in the engagement of Capitol Hill. As
public concern about immigration has grown, Congress has devoted increasing
attention to border and interior enforcement, with high-stakes consequences for
the incentives of officials implementing immigration policy. Congress held
hearings and pressed executive branch officials for commitments, limiting their
163. See Federal Criminal Enforcement and Staffing: How Do the Obama and Bush Administrations
Compare?, TRAC IMMIGR. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/245.
164. Dan Pfeiffer, The President’s Record on Border Security, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 21, 2010,
2:51 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/21/presidents-record-border-security.
165. Id.

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

56

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

[Vol. 2:1

flexibility on a relatively high-profile issue of some public salience (as reflected in
news accounts, even ones that focus on the limited changes administrations do
make). Examples also include congressional appropriations for, among other
things, worksite enforcement that could—if entirely resisted—implicate
impoundment-related fiscal jurisprudence.166
Given the weight of congressional influence, the treatment of Caribbean
immigrants and the Bracero program seem relatively exceptional as examples where
executive branch activity appeared to play a more substantial role in driving legal
and policy change. Even with these examples, however, the story does not directly
support the idea of preeminent presidential power. The Bracero program
developed at least in part within the context of a national security emergency, and
is best understood as an example of agency-initiated policy innovation. In
addition, Congress soon “ratified” the Bracero program through appropriations.167
It is also worth noting that the experience of managing Caribbean entrants played
out against increasing concerns about the reactions of Congress.168
In response to perceptions of presidential efficacy in immigration law
implementation, we can now reach the following tentative conclusions. A variety
of presidential administrations sometimes have resources foisted upon them by
Congress for particular enforcement activities such as worksite enforcement, even
though the resources provided are not sufficient to meet public expectations.169 In
addition, the President and his senior advisors are often constrained in their
capacity to forge their desired enforcement strategy by lawmakers, subordinate
officials, and overall public concerns about immigration and national security.
Accordingly, the broad historical trends—rising removals, a multi-faceted interior
enforcement strategy heavily focused on some version of worksite enforcement,

166. See, e.g., Mira Mdivani, ICE Worksite Enforcement Chief: ‘We Are Going After Employers,’
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (July 23, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/LegalIssues
/FederalResources/Pages/ICEWorksiteEnforcement.aspx (“[ICE enforcement official Brett] Dryer
disclosed that fully 90 percent of the ICE enforcement briefing notebook recently presented to his
director specifically addressed worksite enforcement issues. He said that Congress had appropriated
$134 million for worksite enforcement this year, and that ‘we fully intend to spend it on worksite
enforcement.’”).
167. See generally KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE (1992) (discussing the role played by
the INS and Congress in constructing the Bracero program).
168. The experience of managing Caribbean entrants played out against increasing concerns
about the reactions of Congress and the substantial past involvement of lawmakers. See, e.g., Gilburt
Loescher & John Scanlan, Human Rights, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Haitian Refugees, 26 J. INTERAMERICAN
STUD. & WORLD AFF. 313 (1984) (describing the reactions of policymakers in the U.S., including
lawmakers, to the threat and reality of Haitian migration at the time). Moreover, the lack of
congressional action—particularly in light of congressional hearings and considerable interest in
refugee flows among lawmakers—can also be understood as part of an equilibrium where executive
branch action avoids provoking a sufficiently intense response from lawmakers that would impair
executive branch flexibility.
169. See Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (holding that the President may not
countermand or defeat legislative goals by defunding activities through “impoundment”).
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and increased use of the Border Patrol—cut across individual administrations.
Congressional activity shows the extent of continuing lawmaker interest in
enforcement issues, and even includes specific appropriations for worksite
enforcement that become difficult for any administration to ignore. Even when
formal powers may exist to achieve starker changes in immigration policy, the
practical and political cost of using them can weigh heavily on administrations. An
administration may be excoriated by lawmakers and members of the public for
even considering measures to temporarily regularize the undocumented
population. Within bureaucracies, ICE agents and other law enforcement
personnel may resist wholesale ramp-downs in enforcement. Thus, while a mix of
judicially acknowledged discretion and resource limitations leave presidential
administrations with a measure of control over enforcement, their choices are
limited by larger forces they are only partially able to affect. How those constraints
evolve across presidential administrations depends heavily on underappreciated
connections between statutes, organizations and the public—to which we turn
below.
D. Public Attitudes and Polarizing Implementation
In reflecting on the implications of limited presidential control, it is
important to recognize that policy changes rarely produce a single type of policy
response over an extended period of time. Instead, as E.E. Schattschneider has
noted, policy can create its own politics.170 Earlier, we considered the core insight
of the “policy feedback” literature in political science and political sociology,
which builds on the idea that the public and policymakers respond to each
other.171 Hence, a program that garnered limited initial support can become
increasingly entrenched as constituencies ranging from the employees who
implement it to new local beneficiaries begin to respond to the potential
consequences of losing the new initiative.172

170. See SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 88.
171. See CANES-WRONE, supra note 90.
172. See Pierson, Increasing Returns, supra note 88, at 252. Note that the changing pattern of
responses to the implementation of a new law or policy could be exaggerated by the gain-loss
valuation asymmetry that has become such a staple of scholarship and theory in economic
psychology. The classic work here is Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decisions Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). One potential implication of the conventional
“prospect theory” view is that as policy changes arise and are no longer perceived by affected
constituents as gains but rather as part of a recalibrated status quo, the stakeholders affected may
expend an even greater effort to defend a subsequent change perceived as a loss than to enact what
had previously promised a potential benefit. Although some recent work challenges the strongest
versions of the loss aversion claims associated with prospect theory, individuals and organizations
may nonetheless continue to reflect a degree of loss aversion under certain conditions. See Charles R.
Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory
and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2007).
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But new laws are just half the equation; administrative implementation is the
other. A point sometimes passed over in the policy feedback scholarship is the
potential sensitivity of opinion leaders and the segments of the public they
influence to the implementation of legal provisions—a process that not only
implicates the initial legislative compromise and resulting statutory text, but also
the incentives and value commitments of the officials in charge of turning the
statute into an administrative program. If statutes and the public statements about
them (at the time of enactment) create a public narrative about what a policy is
supposed to achieve, then its implementation generates more explicit benefits and
burdens among relevant constituencies. In the process, implementation can
generate its own politics in a different way: by dramatizing gaps (even ones that in
retrospect should have been anticipated before implementation) between
expectations and realities that opinion leaders and policymakers then confront, or
even exploit.
With this in mind, we can trace a sequence in the recent evolution of
immigration law amounting to a form of polarizing implementation. The term is
meant to capture how the creation of an administrative scheme can affect public
reactions, and even heighten public division and controversy about a statutory
scheme. The core idea of polarizing implementation concerns the ironic
consequences of aggressive new enforcement-oriented statutory enactments in a
world where immigration is becoming a higher-profile issue of widespread public
concern. Instead of furthering the capacity of agencies to enforce the law, new
agency responsibilities do not necessarily improve prospects for promoting
observance of the law and could even make the problem worse. Rather, new
responsibilities could simultaneously exacerbate existing enforcement and
implementation problems while raising public expectations for aggressive action in
response to illicit activity.
If implementation problems are actually capable of ratcheting up the
tensions about immigration law, who exactly becomes more polarized? In this
context, the idea of “polarization” refers to the growing gap between public
enforcement expectations and agency capacity, coupled with frustration among
some constituents about the agencies’ enforcement activities. Anger from the
public, bolstered by reactions from lawmakers, anchor one aspect of polarization.
At the same time, for some immigrant and civil rights advocates, the extent of
discretion involved in interior enforcement is enough to emphasize the urgency of
reform and perhaps discourage these constituencies from supporting piecemeal
reform (viewed as making comprehensive reform less likely), even if the degree of
enforcement activity is not sufficient to satisfy the public or change the political
economy of employers’ calculus.
What follows is a brief stylized description of how this dynamic might play
out. (1) In an environment where public concern with immigration policy is
increasing, low enforcement nonetheless occurs relative to the amount of
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lawbreaking associated with the existing immigration system. This makes it easier
for some business interests to tolerate the existing system because they are less
likely to pay the costs for not complying, which almost certainly erodes the
legitimacy of the current system. (2) Lawmakers, seeking further changes in
immigration policy exploit public frustration with enforcement problems.
(3) Legislative changes since the 1986 IRCA framework expand the scope of the
removable population. (4) Finally, agencies lack the capacity, resources, or
incentives to drastically ratchet up enforcement, contributing to further political
reactions arising from gaps in agency enforcement and further pressures for
legislation complicating agencies’ enforcement missions. Consider each of these
elements in turn.
Greater Salience in Public Opinion and Media Coverage. We will begin
with the vast change in public concern, media coverage, and lawmaker activity
concerning immigration. Although mobilized interests continue to affect
immigration policy, greater public attention to immigration is now commonplace,
complicating the policymaking process. Specifically, public concern about
immigration, and frustration with the system, have grown starkly since 1986,
picking up in the 1990s after nearly a decade of the limited enforcement and
internal contradictions built into IRCA. One relatively comprehensive review of
public opinion trends involving immigration published in 2010 succinctly
summarized the research by noting that “[s]panning what will now be over a
decade, public opinion indicates an increasing concern over immigration issues in
addition to a lack of confidence in the ability of the country’s leaders to address
them.”173 Immigration has of course long been a topic of intense public
concern.174 But surveys show differences in public attitudes about immigration
over time, including particular concern about the federal government’s alleged
failure to enforce immigration laws.175 As a further reflection of the changing
political milieu in which public opinion develops, moreover, news coverage of
immigration in major U.S. newspapers indicates stark changes in the number of
stories about immigration overall. Figure 1 indicates a relatively constant increase
in the amount of immigration-related news coverage, even when compared to the
period between 1986 and 1990 during which Congress passed two major pieces of
immigration legislation.

173. See Segovia & Defever, supra note 102, 375–76 (2010).
174. John S. Lapinski et al., The Polls—Trends: Immigrants and Immigration, 61 PUB. OPINION Q.
356 (1997) (reviewing survey data).
175. See Segovia & Defever, supra note 102. Among other things, immigration has almost
certainly become a topic of greater interest in many communities seeing a new influx of
undocumented immigrants. See Jennifer L. Hochschild, International Migration at a Crossroads: Will
Demography Change Politics Before Politics Impedes Demographic Change? (July 13–15, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/International%20Migration%20at%
20a%20Crossroads.sent_.pdf (discussing the potential consequences of demographic changes on
debates about immigration).
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It may be tempting to think about the swelling public concern over
immigration entirely separately from the content and enforcement of immigration
laws. But rising public concern and skyrocketing media coverage seem only
partially explained by changing demographics in certain local areas, since the
increase in coverage is apparent in national news sources, and rising public
concern evident even in regions that had long experience with high levels of (legal
and undocumented) immigration. It is telling, in fact, that public frustration with,
and concern about, immigration policy has risen fairly constantly in the years since
IRCA and its resulting enforcement problems. Meanwhile, the structure of
immigration law essentially turns millions of Americans into lawbreakers by setting
up labor market requirements that are onerous, yet only occasionally enforced.176
In addition, politicians’ repeated and intense focus on lack of enforcement—
chronicled below—strongly suggests that such appeals resonate with the public.
In short, political debates about immigration and perhaps other regulatory
domains almost certainly evolve in response to how laws are enforced. If
immigration enforcement was irrelevant to public attitudes, we would probably
see less focus in political rhetoric on immigration enforcement and more on the
amount of immigration or other substantive issues involving immigration law.
Concerns over enforcement, and particularly border security, have gained
exponentially greater news coverage in recent years, suggesting some evolution in
the politics of immigration relative to previous decades in the years since IRCA’s
dysfunctional scheme was implemented. Business reactions could also indirectly
affect public attitudes about enforcement: a vastly different and more aggressive
enforcement strategy—absent anything else—would almost certainly create a
backlash from economic interests, which in turn would change the larger political
context of debates over enforcement.
As a threshold matter, the potential for greater public concern about
immigration does have some tentative implications that shed further light on the
fate of immigration law reform efforts. When Ronald Reagan worked with
Democratic and Republican lawmakers to enact a large-scale legalization program
in 1986, lawmakers and the public were far less concerned about immigration. By
contrast, immigration reform efforts strongly supported by presidential
administrations were more likely to trigger the ire of an engaged public when they

176. Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo even makes the case that affluent and middle-class
Americans are critical players in a vast informal economy at the margins of immigration and labor
regulation. See Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Affluent Players in the Informal Economy: Employers of Paid
Domestic Workers, 17 INT’L J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 130 (1997). For a brief but interesting discussion of
compliance challenges, see generally Kathleen A. DeLaney, A Response to “Nannygate”: Untangling U.S.
Immigration Law to Enable American Parents to Hire Foreign Child Care Providers, 70 IND. L.J. 305 (1994).
Whether the link between existing U.S. immigration policy and widespread noncompliance becomes a
significant political axis in public disputes over immigration policy depends in no small measure on
the future of enforcement and the extent to which illicit labor market bargains become a potential
trigger for social stigma among affluent and middle class families.

Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete)

2012]

4/17/2012 1:22 PM

POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF IMMIGRATION LAW

61

were attempted in 2006, 2007, and 2009–2010. Ironically, the greater the public’s
overall concern about immigration (particularly given a relatively limited grasp of
all the subtleties), the easier it may be to undermine conventional (elite) bargaining
that could cement conventional pluralist coalitions supporting reform, as occurred
during successful rounds of immigration lawmaking in previous generations.177
Increased Activity From Lawmakers and Policymakers. Politicians have
been increasingly drawn to the immigration issue as public concern has risen, and
often focus on popular anger over the perceived failures of immigration policy,
and in particular the lack of enforcement. In particular, there is a striking trend in
growing congressional attention to immigration over time. As Figure 2 illustrates,
the now-familiar pattern of extensive lawmaker interest in immigration was not so
much the case in past decades. Instead the starkest increases emerged over the last
twenty-five years, as the limitations of IRCA became increasingly apparent. As
indicated in Figure 2, the percentage of congressional hearings focused on
immigration rose fivefold in sixteen years, from just over 0.5% in 1990 to nearly
2.5% in 2006. Similarly, the percentage of Congressional Quarterly Almanac articles
(describing single legislative initiatives) focusing on immigration has risen fourfold
over a similar time period. The percentage rose from less than one percent in
1986, when IRCA was passed, to nearly four percent in 2006 (and over six percent
in 2000). These developments show how public concern, news coverage, and
congressional discussions of immigration all yield a converging picture of
increasing concern about immigration. One should not overinterpret these figures,
as they do not highlight the precise nature of congressional concerns.
Nonetheless, changes in these measures shed some light on how lawmakers make
decisions about the allocation of two scarce resources capable of driving the
nature of the national lawmaking agenda—their time (as reflected in decisions
about the content and frequency of committee hearings), and their willingness to
introduce legislative proposals that compete for limited public attention.
The picture comes further into focus when we scrutinize policymakers’
stated concerns about the lack of enforcement and the context of public opinion
fueling such concerns. Specifically, political statements from lawmakers across a
variety of contexts routinely focus ever-greater attention on the perceived need to
facilitate removals and increase border enforcement resources.178 Moreover,

177. Accounts of immigration legislation during the 1960s and 1980s emphasize elite
bargaining rather than mass mobilization of public support. For a discussion of the role of elite
bargaining in the 1965 Immigration Act and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, see
ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 324–33 (discussing the legislative machinations and political deals
culminating in the 1965 Act), and Tichenor, supra note 84, at 360 (discussing the 1986 Act, and
concluding that “[b]y insulating policymaking from the views of the public, a constriction of alien
admission and rights was averted”).
178. Although mere unlawful presence in the United States was already a civil offense before
IRCA and the subsequent buildup in border resources, the federal government had yet to implement
the statutes and resource commitments reflecting the policy goal of policing forcefully against
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agency failures to live up to public expectations (as demonstrated by criticisms of
the perceived slow start of Secure Communities, for example) probably contribute
to a political atmosphere facilitating greater political frustration with the existing
immigration system, and eventually encouraging further rounds of lawmaking that
expands agency enforcement responsibilities (discussed in more detail below).
Even the political rhetoric by itself, however, is likely to have an impact on
voters. Scholars have examined the impact of political appeals on decision making,
both in general contexts and in situations implicating immigration. Individuals
exposed to political information shape their reactions and beliefs in response to
that information, and in the context of immigration, will often respond to the
particular mix of ideas communicated by policymakers.179 These results appear to
reflect not only the potential for information to have a genuinely persuasive effect
on those exposed to it, but also the ways in which political appeals on subjects
such as the insufficiency of immigration enforcement can affect the relative
strength of an individual’s preexisting concerns.180
The Core of the Process: Statutory Change, (Worsening)
Organizational Challenges, and Public Frustration. Having documented
swelling public concern and policymakers’ increasing willingness to engage with
immigration issues, we can now complete the picture by returning to the

immigration violations. Once those goals were established, politicians could criticize the gap between
the putative goals of the immigration laws and their reality. Beginning in the 1990s and increasing
over the last decade, federal, state, and local politicians have done precisely this. The following are just
a few examples from a variety of contexts: Proposals to Reform United States Immigration Policy, Hearing
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 103rd Congress (2nd Sess.), 20–22 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Bob Graham) (proposing various bills aimed at reducing the fiscal impact that
illegal immigration has had on immigrant receiving states such as Florida), Eric Schmitt, GOP Fight
with Clinton on Immigrants Splits Party, N.Y. TIMES, at A16 (Oct. 22, 2000) (citing some lawmakers’
concerns about legislation legalizing the status of many immigrants given the lack of enforcement of
existing immigration laws), and Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Plans to Sue U.S. Over Illegal Alien Costs,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at A10 (describing the strategies of politicians in California and Texas
supportive of lawsuits against the federal government asking for resources given insufficient and
ineffective enforcement efforts). Note that sometimes prevailing public attitudes can form an
equilibrium with political narratives offering a simple explanation for complex phenomena such as the
changing role of the United States in the world or the causes and effects of migration flows to the
United States. The prevailing public attitudes and political responses strengthen each other. Cf.
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of Antitreaty
Discourse, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1629 (2003) (describing “a sort of equilibrium—politicians’ . . .
rhetoric shapes public opinion, but that opinion in turn shapes what politicians choose to emphasize
to please key constituencies.”). For just one example from the immigration context suggesting
widespread public perceptions that laws are not enforced, see generally Fox News Poll: 72 Percent Say
Government Not Enforcing Immigration Laws, FOXNEWS.COM (July 29, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/
us/2010/07/29/fox-news-poll-percent-say-government-enforcing-immigration-laws/.
179. See Ted Brader et al., What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and
Immigration Threat, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 959 (2008).
180. Cf. George C. Edwards III et al., Explaining Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue
Salience, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 108, 108 (1995) (discussing how changing issue salience can affect political
outcomes, even if individuals are not persuaded to change their substantive views).
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substance of immigration law and the organizations implementing it over the last
quarter century. That picture is as revealing for what it conveys about the lack of
fundamental change in the larger architecture of immigration as for what it reveals
about the consequences of changes involving agency responsibilities, border
enforcement, and public reactions.
For agencies operating in an environment of relatively high political scrutiny,
grants of new authority also tend to generate new responsibility. This is plainly
true when agencies gain authority to admit a larger number of migrants that
require adjudication and processing (as under the 1990 Immigration Act), but it is
also true in the context of enforcement. If some statutory changes expand agency
powers or relieve agencies of procedural burdens,181 in the immigration realm
those changes are also coupled with expanded responsibilities and rising public
expectations. New powers to remove an ever-expanding class of individuals—
including lawful permanent residents—will often leave agency officials with a
considerable gap between their enforcement capacity and public expectations.
Even when lawmakers provide agencies new resources to fulfill expanded
responsibilities, as occurred when lawmakers appropriated resources to fund
expanded border enforcement efforts authorized in IRCA and subsequent
legislation, those responsibilities in turn generate additional work for other
agencies involved in detention, prosecution, and adjudication that have rarely
received sufficient resources to keep up with the new work.182 Finally,
extraordinary changes in border enforcement encouraged by each major
immigration statute since the 1990 Immigration Act appear to have discouraged
circular migration and thus raised the proportion of longer-term undocumented
immigrants, further adding to the burdens faced by interior enforcement
bureaucracies.
Meanwhile, though agencies have been forced to implement statutes creating
more expansive enforcement missions since 1986, bureaus often lack the
resources or incentives to take on the widespread extent of illegal activity in the
domestic labor market. Doing so would require agencies to incur considerable
political risks, and agencies lack the resources required—particularly given a
statute that limits the size of penalties save in narrow circumstances where
extremely egregious behavior can be demonstrated. From this perspective, it is not
so surprising that employer-focused investigations as a percentage of total interior
enforcement investigations declined from nine percent of the total in 1991—early
in the post-IRCA era, when there was still some uncertainty about the scope of
employer responsibility—to two percent by 2003, when such uncertainty was

181.
182.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part III.B (discussing agency coordination problems).
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considerably minimized and agencies would have incurred greater risks in pursuing
allegedly intrusive investigations against employers.183
Among the most striking features of immigration law’s implementation is the
trajectory of interior enforcement budgets. In fact, the apparent upward trajectory
in nominal enforcement budgets for interior immigration enforcement is wildly
misleading. An example, take a closer look at detention and removal operations
for the critical decade and a half following passage of IRCA, during which
immigration authorities put in place the modern system for interior enforcement
of immigration laws. During the 1990s, interior enforcement agencies received the
major new responsibility of removing a potentially vastly greater proportion of
aliens because of the expanded criminal-related bases for removal.184 Almost
overnight, a far larger proportion of aliens—including lawful permanent
residents—became subject to removal for offenses that could even encompass
certain misdemeanors.
Yet if we leave aside these new responsibilities and focus only on the preexisting detention and removal tasks that immigration authorities needed to carry
out, the removal budget did not consistently keep up with increases in the
undocumented population.185 Figure 3 shows the progression. Between 1988 and
1993, removal resources per undocumented individual (in constant 1985 dollars)
dropped nearly fifty percent. While resources began to increase somewhat once
IIRIRA passed in 1996, by 1999 removal resources per undocumented individual
were below 1986 levels, even as the scope of removal responsibilities skyrocketed
because of the new law. Detention and removal resources rose again after roughly
2005, but only to the point where the most recent statistics barely equal levels
during the 1980s.

183. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT SPENDING SINCE IRCA
6 (2005).
184. See generally Daniel A. Klein, Validity, Construction, and Application of Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)—Supreme Court Cases, 53 A.L.R. FED. 2D 117, § 2 (2011)
(discussing how IIRIRA expanded the types of conviction and criminal conduct constituting grounds
for removal, restricted eligibility for relief, limited procedural rights in removal hearings, and restricted
judicial review).
185. See infra Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Immigration Investigation (1985–2002) and Detention and Removal
Resources (1985–2010) (adjusted for size of the undocumented population, in
constant 1985 dollars)186
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Remarkably enough, the conventional story of staggering resource increases
for immigration enforcement over the last two decades turns out to be misleading.
Instead, during crucial periods in the modern history of immigration enforcement,
new responsibilities and falling budgets exerted an impact on the implementation
of immigration laws. Among other things, these resource constraints all but
certainly exacerbated incentives for immigration authorities to execute routinized,
dragnet-style approaches for removing large numbers of inmates and prisoners
through initiatives such as the Secure Communities program, which sought to
leverage coordination with state authorities.187 Although such an approach may
provide ICE certain structural advantages, given its position as an agency
struggling to meet public expectations with limited resources, this approach can
also engender harsh criticism from some jurisdictions craving greater control over
removals. It also risks further expanding public expectations of ICE’s capacity to

186.
David Dixon, and Julia Gelatt, Immigration Enforcement Spending Since IRCA, MIGRATION
POLICY INSITUTE 7 (Nov. 2005), available at www.migrationpolicy.org (Office of Investigations
budget); Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends,
2010, PEW HISPANIC CENTER REPORT (February 1, 2011), available at www.pewhispanic.org (size of
the undocumented population); TRACFed (ICE budgets for detention and removal); Dep’t of Labor
site used for inflation adjustment.
187. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1823 (1998)
(discussing dragnet-style approaches to drug enforcement).
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remove criminal aliens.
The federal government’s budget for interior immigration enforcementfocused investigative functions shows an even starker drop-off compared to the
removal budget. Amidst burgeoning interest in immigration fraud, removal of
violent and drug gang members, and alien smuggling operations, the Office of
Investigations retained the staggering responsibility of policing American
workplaces. This is a trying task in the best of circumstances, because in principle,
millions of businesses could be subject to employer sanctions.188 We know from
the structure of the INA and cases such as Collins Foods that the agency faces limits
in its capacity to drastically reshape the regulatory environment.189 The agency’s
capacity to live up to its responsibility thus depends crucially on budgets.
Assuming a constant amount of resources (and using the existing undocumented
population as a rough proxy for the challenges involved in policing the labor
market), domestic enforcement capacity would still be strained by new
enforcement initiatives involving fraud, and particularly by the expectation that
after the 1996 passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA authorities could become more
aggressive in removing aliens involved in criminal activity. What would be truly
stunning is to assume that law enforcers could realistically have met their
enforcement challenges as new responsibilities were added, and budgets relative to
the undocumented population were shrinking.
That, however, was the trajectory of budgets for the Office of Investigations
at INS in recent years, between 1985 and 2002.190 Figure 4 also tells this story: in
constant 1985 dollars, investigative resources relative to the size of the
undocumented population rose substantially only for about a year immediately
following the IRCA legalization (owing to the reduction in the undocumented
population). After that, resources fell precipitously, with the 2002 total at less than
half the 1987 total. Meanwhile, several pieces of legislation, most notably IIRIRA
in 1996,191 expanded investigative responsibilities even as resources declined
further. Of course, these declines hardly diminish the considerable opportunity
cost implicit in much of the budget allocation to interior investigations and
removal operations associated with an immigration system that aims in principal
to remove vast numbers of undocumented individuals. Even adjusted for inflation
and relative to the size of the undocumented population, removal resources have
risen sharply during much of the last decade (though in relative terms only to their
level in the late 1980s). With a different allocation of resources, federal authorities
188. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics About Business Size (including Small Business), available at
http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
189. See supra Part I.A.
190. See supra Figure 3. The analysis becomes more difficult after the creation of DHS because
the Office of Investigations within the newly constituted ICE assumed responsibilities for both
immigrations and customs violations.
191. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
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could focus far greater resources on more urgent concerns such as counterterrorism.
Despite the opportunity cost represented by the current situation, however, it is
important to recognize that it has nonetheless left agencies in a difficult position
relative to meeting public expectations engendered by their statutory
responsibilities.

Avgerage Yearly Change in Removals

Figure 4: Percent Change in Formal Removals, by Presidential Term, Since Passage of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986192
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Even before IIRIRA, statutory changes foreshadowed the expansion of
agency responsibilities that would be wrought in 1996 and, indeed, began
expanding those functions. The 1990 Immigration Act added agency to
enforcement responsibilities by enhancing IRCA-related regulations. The trend
continued in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and
several other pieces of legislation since then.193 Although the most immediate
impact of border enforcement funding is on the Border Patrol, border

192. DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 36 (2009).
193. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 28, at 28 (discussing how the Immigration
Act of 1990 “augmented the regulations enacted by IRCA”); id. at 42 (explaining how the Violent
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1994 increased immigration enforcement authorities’
responsibilities through an enlarged definition of “aggravated felony” resulting in a larger removable
population).
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enforcement increases also create consequences for domestic law enforcement
agencies, and specifically for criminal prosecutions undertaken by the Justice
Department. More Border Patrol agents produce a larger crop of apprehensions,
which in turn generates domestic investigations and prosecutions. In addition, the
1994 Act authorized faster removal procedures for some criminal aliens,
contributing to a trend toward growth in the population eligible for removal. The
trend became more pronounced as a result of legislation passed just two years
later.194
The enactment of IIRIRA created a stark and now-familiar expansion in the
scope of removal. While some of its statutory requirements could be viewed as
helpful to immigration enforcers (by facilitating the removal of certain individuals
through limitations on procedural constraints), the core effect of IIRIRA was to
expand the size of the removable population. A core element of the INA is the
definition of a removable alien, including any alien in the United States who enters
without authorization or overstays a visa.195 But IIRIRA starkly expanded the
number of lawful permanent residents who were removable (the size of this
expansion depending on the interpretation of the aggravated felony provisions in
IIRIRA), and because this has an impact on agency activities and the public’s
expectations, it is worth briefly reviewing the scope of the changes. Following
IIRIRA, even some misdemeanors are a sufficient basis for removing lawful
permanent residents.196 Moreover, recent statutory changes (and particularly
IIRIRA) drastically restrict immigration judges’ capacity to suspend deportation.
The effect is a pronounced change, in the form of a vastly larger number of
people subject to removal.197 What was once the “drastic measure” of deportation
or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted
of crimes.198 In the immediate wake of IIRIRA, formal removals jumped to over
114,000 from about 50,000 in 1995.199

194. See id.
195. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006)
(explaining that “an alien present . . . without being admitted or paroled . . . is inadmissible”);
Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(A) (explaining that “any alien . . . inadmissible [at the
time of entry] is deportable”).
196. See, e.g., Dawn Marie Johnson, Note, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as
Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477 (2001).
197. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478–80 (2010) (discussing how the
landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last ninety years. While once
there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority
to prevent deportation, “immigration reforms have expanded the class of deportable offenses and
limited judges’ authority to alleviate deportation’s harsh consequences.”).
198. See ARNOLD & PORTER, LLP, ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGR., REFORMING THE
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 4-9–4-20 (2010) (describing the loss
of judicial discretion in immigration cases and arguing that it should be restored); see also Fong Haw
Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (describing removal proceedings as “drastic measures”).
199. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
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In short, by enlarging the size of the removable population, the 1996 laws
have exacerbated (even after some increases in resources) public concerns about
the failure of agencies to carry out their enforcement missions. Consider the
following: even as the rate of removals skyrocketed from about 70,000 at the time
of IIRIRA’s passage to 200,000 by 2004 and nearly 400,000 by 2010, increasing
attention focused on ICE’s perceived failure to efficiently remove criminal aliens
and other undocumented immigrants from the United States.200 Even with record
totals of removals, critics blasted the gap between the number of individuals
removed by ICE and the scope of the removable population. Some lawmakers
criticized ICE as showing “apathy toward robust immigration enforcement,” and
other observers decried what they described as a “sense of impunity.”201
Admittedly, Congress has increased the interior immigration enforcement
budget in the years since IIRIRA was enacted.202 Yet those increases have not
come close to enabling immigration authorities to fully meet the public’s
expectations, given the growth in the overall undocumented population and the
expansive number of lawful permanent residents and other aliens potentially
subject to removal in the wake of IIRIRA. Budgets for interior investigations tell
part of the story. Figure 3 above demonstrates a dramatic decrease in actual
resources for interior investigation in the critical period between IRCA’s passage
and 2002, at which point the INS was broken up and its pieces moved into the
DHS. As the undocumented population has increased, immigration enforcement
agencies have faced increasing pressure on a relatively meager interior

159 (2004).
200. Id.; see also News Release, DHS/ICE Reveal Highest Immigration Enforcement Numbers on Record
in Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/1010/101008washingtondc.htm (discussing total removals). For criticisms of ICE
efforts, see generally Marc R. Rosenblum & William A. Kandel, Interior Immigration Enforcement:
Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, CONG. RES. SERVICE REP. R42057 30 (Oct. 21, 2011) (“[T]he
proportions of arrests involving Level 1 criminals declined [between FY2006 and FY2011]”), and U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-67, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ICE COULD IMPROVE
CONTROLS TO HELP GUIDE ALIEN REMOVAL DECISION MAKING (2007) (recommending expanded
guidance for ICE personnel to exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis). Such reports also garner
coverage in the media. See, e.g., House Panel to Subpoena Homeland Security for Information in Illegal
Immigrants, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/11/02/
house-panel-to-subpoena-dhs-for-information-on-illegal-immigrants/ (discussing the Congressional
Research Service and noting lawmaker concern triggered by the report’s information regarding the
number of criminals eligible for removal that were not removed). Meanwhile, critics argue that ICE
has achieved its record of removals only by sweeping into Secure Communities and similar efforts
individuals with only minor (if any) infractions and even U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Anjli Raval, U.S. to
Target Criminals in Deportations, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7c0b19b6
-0a2f-11e1-85ca-00144feabdc0.html.
201. See Peter Slevin, Record Numbers Being Deported, WASH. POST, July 26, 2010, at A1.
202. See generally Immigration and Customs (ICE) Enforcement Budget Expenditures FY 2005–FY
2010, TRAC IMMIGR. (2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/224/include/3.html
(documenting ICE budget trends since 2005).
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investigations budget (even one that has risen to some degree).203
Whatever else IIRIRA accomplished, it did not fundamentally change the
legal regime governing employer sanctions or the architecture of overall
immigration policy. In contrast, stark changes in border enforcement have been
easier to achieve. As immigration has become an issue of greater public concern,
lawmakers have increasingly sought to engage the issue—but for the most part,
major changes in interior enforcement and even future flows have been more
difficult to achieve. Instead, the present institutional political economy of
immigration law favors border enforcement. In the specific context of
immigration-related lawmaking, border security is different—figuratively and
literally—from the other three major components of comprehensive reform:
employer verification, legalization, and legal immigration.204 Because it is simple to
grasp as a “policy metaphor” and the political costs of enhanced border
enforcement are lower than those of stepped-up interior enforcement for nearly
all relevant constituencies,205 enhanced border enforcement policies galvanize
relatively strong support from the public (only a tiny fraction of whom experience
the costs) and provoke relatively little interest-group opposition.206
From an analytical perspective, there may seem to be little fundamental
difference between regulating migration by raising the costs of entry and doing so
by decreasing the value of illegal entry. But a distinction almost certainly exists at
the level of political psychology and public rhetoric. Voters and lawmakers
routinely assume that the direct costs of entry can be easily affected by ratcheting
up border enforcement. Notwithstanding some of the less visible complexities and
unintended consequences, sending a message may be the paramount goal.207 On
203. Admittedly, the staff at ICE has pursued some administrative innovations resulting in the
creation of initiatives such as Secure Communities to facilitate removal of criminal aliens. Yet even
these efforts have a two-edged quality, by simultaneously facilitating the removal of large numbers of
individuals (with the proportion of serious criminals varying on the basis of program capacity and
priorities) and further raising public expectations that substantial numbers of criminals will be
successfully removed. See supra Part III.C (discussing Secure Communities).
204. See MPI TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 47, 53 (describing broadly accepted elements of
comprehensive immigration reform).
205. See generally Richard R. Lau & Mark Schlesinger, Policy Frames, Metaphorical Reasoning, and
Support for Public Policies, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 77 (2005) (concluding that policy metaphors help
constrain the beliefs of even the least politically aware members of the general public); Mark
Schlesinger & Richard R. Lau, The Meaning and Measure of Policy Metaphors, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611
(2000) (discussing how policy metaphors help guide political reasoning among both elites and the
general public).
206. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 125, at 545 (contrasting border enforcement to interior
enforcement and noting that “[b]order measures, in contrast, step on almost no influential toes.
Border crackdowns are therefore used to demonstrate enforcement seriousness, alienating few and
placating many”).
207. Cf. Kitty Calavita, The New Politics of Immigration: “Balanced-Budget Conservatism” and the
Symbolism of Proposition 187, 43 SOC. PROBS. 284 (1996) (stating that “in the United States at least [in
the mid-1990s] immigration is one of the few public policy issues in this contentious period on which
most political leaders agree, with President Clinton and Newt Gingrich both calling for greater
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the other hand, decreasing the value of undocumented entry depends on a mix of
policy tools that include regulatory review of the work authorization process, ex
post facto interior enforcement, and legal migration avenues to change the
opportunity cost of illicit migration. Simpler arguments, not surprisingly, tend to
be more persuasive—particularly among low-information yet emotionally engaged
members of the public.208 Indeed, voters whose exposure to information about
seemingly lax enforcement on the border arouses strong negative reactions will
tend to weigh that information more heavily,209 and may have a far harder time
accepting the more complex case for interior enforcement and legal immigration
reform.210 Individuals with strong affective responses often tend to have a harder
time focusing on the policy nuances of a particular course of action rather than
the symbolic content of a policy. In a political environment of rising concern
about immigration and strong affective responses to the perceived erosion of
sovereignty, the marginally simpler policy argument of fortifying the border is
likely to have greater resonance among unsophisticated but concerned voters than
the more complex idea of shaping the demand for migration through multiple
regulatory strategies.
By contrast, other pieces of comprehensive reform are a harder sell.
Lawmakers who are channeling public frustration with the immigration status quo
are often unwilling to support the more substantial regulatory burdens associated
with changes in employer verification. Employer verification is increasingly
popular among the public, but relatively lax enforcement keeps the costs on
business and individuals manageable. Drastic changes in employer verification—
involving either increased enforcement or greater federal surveillance and
control—would generate either interest group opposition or concern over civil
liberties and the centralization of state power. Supporters of legalization include
immigrant advocates, civil rights organizations, some employers, and a variety of
constituencies including some representatives of law enforcement, local

control of the borders”).
208. See Michael D. Cobb & James H. Kuklinski, Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political
Persuasion, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 88, 93 (1997). Reviewing a variety of empirical studies and placing their
own results in context, Cobb and Kuklinski draw a distinction between arguments that are “long and
complex” and “largely factual and argumentative in content” versus those that are “short, simple, and
symbolic,” and find the latter far easier for relatively poorly informed voters to assimilate persuasively.
Though Cobb and Kuklinski do not specifically discuss immigration and border policy, their
categories readily map onto the distinction between arguments for increased border enforcement and
those calling for a coordinated approach including regulation of domestic employers, border and
interior enforcement, and changes in legal immigration opportunities, while also highlighting the
unintended consequences of more enforcement (e.g., disrupting circular migration and encouraging
longer-term undocumented stays in the United States).
209. See Joanne M. Miller, Examining the Mediators of Agenda Setting: A New Experimental Paradigm
Reveals the Role of Emotions, 28 POL. PSYCHOL. 689 (2007).
210. Cf. Brader et al., supra note 179.
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government, and religious groups.211 But a substantial fraction of the public is
skeptical that this will solve perceived immigration problems, so the larger public
remains divided. Large-scale reforms of legal immigration pose risks to some
stakeholders (e.g., those favoring high absolute levels of family-based migration,
employers losing some control over employment-based migration, and organized
labor concerned about future flows). Meanwhile, border security increases entail
fiscal costs rarely borne by a concentrated group with political power in the
United States.212 The direct costs of increased border enforcement affect only a
small fraction of residents close to the border, and this is offset by the greater
interest from some members of those communities who instead favor more
intense enforcement.
The legacy of the ramp-up in border enforcement is at least as complicated
as the idea behind securing the border is simple. As Massey and other scholars
report, the stark increase in border enforcement resources has coincided with a
marked increase in the reluctance of Mexican-origin, U.S.-based, undocumented
immigrants to return to Mexico in the wake of the surge in border enforcement.
This development has almost certainly added to the cumulative size of the
undocumented population in the United States.213 More specifically, the border
buildup appears to have dramatically changed migrants’ willingness to attempt
returning to Mexico as part of a pattern of circular migration. Based on analyses of
decisions of undocumented Mexican migrants, the probability of return to Mexico
within twelve months of undocumented entry fell from just over forty percent
around 1986 to about twenty-five percent by 2002. Given that the rate of entry of
undocumented immigrants remained fairly constant, the overall undocumented
population predictably increased—in part, ironically, because of the border
buildup’s almost certain impact of discouraging return migration.214
The border buildup disrupts circular migration because of the costs imposed
on circular migrants. As Massey puts it,
Raising the out-of-pocket costs of undocumented migration increases trip
lengths because migrants have to work longer before the trip becomes
profitable. [Also] by pushing migrants away from urban areas and into
more remote sectors, operations Blockade and Gatekeeper increased the
211. See, e.g., Amy Sullivan, Religious Groups Push for Immigration Reform, TIME, Apr. 30, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1986320,00.html; Dennis Wagner, Police Chiefs
Press for Immigration Reform, USA TODAY, July 23, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
nation/2009-07-23-police-chiefs-immigration_n.htm.
212. The occasional protests of local cities in the Southwest whose landowners are affected by
construction of border fencing constitutes an interesting exception that underscores the extent to
which conventional border enforcement fails to garner concentrated opposition from economic
interests. See Texas Cities Join Suit Against Mexico Border Fence, WASH. TIMES, May 29, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/may/29/texas-cities-join-suit-against-mexico-borderfence.
213. See Massey, supra note 114, at 136.
214. Id.
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physical danger of border crossing. . . . The end result of the border
buildup has thus been to lower the probability of return migration and
push migrants toward permanent settlement.215
Migrants who do cross often end up in different places. A major consequence
of the ramp-up in border enforcement appears to have been a change in migrants’
crossing patterns—away from a high concentration on traditional border-crossing
points and toward states such as Arizona that subsequently exhibited growing
concern over illicit migration.216 By driving illicit migrants crossing the U.S.Mexico border away from the two historically most common border-crossing
points (San Diego and El Paso) and toward a greater number of locations, the
border buildup ironically helped beget the political backlash against immigrants
that has been so critical in explaining recent American immigration policy.217
When the ranks of the Border Patrol began swelling in the early 1990s, the
proportion of U.S.-Mexico illicit border crossers not crossing at San Diego and El
Paso began to skyrocket (rising to forty percent by 1993, from thirty percent in
1989). As migrants scattered from the original corridors, they moved toward states
such as Arizona and New Mexico, where immigration soon became a far more
prominent political issue. At the same time (whether simply because of new
economic opportunities, or because the move away from crossing in Texas and
California moved new migrants into different social and economic networks),
illicit migrants crossing from Mexico increasingly ended up in different and less
urban areas that had relatively limited if any previous experience with significant
migration from Latin America.218
The relatively high salience of immigration today compared to 1986 is a
major factor shaping the status quo and complicating policy change. When
immigrants were more heavily concentrated in large immigrant-receiving states,
the immigration issue held far less national resonance. Immigration sometimes
became controversial in such states, as with California and the fight over
Proposition 187 in the mid-1990s.219 For the most part, however, these states
tended to have long-term experience receiving large numbers of immigrants.
Moreover, some states, as with California, were already on a long-term
demographic trajectory that favored less aggressive policies against unlawful
immigrants by making the issue less novel and fostering constituencies supportive

215. Id.
216. Id. at 132 (“Operation Gatekeeper, by far the largest deployment of enforcement
resources, deflected migrants away from California toward new crossing points in Arizona, New
Mexico, and more dangerous sections of the Río Grande.”).
217. See id. at 134.
218. See id. (Changes in the location of border crossing for migrants may have contributed to
an evolution in their eventual area of settlement. “Not only were undocumented migrants deflected
away from traditional crossings, but once in the United States they kept on going.”).
219. See generally Adrian D. Pantoja et al., Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political
Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos, 54 POL. RES. Q. 729 (2001).
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of immigrants.220 These states also often received a substantial share of their
migrants in large, multiethnic cities rather than smaller towns and rural areas.
E. How Statutory, Organizational, and Macropolitical Factors Interact
As laws are interpreted by executive organizations, funded and overseen by
lawmakers, and discussed in the public sphere, each of these activities can interact
in significant ways and contribute to a larger explanation that could not be
provided by a more parsimonious account. We can see this by considering how
each set of factors leaves traces in the details of the immigration system, and how
each factor blocks some avenues for change that would remain open even if the
other two factors were present. Different statutory compromises could have
bequeathed to Americans a very different set of immigrants and labor market
responsibilities. The country caps and visa limits in the 1965 Act limited flexibility
to legally accommodate migrants from Latin America, and the IRCA compromise
carried within it the core of a system that engendered widespread political
backlash.
Holding constant the statutory framework, the status quo would also be
quite different with less organizational fragmentation. The creation of the DHS
and consequent three-way split of most immigration-related functions within the
DHS appears to have had some consequences for agency priorities and activities
(underscoring the reality that organizational changes have consequences).221
Fragmentation also changed agency incentives to address internal management
priorities and longer-term issues, such as the shortfall in funding for immigration
adjudication; these problems, in turn, further eroded support for the immigration
system among some constituents. And the entanglements of bureaucratic
jurisdiction and competing agency incentives further complicated presidential
control by raising the costs of implementing policy changes (which need to garner
a degree of support from multiple agencies, and can be modified or watered-down
by a greater number of partially independent entities); limited presidential control,
in turn, lowered each presidential administration’s capacity to affect the current
system through the use of enforcement discretion or parole.
In a different world, moreover, greater presidential control could mean some
use of humanitarian parole authority and explicit enforcement discretion to
address the status of the undocumented and to implement an alternative ex post
facto immigration scheme.222 Indeed, to the extent that smaller-scale

220. In California’s case, the experience with Proposition 187 itself may have accelerated the
shifting political climate. Cf. Matt A. Barreto & Ricardo Ramirez, Minority Participation and the California
Recall: Latino, Black, and Asian Voting Trends, 1990–2003, POL. SCI. POL. 11 (2004).
221. See, e.g., MEISSNER & KERWIN, supra note 140.
222. See Royce Bernstein Murray & Sarah Petrin Williamson, Migration as a Tool for Disaster
Recovery: A Case Study on U.S. Policy Options for Post-Earthquake Haiti (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working
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organizational innovations could make a difference (such as coordinated labor and
immigration enforcement that puts additional pressure on employers), they are
less likely to succeed and more costly because of organizational fragmentation
(e.g., disagreement between ICE and DOL, or between ICE and the CIS, or
competition over matters such as internal affairs investigative jurisdiction between
the CBP and ICE).
Finally, policymakers and the agencies shouldering responsibility for
executing immigration policy confronted an increasingly polarized and unforgiving
political context. Far from leaving agencies more capable of meeting public
demands, the combination of new statutory authority and budget decisions have
often left agencies in a more difficult position when it comes to meeting public
expectations for immigration enforcement. Note that the existence of resource
constraints relative to public expectations and agency goals would never entirely
extinguish discretion. In recent years, immigration officials have still confronted a
vastly greater number of removable individuals relative to their capacity to remove
and detain them. Moreover, internal agency problems such as those encountered
by the Obama Administration when seeking to focus the Secure Communities
effort would leave lower-level operators with some room to decide how to set
priorities. What the resource constraints do create, however, is pressure on agency
leaders to perfect administrative schemes allowing for the removal (even if
sometimes relatively free of careful screening) of larger numbers of individuals
while managing the costs. It is in that context that the much-maligned Secure
Communities effort developed in order to simplify the process of screening
individuals detained by state and local authorities. Because most undocumented
individuals are not detained, however, even the most sophisticated scheme faces
impossible odds in making anything more than a relatively minor dent on the
overall number of roughly ten million undocumented individuals in the United
States.223
At the same time, as larger numbers of immigrants—particularly from
Mexico—settled in the Southeast and other regions with little recent experience
receiving immigrants from Latin America, controversies over immigration became
more salient to the public. The growing interest in local measures helped mobilize
immigrants and their supporters, further raising the issue’s profile. As a
consequence, grand elite-driven bargains marrying legalization, changes in workrelated immigration of interest to employers, and enforcement were more
susceptible to destabilizing attacks galvanizing otherwise scarce public attention.
As Figure 2 illustrates, data on congressional hearings and Congressional Quarterly
Almanac articles suggest that major policy changes on immigration before the last
Paper No. 255, 2011) (discussing the potential economic and humanitarian impact of humanitarian
parole for the Haitian economy following the January 2011 earthquake).
223. See text accompanying notes 158–60 (discussing Secure Communities and the difficulties
faced by the Obama Administration in implementing substantive changes in the program’s operation).
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two decades were associated with less overall congressional activity and attention
to the immigration issue. These changes help explain the different political context
in which IRCA passed in 1986 with a large-scale legalization program, and how
immigration reform efforts strongly supported by presidential administrations
were more likely to trigger the ire of an engaged public in 2006, 2007, and 2009–
2010.
These political developments, of course, did not occur in a vacuum, and in
any event exogenous political changes do not tell the whole story of recent
immigration law. Growing political interest in immigration changes
policymakers’—and organized interests’—incentives to use aggressive rhetoric and
support approaches appealing to the growing fraction of the electorate that is
becoming interested in immigration. While a variety of additional factors
unquestionably affected immigration law in the decades since the landmark
passage of the 1965 INA amendments, a key element in modern immigration law’s
story is the process through which policy elites and the larger public have reacted
to each other amidst growing interest in immigration. On three occasions between
2006 and 2010, lawmakers, organized interests, and executive branch officials
made concerted efforts to pursue immigration reform.224 Advocates for reform
faced widespread and adverse public reactions.225 If immigration issues were less
prominent national political concerns or public reactions were less skeptical of the
federal role, lawmakers would have faced a different calculus almost certainly
favoring substantial immigration reforms. A different political context would also
change presidential and agency incentives to use ex post facto enforcement and
discretion, thereby potentially affecting the incentives of employers to comply
with existing laws or support further changes, and addressing other features of the
immigration system.
F. Why Public Responses Complicate Statutory Change
We can now reassemble the pieces of the puzzle. In part because of
politicians responding to public anger, particularly in the period since 1990,
Congress has indeed enacted laws that simultaneously expanded the removable
population (particularly through IIRIRA in 1996), ran the risk of keeping the
removable population in the United States through a ramp-up in border enforcement
disrupting circular migration, and raised public expectations that undocumented
aliens and lawful permanent residents involved in crimes would be removed. As
public frustration has grown, lawmakers have had increased incentives to propose

224. See Anthony Boadle, Obama Sees Early 2010 Start on Immigration Reform, REUTERS (Aug. 7,
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/07/us-obama-immigration-idUSTRE5765Y420090807
(discussing failed immigration reform efforts in 2006 and 2007).
225. See Aramark Facility Servs v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 530 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing reactions of policy elites and the mobilization of protest during the immigration reform
debates of 2007).
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further enforcement-oriented responsibilities, which have exacerbated the cycle
and lead to further rounds of lawmaking. Lawmakers not only failed to provide
increased resources to cope with these problems, they permitted a stark decline to
occur in resources for interior enforcement during the crucial years following
IRCA. Paradoxically, these trends have simultaneously exacerbated enforcement
challenges while engendering a powerful political backlash because of perceived
enforcement failures. And this, in a nutshell, is the backdrop for contested and
often divisive legal disputes regarding the implications of IRCA and employer
sanctions,226 the role of state and local laws in immigration enforcement,227 and
the operation of programs such as the Secure Communities initiative designed to
fulfill immigration authorities’ broadened responsibilities for enforcement.228
Why would greater public frustration and eroding legitimacy for immigration
law be an important feature of the status quo? More specifically, why would a
discredited immigration law make it harder to pass reforms? For one, other things
being equal, public frustration with perceived policy failures erodes trust in the
government’s capacity to perform such functions.229 Eroding trust almost certainly
increases the attractiveness of more drastic measures that send a message, raising
the likelihood that enforcement-oriented measures such as a larger border patrol
and fence construction would be enacted and supported, even if they do not
meaningfully address the underlying problem. With lawmakers from different
states interested in connecting with voters, public frustration about insufficient
enforcement is thus the fertile soil in which one-sided responses to immigration
policy develop. Without such frustration, it would be difficult to see how narrow
and costly policies that do not address the full scope of the problem would be as
likely to pass. In contrast, restructuring employer verification measures that could
have a large impact on millions is prone to attract greater opposition from
interests and stakeholders concerned about expansive federal labor market
regulation (particularly if it is not coupled with other elements of desired policies,
such as easier access to visas for high-skilled immigrants or a legalized workforce).
Moreover, public frustration probably interferes with more far-reaching
reforms in a variety of subtle ways. Widespread public disappointments with
federal regulation of immigration, even if sometimes engendered or exacerbated
by limited information, raises the public profile of the issue and makes it more
difficult for credible elite bargaining to occur. In addition, to the extent that some
more far-reaching changes depend on successfully selling to the public the idea
that new labor market regulations or enforcement measures will be successfully

226. See id.
227. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010).
228. See Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No.
10 Civ. 3488(SAS), 2011 WL 381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011).
229. See, e.g., Luke Keele, Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government, 51 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 241 (2007).
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implemented, more public frustration about the failures of existing enforcement
makes the sale more difficult. And swelling public skepticism of the immigration
system heightens the risk of entirely reopening the statutory bargains over
immigration; a frustrated public relatively angry about the immigration system
could entice lawmakers into supporting increasingly far-reaching statutory
changes, including restrictions on family-based immigration or new limits on
residents’ progression toward citizenship.
These concerns helped sink reform in 2007 despite the considerable
enthusiasm of many policy elites, including the President and his staff. Pivotal
senators had agreed on a framework but needed to resolve a variety of details,
such as how to operationalize the precise criteria to be used in allocating the
majority of immigrant visas in the new scheme. The devil proved not only to be in
the details, but in the social and political context at work while lawmakers and
staff rushed to work out those details. In a world where public attention had for
years increasingly focused on immigration, and Internet technology lowered the
cost and time required for organizing vigorous public responses, lawmakers faced
a vastly more politically treacherous environment in the tense hours and days
during which they were scrambling to nail down the details of the framework
agreement for a new immigration scheme.230 For all these reasons, we can expect
rising public frustration with the immigration status quo to contribute a great deal
to keeping it in place.
IV. IMPLICATIONS: IMMIGRATION LAW, POLICY CHANGE, AND THE
NATION-STATE
The preceding analysis shows how statutes and the organizations that
implement them play an outsized role in a country defined largely by its capacity
to weave immigrants into the fabric of its society. Our exploration of the current
system underscores that it is not entirely without merit and leaves some interested
parties better off than others. At the same time, many of its consequences are
both costly and poorly understood—including in particular diminished economic
opportunities, and a misallocation of resources relative to the country’s
overarching security concerns.
A focus on institutions, organizations, and statutes does not deny the
importance of dramatic, unexpected events such as the September 11 attacks.
Even if those attacks helped explain why the Bush Administration shelved its early
interest in comprehensive immigration reform, spurred immigration detentions,
and sought further legal changes at the intersection of immigration and national
230. See Julia Preston, Grass Roots Roared and Immigration Plan Fell, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at
A1 (“[T]he legislation sparked a furious rebellion among many Republican and even some
Democratic voters, who were linked by the Internet and encouraged by radio talk show hosts. Their
outrage and activism surged to full force after Senator Jon Kyl, the Arizona Republican who was an
author of the bill, suggested early this week that support for the measure seemed to be growing.”).
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security law, the impact of such exogenous shocks on immigration law plays out
against the backdrop of longer-term trends and institutional realities.231 We have
seen, for example, how the increase in border enforcement resources was on a
steady upward trend well over a decade before September. Similarly, the expansive
removal authority that characterizes much of immigration enforcement today was
largely created by statutory changes in the mid-1990s.
To assess the implications of immigration law’s institutional roots, this Part
begins by connecting the preceding story of institutional constraints in
immigration to broader themes involving legal and policy change in the United
States. It then develops the idea that the American experience with immigration
law may ultimately harbor larger implications involving national capacity to affect
cross-border flows—particularly among relatively powerful states with a
recognized ability to shape their broader context. Nation-states are the defining
feature of our modern legal architecture. As developed below, their relevance to
each other, and to the lives of individuals throughout the world, depends more
than commonly acknowledged on bureaucratic safety valves managing the costs
and benefits of legal commitments that may, for extended periods, appear to be
worth accepting.
A. (Negative) Policy Feedback, (Non)Delegation, and Implementation
Modern immigration law is almost certainly a poor vehicle for serving the
interests of most Americans. But a variety of simple accounts, rooted in
conventional or institutional corruption,232 or in a lack of public concern about
immigration issues,233 also falls short when it comes to explaining the situation
facing immigration judges, lawyers, agencies, and the public. Subtler dynamics are
at work, connecting statutory schemes, organizations, and the larger public.
Earlier, I noted that American immigration law is in some respects a study in what
political scientists have called “policy feedback,” or the process through which
legal and policy changes create new political conditions. The progression
developed here—from statutory contradictions and implementation difficulties, to
harsh legislative and public reactions, and to further statutory and implementation

231. See Michelle Mittelstadt et al., Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration Policy
and Program Changes in the Decade Since 9/11, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE: IMMIGRATION FACTS
(2011). While the authors conclude that “the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have molded an
immigration system that is dominated by security and border-control considerations,” id. at 12, they
also conclude that a variety of changes, including increases in worksite enforcement, electronic
employment eligibility verification, and the rise in expedited removals were not changes “directly
flowing from 9/11.” Id. at 2.
232. Lawrence Lessig, Democracy After Citizens United, BOS. REV., Sept./Oct. 2010, at 11–29.
233. Cf. Kathleen A. Dolan & Thomas M. Holbrook, Knowing Versus Caring: The Role of Affect
and Cognition in Political Perceptions, 22 POL. PSYCHOL. 27, 28–30 (2001) (explaining how emotional,
affective responses can drive political perceptions, and discussing how affect differs depending on the
issue).
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problems—is in some respects quite distinct from the typical policy feedback
narrative.
To understand the distinctions, recall that the conventional policy feedback
story tends to be more focused on stakeholder and civil society reactions, spurred
by policy changes that foment some mix of social organizing, coalition-building,
and complementary-policy changes that further entrench the original statute.234 It
is easy to see how policy entrepreneurs aspire to unleash such a cycle; it should be
just as clear that nothing guarantees its success. Recently, Eric Patashnik and
Julian Zelizer explained why this literature needs to better contend with the limits
of policy feedback—including among others potentially poorly timed or
insufficient institutional (organizational or financial) resources.235
While the argument here bears some relationship to the policy feedback
literature (including the ideas emphasizing the limits of policy feedback advanced
by Patashnik and Zelizer), it stands out in at least two respects. First, the focus is
on the entrenchment of a statutory regime bereft of support (and indeed, in some
respects all the more entrenched because the lack of support generates political
consequences that exacerbate the difficulty of changing the status quo). Second,
the focus is on the consequences of the statutory regime that arise as a result of
enforcement and implementation. By placing the present argument in the broader
context of the policy feedback literature, we can illuminate some underappreciated
ways in which statutes and their enforcement shape the political context, which in
turn makes some chunks of existing law more difficult to change and exacerbates
changes in other areas.
In effect, the legacy of modern immigration law spawns a species of policy
feedback that is created by a heavily maligned and poorly executed mechanism for
interior enforcement, a political economy favoring attention to and growth in
border enforcement (without fundamental changes in interior enforcement
directed toward employers), and an increasingly engaged public. As we have seen,
these factors ironically make changes to a poorly functioning system more
difficult.236 With immigration law, entrenchment grows in the sense of the
regime’s staying power, not because of growing support but for exactly the
opposite reason—a state of affairs that almost certainly contributes to eroding

234. See, e.g., Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause, supra note 89.
235. See Eric M. Patashnik & Julian E. Zelizer, When Policy Does Not Remake Politics: The Limits of
Policy Feedback (December 10–11, 2010) (unpublished paper), http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/News_&_Events/Patashnik-Zelizer_YaleLawConference_2010.pdf.
236. One consequence of the impediments to changes in immigration law may be to slow
down the pace and process through which immigration leads to demographic shifts among voters,
thereby disrupting the cycle through which immigration has historically impacted the democratic
process. For an example of how immigration affects (sometimes in subtle ways) the democratic
process, see generally ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 10 (discussing the coalition between economic
interests and “recent ethnics” made possible by immigration flows). For an account of how policy
feedback could bear a relationship to demographic change, see Hochschild, supra note 175.
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trust for policymakers and greater interest in measures ill-suited to address the
problem in question.
These entrenchment dynamics, in turn, have a variety of consequences that
begin with the nation’s approaches to border enforcement policy. The border
buildup is an example of how a system can become partially locked-in even as
policy change continues to occur. Even the recent changes in border security
(when combined with new rules since the mid-1990s governing the ease with
which individuals can be removed) constitute fairly stark changes in policy. What
this evolution has not accomplished is to drastically modify the overall architecture
of the system. Thus, stark increases in border enforcement capacity appear to be
leading many undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States longer,
thereby playing a role in driving up, or at least keeping high, existing totals of
undocumented migrants.237
Sociologists studying this population have documented a relatively
widespread historical pattern of circular migration involving Mexican
undocumented immigrants. Before the stark changes in border security policy set
in motion by the early 1990s, undocumented individuals of Mexican origin
routinely returned to Mexico with the intention of subsequently reentering the
United States. Some of these individuals, however, though initially planning to
return to Mexico temporarily, ultimately decide to remain in Mexico. More
recently, scholars describe a predictable and growing unwillingness of many such
undocumented migrants to leave the United States for fear of being unable to
exercise the de facto (though not the de jure) option of returning. This pattern
almost certainly helps explain the persistently large size of the undocumented
population in the United States in the years since the border enforcement rampup, and showcases some of the subtle and potentially perverse links between
border enforcement and the scope of domestic enforcement activities.238
Furthermore, the border buildup appears to have had a relatively meager
impact on the architecture of interior enforcement. Its limited (though
consequential) effects on patterns of illicit migration are not enough to change the
larger context of the situation the country faces on immigration.239 Prospects for

237. See Massey, supra note 114, at 136 (discussing disruptions in circular migration).
238. See id.
239. Despite the ramp-up in border enforcement and in immigration-related criminal
prosecution, some recent research suggests these factors have only weak effects on the ultimate
willingness of migrants to illegally cross the deadly terrain on the border. See generally The Impacts of
Border Enforcement on Unauthorized Mexican Migration to the United States: Field Hearing on Immigration in San
Diego, California Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Wayne A.
Cornelius, Director, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at University of California-San
Diego), available at http://www.bibdaily.com/pdfs/Cornelius%20testimony%208-2-0 6.pdf (showing
through interviews with migrants that tightened border enforcement in urban areas has not halted
unauthorized immigrants from entering the United States, and discussing complex, potentially
perverse consequences from heightened border enforcement).
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more substantial change probably depend on disrupting some of the
circumstances holding the larger statutory scheme in place, including the relative
lack of interest from many businesses in changing laws that many of them often
ignore, because these laws are only partially, if ever, enforced.240 Nor will much of
the public be likely to support larger changes in immigration without confidence
that the resulting legal arrangements will be more routinely and effectively
enforced than the status quo.
In the meantime, public frustration with immigration will spur more state
and local lawmakers to take action.241 While local immigration power is sharply
limited, particularly by federal statutes, existing law does leave room for some
exercises of local control on this issue.242 The evolution of the doctrine here leaves
states and localities with some choices about their involvement—choices not
entirely limited by the INA, judicial interpretations of it, or even other aspects of
federal immigration law. It is difficult to envision a scenario involving substantially
fewer efforts by state and local authorities to affect immigration policy without
substantial changes in the federal scheme. Put simply, agencies given all but
impossible tasks are hard-pressed to earn the measure of broad public support and
legitimacy capable of forestalling local frustration and national disapproval.
Widespread cynicism about a bureau’s mission is hardly an inspiring
outcome for agency officials. Many agencies within the executive branch are not
powerless in managing the threat of such negative policy feedback.243 They can
sometimes water down substantive requirements to avoid blatant noncompliance,
in an effort to reframe public discussion regarding their efficacy in achieving
popular goals. The implementation of the Adam Walsh Act, a new federal
initiative designed to leverage federal resources in an effort to change states’
supervision of sex offenders, is one example of how the gap between aspirations
and compliance can engender discussion of whether substantive requirements
should be made more permissive.244 In other cases, agencies can dramatically
240. See, e.g., Hannah Clark, The Business of Immigration Reform, FORBES (May 5, 2006, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2006/05/04/holzer-immigration-reform-cx_hc_0505QandA.html (noting
that businesses are not clamoring for immigration reform because “it’s not clear what benefits
business will get out of it, because business benefits a lot from the status quo, [and] from relatively
unlimited access to cheap labor”).
241. See, e.g., Michael W. Savage, 3 Other States Weighing Tough Immigration Bills, WASH. POST,
July 8, 2010, at A4; Arizona-Style Immigration Bills Emerge in New Legislative Sessions, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan.
29, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/29/arizona-style-immigration-bills-emergenew-state-legislatures.
242. See, e.g., Memorandum from Teresa Wynn Roseborough, the Office of Legal Counsel,
Assistance by State & Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens: Memorandum Opinion for the
U.S. Att’y, Southern Dist. of Cal. (Feb. 5, 1996).
243. In this context, the term “negative” refers to a cycle that is capable of contributing to the
erosion of support for a legal scheme.
244. See generally Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative
Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993 (2010) (discussing compliance-related challenges associated
with the Adam Walsh Act, and the role that more realistic compliance requirements could play in
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change prophylactic measures or penalty provisions, thus creating new incentives
to spur greater compliance even when faced with constrained resources.245
These scenarios depend to a large degree on the extent of legislative
delegations to agencies. Such delegations tend to be commonplace in conventional
regulatory contexts. In those situations, lawmakers delegate considerable (though
not infinite) authority to agencies to administer in accordance with one or more
broad considerations that often allow administrators to consider the dilemmas of
implementation. Most of the immigration landscape is better described as a
domain of far more limited, or even nondelegation. Neither agencies nor the
President have meaningful control over the overall visa allocation scheme or the
number of visas.246 Outside some fairly circumscribed bounds,247 agencies also
have a limited capacity to change the regulatory structure governing the
enforcement of employer sanctions, either by starkly increasing penalties or
addressing state-of-mind requirements through substantive changes or
prophylactic rules.248
Although the relative rigidity of immigration law bears further scrutiny, it is
almost certainly born from a congressional conclusion regarding the political
complexity of a multidimensional issue that implicates social policy, labor markets,
and security-related debates. With an issue harboring such complexity, broad
delegations of authority may be unlikely to insulate Congress from adverse
political reactions for agency decisions—thereby altering some of the incentives
for lawmakers to delegate authority in the first place.249 The result leaves agencies
boosting state-level policy changes in the registration and supervision of sex offenders).
245. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 693–98 (2003) (discussing USDA and
FDA Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) regulations as an example of “managementbased” regulations); Margaret O’K. Glavin, HACCP: We’ve Only Just Begun, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
137, 138–39 (2001) (describing the structure of prophylactic HACCP food safety regulatory rules, and
their initial apparent successes since implementation in the U.S. food regulatory context).
246. The executive branch does have some limited leeway in defining the scope of particular
visa categories, and the longstanding compromise that governs the allocation of refugee visas.
Furthermore, this allocation does involve a proposal from the executive branch to the legislature
regarding the number of visas that the administration proposes to make available in any given year.
These authorities are quite limited relative to the ability of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to
reshape the food safety regulatory environment that governs meat, poultry, and egg processing
establishments.
247. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Chertoff, 552 F. Supp. 2d 999 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing
ICE’s effort to use data from the Social Security Administration to issue “no-match” letters for
certain employers).
248. For some examples of agencies implementing prophylactic requirements to advance
substantive regulatory goals, see, for example, Proposed Rules: Department of Labor, Mine Safety
and Health Administration—Pattern of Violations, 76 Fed. Reg. 5719 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at
30 C.F.R. pt. 104); Rules and Regulations: Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection
Service–E. coli O157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 62325 (Oct. 7, 2002) (to be
codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 417).
249. See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS (1999)
(discussing the dynamics of congressional choices to delegate policymaking authority to executive
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less capable of managing implementation dilemmas, including the potential for
negative policy feedback dynamics that erode agencies’ legitimacy over time.
True, agencies and the White House can play an important role in deciding
on the allocation of scarce enforcement resources or the content of new
immigration policy initiatives. As we have seen, however, the cauldron of law and
politics that defines immigration goes a long way toward tying the hands of the
executive branch.250 This perspective stands in some contrast to the conclusions
of Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez in their recent work on the presidency and
immigration. Their illuminating account offers a useful historical perspective on
the presidential role in immigration, highlighting in particular the long precedent
for substantial presidential involvement in immigration policymaking through the
use of inherent or delegated powers. My account, however, highlights the
somewhat more constrained nature of presidential power in recent decades. Some
of these constraints simply reflect the congressional reluctance to delegate broader
formal authority over immigration to either agencies or the President,251 given a
“polarizing implementation” dynamic, and the extent to which this is explained by
legal rules and institutional constraints rather than administrative procedures or
explicit discretionary choices. The ideas developed here show how organizations,
statutes, and political responses interact to shape the direction of the law. In

agencies); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice
Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006).
250. Cox and Rodríguez make a number of interesting arguments about the presidency and
immigration law. They note that historically, legal doctrines that govern immigration not only
recognize Congress’s power to regulate migration, but also a robust (and perhaps unique) role for the
President, stemming from foreign affairs powers and legal domains “incident” to the United States’
status as a sovereign nation. In fact, notwithstanding the increasingly widespread view that
congressional power is preeminent in immigration, the history of the Bracero program and the
treatment of Caribbean migrants reflects a high degree of presidential control of immigration policy
(particularly through the ex post facto regulation of removal). Expansions in the size of the removable
population have exacerbated the trend towards presidential power (in a manner similar to what
appears to have occurred in the context of criminal law, as substantive criminal law has expanded to
cover a growing proportion of conduct). Ex post discretion, however, does have drawbacks—such as
the executive branch’s lack of capacity to change the criteria for admission of lawful immigrants, or
the association of illegality and immigration among voters who may perceive discretionary
enforcement choices as essentially condoning illicit activity. Accordingly, there is a case to be made in
support of more expansive delegations of ex ante screening power to the executive branch. See
generally Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 483–519 (arguing that the President’s authority to screen
immigrants through enforcement decisions creates an asymmetry that has consequences which
Congress could address by formally giving the President the power to adjust quotas and admission
criteria).
251. Leave aside for present purposes the extent to which the President can or should play a
preeminent role in deciding how authority explicitly delegated to executive departments should be
exercised. Compare Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (arguing against presidential assumption of responsibility for, and
assertion of control over, regulatory decisionmaking), with Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (concluding that presidential control of many regulatory actions is
defensible on accountability and pragmatic efficiency grounds).
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contrast, legal scholars and lawyers sometimes play down the role of public
reactions,252 and political scientists who study policy feedback rarely focus on the
potentially critical role of legal implementation in shaping responses.253
B. Nation-States and the Control of Cross-Border Flows
The story of America’s recent immigration law also shows how much nationstates’ capacity to control transnational forces depends on the organization of
their laws and public agencies, not on macrolevel national decisions that
implement themselves automatically. Powerful nation-states can control some of
the forces affecting immigration. They run risks if they overestimate what they can
control, however, as this can trigger polarizing implementation, use up resources
that could have more useful effects, reduce willingness to accept migration that
can serve as a safety valve relieving pressure for unauthorized migration, and
signal ineffectiveness to domestic and external players. Ultimately, what they are
able to control depends on the organization of their laws and public agencies, not
on macrolevel national decisions that implement themselves automatically.
Taking a different tack focused on the changing nature of cross-border
flows, some scholarly observers increasingly question how much the United States
can control patterns of immigration activity.254 Yet immigration policy does
explicitly and implicitly shape the direction and global position of the United
States, a uniquely vast immigrant democracy. Consider just a few examples:
(1) U.S. immigration policy changes helped spur substantial downward pressure
on visa admissions to the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
(2) Immigration policy changes affect the number of refugees admitted to the U.S.
and the terms of their admission. (3) As we have seen, while a variety of factors
affect patterns of immigration from Mexico, U.S. policy changes in implementing
the law (including, for example, the dramatic increases in the Border Patrol
coupled with open-ended discretionary provisions facilitating removal) are
associated with rising smuggler fees. (4) U.S. immigration policy affects the flow of
legal immigrants, the mix of family- and employment-based immigrants, and
therefore the future makeup of the American electorate (as well as the capacity of
the United States to continue attracting talented, innovative individuals to the
country).
252. For example, Richard Stewart’s classic treatment of the evolving character of American
administrative law has relatively little to say about the role of the mass public in precipitating or
otherwise impacting the changes he described. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
253. See, e.g., Pierson, Increasing Returns, supra note 88. Pierson’s otherwise illuminating overview
of major mechanisms for policy feedback does not devote significant attention to the role of
bureaucracies responsible for implementing statutes and their potential for shaping the
implementation process through interpretive and administrative choices.
254. See Massey, supra note 114 (discussing North American integration and the difficulty of
managing migration).
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True, state power to police migration flows across a vast border is not
without its limits. Those limits are starkly apparent in an advanced industrialized
country that shares nearly 1000 miles of border, and strong economic and social
ties, with a developing nation that is experiencing substantial emigration pressures.
Yet the focus on allegedly inexorable human movements runs the risk of
understating the practical and human impact of immigration and border
policymaking, even in a country such as the United States. The degree of activity
by interest groups and throughout civil society more generally that is aimed at
shaping immigration policy reflects the stakes riding on the substance and
implementation of immigration law. Choices about immigration law at the border
over the past thirty years have had striking consequences for the choices of many
immigrants, including how much risk of death or serious injury to assume.255
Policy responses to change the degree of interior enforcement allocate costs and
benefits to migrants, employers, and others. Meanwhile, a substantial and
continuing gap exists between the number of people who emigrate to the United
States (lawfully or not) and those who reportedly want to—a gap reflected not
only in long queues for visas in some countries but also in the willingness of
would-be illicit migrants to pay increasingly high sums to evade border controls.256
Ironically, it is the government’s meaningful, if limited, capacity to regulate
immigration that generates the dilemma of how to control flows of migrants.
Instead of showcasing regulatory futility, these outcomes reflect something subtly
different—a mix of considerable state efficacy hamstrung by political and
implementation constraints. By showcasing the significance of interactions
between enforcement choices and public reactions in a pluralist democracy, the
evolution of the INA and its enforcement emphasizes how much nation-states’
capacity to control transnational forces depends on the organization of their laws
and public agencies, not on macrolevel national decisions that implement
themselves automatically. Valuable insights emerge from a variety of crisp
analytical models of immigration policymaking, including among others
Treibilcock’s account of optimal immigration policy, and Cox and Posner’s
analysis of the “second-order” structure of immigration law.257 These insights
should be applied with caution, however, as the presence of political interference
and implementation constraints can limit a more abstract model’s explanatory

255. See Cornelius, supra note 46.
256. See supra note 48 (discussing the impact of implementation changes, including changes in
the price of border-crossing and the proportion of migrants using ports of entries); see also Mexican
Migration Project, Graph 1: Border Crossing Costs (U.S. Dollars adjusted to 2011-CPI), available at
http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/001costs-en.aspx.
257. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 809 (2007); Michael J. Trebilcock & Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy of Emigration and
Immigration, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234, 235 (2006) (assuming that “emigration and immigration states
both implement policies aimed at maximizing their domestic social welfare”).
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power and policy implications.258 Indeed, constraints and implementation
problems are everywhere in immigration law. They confront the President in
deciding how (or how much) to enforce immigration provisions. They confront
agency headquarters in disciplining field offices with their own ideas about how
aggressively to enforce immigration laws. They confront lawmakers who are
designing policies that pivot on ambiguous information, or on unrealistic degrees
of compliance from the public.
CONCLUSION
As the United States is a self-described nation of immigrants, it is perhaps
fitting that immigration law’s far-reaching consequences touch such a vast number
of lives. The legal allocation of citizenship and migration opportunities touches
hardworking and occasionally undocumented college students whose parents held
their tiny hands when they arrived in the United States. It leaves engineers and
doctors in the clutches of interminable queues for permanent residence that would
have startled even Kafka. Through its own structure and its subtle effects on the
international policymaking process, immigration law profoundly affects people
around the world who dream of moving to an advanced industrialized country and
believe they have a plausible legal basis for doing so. Among those with seats at
the table in the national conversation about the fate of immigration law are
millions of ordinary Americans who do not know a great deal about immigration
but nonetheless have an opinion about it and feel (even if indirectly and not in a
manner they can fully articulate) they are subject to its effects. They confront a
system that is neither particularly coherent organizationally nor especially rational,
but rather one forged in fits and starts over many decades, slow to change, and
riddled with internal contradictions.
This Article explored the deep institutional forces contributing to those
contradictions. Immigration law remains uniquely important because it continues
to address foundational questions about the constitution of a national community.
In the process, that scheme simultaneously allocates benefits and burdens to
millions of people and the groups who represent them.259 This uniqueness has not
gone unnoticed in judicial opinions that address matters such as the relationship
between national sovereignty and immigration,260 and plays its part in the
preceding analysis. At the same time, while my focus is on the recent structure and

258. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV.
857 (2007).
259. See supra Part II.A; see also ZOLBERG, supra note 24 (discussing the capacity of immigration
law to shape economic benefits and burdens along with the cultural character of communities).
260. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted
maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”).
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staying power of immigration law, the case study also sheds light on more general
questions, such as how statutes and the organizations that implement them affect
each other as well as the public, and how nation-states wield scarce but meaningful
power in a changing world.
In shedding light on those questions my account shows how, for all its
distinctiveness, immigration law is not unique in two crucial respects. First, the
substantive core of immigration law reflects a continuing entanglement between
normative aspirations (concerning values such as orderly continuing flows of
immigrants, family unity, and a relatively unimpeded path from legal residence to
citizenship) and the realities of pluralist politics—where political and legal actors
that harbor competing goals repeatedly engaged in conflict and bargaining to
shape an often-contradictory statutory core. Second, the relevance of immigration
law—constituting an elaborate regulatory scheme—is largely forged through an
implementation process fraught with fragmented agency players, limits in
organizational capacity, and public frustration. Both of these features help us
address the puzzle of why Americans are burdened by a self-defeating system that
has few supporters and almost no defenders.
By investigating the entrenchment of immigration law in this larger
institutional context, the Article makes several scholarly contributions.
Conceptually, my analysis shows the importance of interactions between three
distinct but related political economies affecting modern American immigration
law—statutory bargains driven by accommodation among organized interests,
organizational practices reflecting a fragmented cast of bureaucratic players and
increasingly weak presidential control, and public attitudes reflecting social
developments as well as reactions to each of the first two political economies. An
example of how these domains interact is found in what I have described as
polarizing implementation: where lawmakers face a nearly irresistible temptation to
ratchet up border enforcement and internal agency responsibilities while feeding
increasingly ambitious public expectations that agencies fail to satisfy. Lawmakers
thus contribute to swelling public expectations while doing little more than
tinkering with a system incapable of meeting those expectations.
With fragmented agencies burdened by statutory compromises carrying out
their missions, the agencies’ relationships to lawmakers, interest groups, and the
public also shed light on the broader dynamics of statutory entrenchment. On the
one hand, the Civil Rights Act, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the
Goldwater-Nickles Defense Department reforms are examples of statutory
schemes that developed a far-reaching network of roots linking organized
interests, civil servants, lawmakers, and public perceptions while fostering
increasing perceptions of public legitimacy.261 Not so with immigration, where the
story shows how statutory schemes can also become essentially glued to an
261.

Cf. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 12.
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unattractive status quo that is bereft of public legitimacy, through a similar
entanglement of players and perceptions blocking virtually every practical avenue
for changing that status quo. In the case of immigration, the increasingly shrill
responses to a rickety scheme originally born from expansive and unrealistic
promises have also engendered strong and growing constraints on presidential
control of immigration policy. In particular, my argument underscores the
relatively limited control the President can achieve over internal immigration
enforcement given the aforementioned polarizing implementation dynamic, and
the significance of legal rules and institutional constraints instead of administrative
procedures or explicit discretionary choices in explaining this.
Finally, my account underscores how IRCA and similarly significant
immigration law changes were easier to achieve than the major immigration
reforms proposed in 2006, 2007, and 2009–2010, all of which were supported by
presidential administrations, powerful stakeholders, and substantial segments of
the general population. In contrast, earlier reforms benefited from lower public
salience, a more supportive interest group context, and a system not burdened by
the legacy of a major statutory scheme built to fail.
Some aspects of that system are undoubtedly shaped by the broader arc of
American history. But the regulatory bargains struck since the 1980s had powerful
consequences for agency officials, immigration adjudicators, Article III judges, and
millions of people every day. Changes from the status quo, in turn, depend on the
intersecting political economies of lawmaking, implementation, and public
responses that now drive much of what immigration law has become. In light of
these dynamics, perhaps hard-fought statutory or implementation changes could
change the costs of the status quo for organized interests with a stake in
immigration policy. Perhaps policy changes increasing the public’s perceptions of
immigration policy’s efficacy and legitimacy could gradually lower the issue’s
profile and increase the electorate’s inclination to support broader changes in the
federal role. No doubt further demographic change will also continue to shape the
political context in which immigration laws are written and evaluated.262
An evaluation of the present state of the law, however, yields a disquieting
picture. At the center of it is an emerging cycle of eroding public legitimacy and
polarized public responses. That cycle renders more difficult the statutory and
administrative changes that promise greater coherence in immigration law, and
raises at least the prospect of endangering amidst swelling public frustration key,
longstanding features of American immigration law, including the relatively large
number of legal immigrants admitted each year and their routine access (after
several years) to citizenship. Still, while this interplay of statutory law,

262. See generally Hochschild, supra note 175 (discussing the potential of demographic change to
drive developments in immigration policy even as it increases the risk of short-term political conflict
over immigration and related issues).
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implementation, and public responses reveals much about American pluralism,
nothing in this account traces its roots to immutable features of American history
or even the inviolable internal logic of nation-states. Instead, the most recent
chapters in the story of how Americans regulate our national community harbor at
their core an irony of laws that simultaneously engender exceedingly high public
aspirations while making it all but impossible for agencies to live up to them.

